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Abstract: 
 
Post 1997, the New Labour administration wanted to foster innovation in local 
government to reduce bureaucracy and modernise the public sector - part of the 
Local Government Modernisation Agenda (LGMA).  One keystone of that 
agenda was to introduce a power of first resort for local government (DCLG, 
2008).  Authorities could regard this power as a license to offer creative and 
innovative solutions to local problems, to engage in any function that did not 
break the law.  New Labour’s new discretionary power was called the Power of 
Well-Being.  Despite central government’s aspiration, evidence shows that less 
than a fifth of local authorities have used the Power of Well-Being.  This thesis 
provides a comparative investigation across four local authorities into their use 
of the Power of Well-Being.  The aim of this research is to assess the impact of 
the Power of Well-Being on local authorities’ autonomy, their attitudes towards 
discretionary power and local authority officers’ attitudes towards risk.  From the 
four case study authorities, it was clear that the attitude of senior officers - and 
the culture of an organisation - was the greatest determinant of whether to 
engage the Power of Well-Being.  The research found that the role of legal 
officers and the attitude of senior officers or members is crucial in the 
successful engagement of discretionary legal power.  In local authority’s that 
are devoid of cultural ambition within the organisation, risk averse legal officers 
acted as ‘gatekeepers’ to block usage of the Power of Well-Being.  Where an 
organisational culture of ambition does not exist, the withdrawal of discretionary 
funding tends to limit the level of engagement in discretionary activity.  
However, where stability occurs there is a greater likelihood of discretionary 
activity.  The implication of this research on a future discretionary power, and 
local government’s autonomy, is that the most significant hindrance to the 
success of a discretionary power would be officers’ and members’ attitudes.  
The Power of Well-Being technically enabled authorities to break from tradition 
to engage beyond their traditional boundaries; in practise, this was not the case.  
Successful engagement in discretionary activity would require officers and 
members to be fully aware of the practicalities of use of a discretionary power.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction:  The Power of Well-Being and Local 
Government Autonomy in Contemporary Britain 
 
“I recall serving on a national executive sub-committee in the 1980s and 
discussing what a new Labour Government would do for local democracy 
- we were doing that because the huge rows about rate capping and the 
abolition of the county councils had taken place. My right honourable 
friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) was on the same working 
party. Many of us thought then that a general competence power should 
be given to local authorities - I still think that - but he came up with this 
stunning argument: if there were such a power, what would there be to 
prevent Islington from making an atom bomb? I do not know why he 
chose to use Islington in that absurd example, but if seriously intelligent 
and respected people such as he come out with absurd arguments such 
as that, there really is no argument against giving a general competence 
power to local authorities.  Unless local authorities have the ability to do 
things unless they are specifically prohibited from doing them, the 
converse of that will occur and there will be regular interference in very 
important local matters - beyond those relating to public conveniences - 
that are better determined locally.” 
Graham Stringer MP 
HC Deb 13 October 2009 c202-203 
 
This thesis explores the range of factors which have encouraged or inhibited 
Local Authorities usage of the Power of Well-Being (PoWB), as contained in the 
Local Government Act 2000, and assesses how activities in this area inform our 
understanding of the emergence of a more active form of localism.  The aim of 
the PoWB was to “replace the presumption of ultra vires with a new power for 
well-being which allows councils to undertake any activity that promotes the 
well-being of their area, except where they are specifically restricted from doing 
so” (HoC, 2002).  
 
“The Government wanted to create self-confident councils, acting as 
community leaders - changing the role of councillors to become 
advocates of their constituents rather than the defenders of current 
practice and sometimes poor service provision. In particular Part I of 
2000 Act introduced a new power to promote social, economic and 
environmental well-being. This was explicitly intended to strengthen 
councils' responsibility for, and ability to respond to, the distinctive needs 
of their communities." 
 (HoC, 2002) 
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The thesis aims to provide one of the first academic investigations into the use 
of the PoWB, capturing both the attitudes towards the PoWB in local authorities, 
and assessing the efforts made by local government to promote the well-being 
of local residents.  It will also explore local authorities’ attitude towards wider 
discretionary power and the perception of senior local officers of the nature of 
local autonomy.  This aim will be accomplished by meeting the following 
objectives: 
 
 To critically analyse the existing literature on central-local relations, and 
establish the contemporary focus on ‘New Localism’ after 1997. 
 To explore how the concept of local government autonomy can provide a 
coherent approach to our understanding of the use of the PoWB. 
 To develop an understanding on the usage of the PoWB by collecting 
original data from local and national perspectives.   
 To analyse the future of the wider local well-being agenda given the 
change in Central Government, and with regard to the impact of likely 
cuts in public expenditure. 
 To develop a contemporary typology of British local government to help 
distinguish between different attitudes towards discretionary activity.  
 
This chapter will provide an overview of the origins underpinning this research, 
the philosophical context of the topic, discussion of the principal issues 
involved, outline an expected hypothesis and summarize the local – and 
national – context of the research.  This chapter will end with a guide to the 
structure of the thesis.   
 
Origin of the research 
 
Since the electoral landslide, and election of New Labour, in 1997, a range of 
legislation has been passed to modernise local government; this was part of the 
Local Government Modernisation Agenda (LGMA).  The main purposes of the 
LGMA was to promote democratic accountability amongst local authority 
elected members, reduce bureaucracy and devolve authority to local 
government (Midwinter, 2001; Copus, 2007; Wilson and Game, 2006; Sullivan, 
2006, 2007; Mason and McMahon, 2008).  In 2000, the New Labour 
government passed the Local Government Act which created a duty for local 
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authorities to develop a strategy to promote the well-being of the local people, 
the area and those other people resident in the area (Great Britain.  Local 
Government Act 2000:sc.4).  It also created a new discretionary power for local 
authorities, the PoWB – (Great Britain.  Local Government Act 2000: sc.2).  
With its origins in the 1997 New Labour General Election manifesto, the PoWB 
was meant to represent an enabling power for local government.  That is to say, 
the PoWB would enable local authorities to intervene in non-traditional areas 
and conduct extra-statutory activity.  In 2002, oral evidence from the Society of 
Local Authority Chief Executives to the Department for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions Select Committee reflected on the limited adoption 
of the PoWB highlighting:  
 
"These powers were welcomed by local authorities but we are concerned 
that Part I of the Act may have lost its way both in the short term and in 
the longer term. It needs to be re-launched in a more meaningful way ... 
We have heard little since its launch as to how - or even if - it is being 
used. Although its introduction was accompanied by guidance notes of 
various kinds, for many legal advisors in local government that launch 
was a false dawn. At some point its ambiguous form together with 
experience of its use by practitioners needs to be reviewed. Doing so 
would then allow for a re-launch. Without such a re-launch, we suspect it 
will start to gather dust on the shelves of cautious local government 
lawyers. It is felt that a more rigorous approach to co-ordinate the use of 
these powers needs to be taken." 
(HoC, 2002) 
 
Midwinter (2001) highlights the PoWB as a ‘milestone’ in the LGMA.  It 
enshrined local government’s community leadership role in legislation (DCLG, 
2008b), and was one element of a legislative agenda designed to realise ‘New 
Localism’.  New Localism could be characterised as a method of decentralising 
power away from central government and towards local government – within a 
framework of agreed minimum standards (Stoker, 2004).  However, the mix 
between rhetoric and reality – between new localism and genuine local 
autonomy – remains obscure.  Stoker reflects that New Localism embodies: 
 
“a practical response to a significant practical challenge: how to manage 
a substantial variety of state service provision and interventions in a 
world that defies the application of simple rule-driven solutions and often 
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requires an effective response from the recipient of the service or 
intervention in order for the state action to work.” 
(Stoker, 2004: p.118) 
 
Importantly, Stoker highlights the distinction on the emphasis on New Localism 
was not “a romantic return to community decision making or rampant beggar thy 
neighbour localism” (Stoker, 2004: p.118).  The PoWB represents one element 
of the LGMA, as part of a wider review to create a more balanced system of 
multi-level governance (Jessop, 2004; Stoker, 2000, 2004).  The PoWB clause 
grants local government the discretionary legal authority “to have power to do 
anything which they consider is likely to achieve any one or more of the 
following objects – 
 
a) The promotion or improvement of the economic well-being of their area, 
b) The promotion or improvement of the social well-being of their area, and 
c) The promotion or improvement of the environmental well-being of their 
area.” 
(Great Britain. Local Government Act 2000: sc.2:1) 
 
The PoWB also allows local authorities to act for the benefit of the whole or part 
of the local area, or all or any persons resident or present in the local authority 
area (Great Britain. Local Government Act 2000: sc2:2).  Stoker highlights that 
“there are differences of emphasis amongst government ministers about how to 
take forward the New Localist agenda” (Stoker, 2004: p. 117).  A similar 
distinction could be applied to local authority officers and members regarding 
interpretation of the PoWB; however a much broader question is whether local 
government officers and elected members accepted the role of the PoWB as a 
power of first resort.   
 
Whilst the intention was that the PoWB would represent an enabling power, the 
New Labour Government argued that the PoWB offered a power of first resort 
to local government.  That is to say, local authorities need look no further than 
the PoWB when looking for legal authority for a specific function or project.  
However, the PoWB did not change the existing legal arrangement.  Although 
academics have acknowledged that the PoWB did ‘ease the legal shackles’ 
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restricting local government discretionary action (Wilson and Game, 2006; 
Braybrook, 2008; Eaton, 2009), local government remains constrained by the 
ultra vires principle.  The ultra vires principle states that, unlike individuals, local 
government can only carry out those functions that statue explicitly permits.  
Whereas an individual can do anything unless the law states otherwise, local 
government can only engage in projects or functions that the law explicitly says 
it can.  The PoWB did not change the ultra vires principle; it did not represent a 
Power of General Competence (PoGC).  Moreover, as it did not present a 
PoGC, there are significant limitations on the PoWB.  It does not allow local 
authorities to: 
 
 Raise capital or revenue, or incur debt to finance the use of the PoWB, 
 Use the PoWB without taking direct account of the Sustainable 
Community Strategy1 for the local authority area,  
 Use the PoWB without the local authority considering how its use would 
contribute to the economic, social or environmental objectives of the 
Sustainable Community Strategy, and may need to demonstrate how its 
use would do so, 
 Use the PoWB without taking into account the statutory guidance from 
Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG),  
 Override existing secondary legislation that placed requirements, 
restrictions, prohibitions or limitations on local authority activity.   
(LGA, 2008: p.3) 
 
Furthermore, as half of all statutory duties imposed on local government since 
the 1840s have been introduced since 1997 (Pickles, 2011), the conceptual 
basis of the LGMA could be questioned.  When the Audit Commission 
introduced the Comprehensive Performance Assessment, in 2002, to assess 
the performance of local authorities in response to rising public expectations, 
central government developed further (and more sophisticated) controls.   
 
“Under the Comprehensive Performance Assessment that each local 
authority is now subjected to, the centre not only defines the outcomes 
                                                          
1
 A Sustainable Community Strategy (SCS) sets out the long term vision for the area.  It is drawn-up in 
response to local needs.  As the ‘plan of plans’ (ODPM, 2003), an SCS includes and builds upon the 
Regional Economic Strategy, Regional Housing Strategy, Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal and 
previous White Papers.  An SCS is “an action plan to build successful, thriving and inclusive 
communities” (ODPM, 2003: p.3).  It is drawn up by the Local Strategic Partnership and implemented 
through the Local Area Agreement.  The outcomes and targets are designed to achieve the vision for the 
area set out in the SCS.  However, an SCS is not subject to external validation, checks or controls but is 
subject to a sustainability examination.   
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required in particular policy areas but also what constitutes good practice 
in a host of managerial contexts” 
(Pratchett, 2004: p.371) 
 
Pratchett highlights that this emphasis on performance metrics presented a 
significant challenge to New Labour’s vision of New Localism stating: 
 
“local autonomy requires an acceptance of difference between areas in 
both democratic processes and political outcomes.  This challenge is 
significant for the ‘new localism’ vision” 
(Pratchett, 2004: p.372) 
 
The New Labour Government recognised the inherent challenge posed to New 
Localism.  Initial research into local authorities’ use of the PoWB found that a 
low level of usage was a direct consequence of low awareness of the PoWB 
(INLOGOV & UWE, 2008; DCLG, 2008b).  A more contemporary account of 
use of the PoWB by local authorities indicates that only 15% of authorities have 
utilised the PoWB (Williams, 2010).  However, beyond this initial research there 
has been little further academic investigation of the use of the PoWB.  This 
thesis will aim to fill that gap in knowledge by identifying the common factors 
that act to inhibit or promote councils’ use of the PoWB, and explore the role of 
officers and elected members in the decision to utilise the PoWB.  The findings 
will be utilised to produce a contemporary typology of local government’s 
discretionary activity that will inform our understanding of local authority 
discretionary activity.   
 
As the PoWB was intended to act as enabling power, and one element within 
an agenda to enable New Localism, the findings from this research will 
contribute to understanding a theoretical framework for local autonomy.  This 
framework will then – with the research findings – provide insight into policy 
implications for the future of local autonomy, and the future use of discretionary 
legal power in the form of a power of general competence – a key feature of the 
Coalition Government’s localist agenda (Cabinet Office, 2010).  Pratchett 
surmises that “autonomy is about liberty, whether of the individual person or the 
individual organisation” (Pratchett, 2004: p.372).  Although Pratchett was 
13 
 
concluding on the tensions between local autonomy and local democracy, the 
‘freedom from / freedom to’ distinction is relevant to a theoretical framework for 
conceptualising modes of autonomy.   
 
Using Pratchett’s (2004) ‘freedom from / freedom to’ distinction, tensions with 
New Localism can be highlighted. Whilst the PoWB may have increased local 
authorities’ ‘freedom to’ carry out functions that were traditionally regarded as 
ultra vires, the various restrictions and limitations decreased local government’s 
‘freedom from’ central government.  Importantly, the parallel that Pratchett 
highlights regarding the distinction between personal versus organisational 
liberty is particularly relevant – given the nature of local government’s 
discretionary legal power and the ultra vires principle.  Pratchett (2004) 
indirectly alludes to the rationale behind the decision not to release local 
government from the current systemic restraints (and giving local authorities a 
power of general competence) by increasing authorities ‘freedom to’ – instead 
offering the PoWB.   
 
Pratchett highlights that “local autonomy … can be in conflict with the 
institutions of national democracy” and that “too much local autonomy … can 
destabilise the national institutions (Pratchett, 2004: p.373).  Concluding that 
“the new localism may have managed to clarify some of the complexities that 
bedevil central - local relations, its capacity to resolve this dilemma seems 
limited” (Pratchett, 2004: p.373).  This research will incorporate Pratchett’s 
(2004) distinction, further develop a framework for local autonomy and assess 
the role of the PoWB in the realisation of New Localism.  Furthermore, this 
thesis will consider New Localism as a method to achieve genuine autonomy for 
local government and whether further measures are required to actively 
promote localism and the future of the local well-being agenda.   
 
Understanding well-being 
 
One of the central philosophical issues at the heart of this research refers to the 
questions: what is well-being? and can it be promoted by local government? At 
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present, the study of the politics of well-being is an emergent research area.  
Most of the recent academic research has concluded that further enquiry is 
required before a definitive conclusion on those factors that contribute to well-
being can be reached.  The literature currently available has little information 
provided on the role of local government in the promotion of well-being, beyond 
the few theoretical accounts exploring the meaning and nature of well-being 
(Frey, 2000; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Helliwell et al, 2004; Braybrook, 
2008; Dean, 2009).   
 
Everyone seems suddenly to be concerned with well-being. In the political 
realm, President Sarkozy’s invitation to Joseph Stiglitz to chair the Commission 
on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, produced 
a clear emphasis on the importance of promoting and measuring well-being, 
given that “GDP is an inadequate metric to gauge well-being over time 
particularly in its economic, environmental, and social dimensions” (Stiglitz, Sen 
and Fitoussi, 2009: p.8).  In defining well-being, the Commission adopted a 
multi-dimensional approach that captured: material living standards (income, 
consumption and wealth); Health; Education; personal activities (including 
work); political voice and governance; social connections and relationships; 
environment (present and future conditions) and security, of an economic as 
well as a physical nature (Stiglitz, Sen, Fitoussi, 2009: p.14-15).  More recently, 
the UK Prime Minister has argued that  
 
"It's time we admitted that there's more to life than money and it's time 
we focused not just on GDP but on GWB – general wellbeing ...wellbeing 
can't be measured by money or traded in markets. It's about the beauty 
of our surroundings, the quality of our culture and, above all, the strength 
of our relationships. Improving our society's sense of wellbeing is, I 
believe, the central political challenge of our times"  
(David Cameron quoted in Stratton, 2010b). 
 
Academic research into the various aspects of well-being has a longer pedigree 
and predates the recent political interest. In 2007, Johns and Ormerod 
highlighted that the concept itself - and its relationship to other fields of study - 
had become very fashionable.  By 2000 there were more than 4,300 articles on 
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the issue published in academic journals (Veenhoven, 2007).  However, this 
growth in interest is far from universally accepted or welcome and there is much 
confusion over the language and concepts used in the research.   
 
Although many scholars use well-being, happiness, life satisfaction and quality 
of life as synonyms, whether they actually are in fact interchangeable remains 
uncertain (Jordan, 2008).  The difference between the concepts is not mere 
semantics but crucial to understanding the concept.  Diener outlines the debate 
over language succinctly, stating that the terms have dual definitions, both 
broad and narrow, “like happiness, well-being is a widely used term, and it too 
can potentially have many meanings” (Diener, 2009: p.9).   
 
Bok (2010) continues this debate on the distinction between the terms saying 
“happiness seems to refer to one’s immediate feelings and impressions while 
satisfaction connotes a more cognitive appraisal of one’s life as a whole” (Bok, 
2010: p.9).  However, despite making this distinction between the terms Bok 
also acknowledges that, in practice, “researchers tend to use this term 
interchangeably, I do likewise...” (Bok, 2010: p.9).   
 
Dooris (1999) summarises the languages used in different concepts by 
highlighting “a strong tendency for different professional and sectoral groups to 
hold on to a particular language (and by implication, framework), and to 
advocate the use of this with an almost evangelical and fundamentalist fervour” 
(Dooris, 1999, p.9).  Although Dooris was not discussing the relationship 
between happiness, well-being and life satisfaction; the findings – specifically 
those on the barriers created by language used in these concepts – are 
especially relevant for the study of well-being in a public policy arena.  Stratton 
(2010) similarly acknowledges these difficulties, but queries whether politicians 
are as concerned as academics about the linguistic distinction involved offering 
to “substitute happy with the compound noun well-being” (Stratton, 2010).   
 
The promotion of well-being and the goal of greater quality of life has been 
increasingly acknowledged as an objective of economic, social and 
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environmental public policy interventions (Bacon et al, 2010).  However, 
research into the politics of well-being is much less widespread and remains in 
an embryonic state (Bok, 2010).  At the sub-national level, whilst there is some 
research into how local government can promote well-being (Bacon et al, 2010), 
this research offers a narrow perspective on the role of governance structures 
and political institutions in public policy, and how reshaping public policy can 
promote well-being. At the local level, some local authorities use a range of 
terms to define quality of life and pursue projects to promote local community 
well-being; others adhere to a single strand of central government policy to 
define and measure well-being.   
 
Understanding well-being within the contemporary political agenda is invariably 
linked to the shrinking of the State and the rise of the Big Society.  One route to 
achieving the Big Society is to engender social capital that can improve 
community cohesion.  The most achievable route to promoting community 
cohesion is by decentralising power from central government to local 
government to local communities.  Through decentralising power, communities’ 
can take responsibility for their own well-being rather than central government 
holding ownership.  New Localism, through decentralising power, from central 
government eventually to communities, also links to community well-being.  
Discussing the distinction between rhetoric and reality in the politics of New 
Localism, Stoker reflects that: 
 
“there is undoubtedly much that is pure rhetoric in the new found interest 
on the part of New Labour in localism and much that represents a 
strategic political response to possibility that the Conservatives might use 
localism to attack the control freakery, state paternalism and big 
spending plans that could be said to characterise many of New Labour’s 
policies” 
(Stoker, 2004: p.118) 
 
Even though Stoker is discussing New Localism, similar conclusions could be 
drawn about the politics of well-being.  The contemporary politics of well-being 
merits further investigation; well-being as a topic seems to have been absorbed 
into the political mainstream as an issue for all major political parties in Britain:   
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“Today’s generation want more than a job, more than to earn simply to 
enjoy.  They want a good job. They want a career.  They want to develop 
as individuals through work as well as through the hopes and fears of 
family life.  Our purpose should be to help them achieve that ambition” – 
Tony Blair   
 
“It’s time we admitted that there’s more to life than money and it’s time 
we focused not on GDP but on GWB – general well-being.  Well-being 
can’t be measured by money or traded in markets.  It’s about the beauty 
of our surroundings, the quality of our culture, and, above all, the 
strength of our relationships” – David Cameron 
(The Independent: 2007) 
 
Although debates on happiness and the good-life go back to Aristotle, research 
into well-being is still “in its infancy compared with most other fields in the social 
sciences” (Bok, 2010: p.211).  The academic assessment of well-being can be 
organised into a number of key themes.  They are the clarification between 
types of well-being, the impact that income has on satisfaction and the 
inaccuracy of certain types of well-being and the problems this might create for 
the measurement of well-being.   
 
 In 1974, Easterlin found that average levels of satisfaction and well-being 
did not increase in line with income – specifically, that average happiness 
in the US had not risen substantially over the past half century despite 
significant economic growth in per capita incomes (Easterlin, 1974; 
Stutzer, 2004).   
 Sumner (1996) offered an important clarification for classifying differing 
aspects of well-being summarising that “I believe there to be an 
interpretation of the subjective / objective distinction such that subjectivity 
turns out to be a necessary condition of success” (Sumner, 1996: p.27).  
The distinction between subjective and objective definitions offers a more 
practical perspective to evaluate well-being. 
 Another key milestone is the discovery by psychologists that people’s 
subjective well-being is often inaccurate (Putnam, 2001; Gilbert, 2007; 
Kahneman and Thayler, 2006).  Putnam (2001) found that people are 
surprisingly bad judges of what will make them happiest, particularly if 
the happiness or unhappiness they experience will be temporary or 
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permanent.  Sale et al (2002) state that “reality is socially constructed 
and so is constantly changing” (Sale et al, 2002: p.353); by adapting this 
logic to well-being it can be seen that well-being is in a constant state of 
flux because it is a socially constructed concept, which further reinforces 
the relevance of the subjective distinction.  Diener then underpins that 
distinction with the hypothesis that “all definitions of well-being imply an 
evaluation” (Diener, 2009: p.9); this does not reduce the importance of 
the objective, which Diener (2009) later acknowledges the worth of but 
emphasises the necessity of the subjective assessment.  Even so, 
Sumner’s (1996) distinction adds to the problems inherent in measuring 
the subjective well-being of a population.   
 In 2004, economists found that income inequality does not lead to more 
dissatisfaction (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004).   
 This conclusion was further reinforced by Veenhoven and Hagerty (2006) 
with their provocative finding on the relationship between well-being and 
the welfare state noting that “there is no evidence of a growing disparity 
between happy and unhappy citizens in rich nations, the reverse has 
happened...” (Veenhoven and Hagerty, 2006: p.13).  Veenhoven and 
Hagerty’s study also found no correlation between the amount that a 
government spends on social welfare programs and the health, 
happiness or longevity of the recipient populations (Veenhoven and 
Hagerty, 2006).   
 
Johns and Ormerod offer two potential conclusions: “either that attempting to 
improve the human lot through economic or social policy is futile, or that 
happiness data over time is an extremely insensitive measure of human 
welfare” (Johns and Ormerod, 2007: p.13).  Johns and Ormerod also submit a 
potential conclusion for Easterlin’s (1974) finding regarding the inverse 
relationship between growth in income and subjective well-being, stating that 
“people become accustomed to the new, higher levels and would feel less 
happy if these were reduced to their previous levels” (Johns and Ormerod, 
2007, p.14).   
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Much of the modern renaissance of academic interest into understanding the 
root causes of well-being has been made in the broad fields of economics and 
psychology.  This is characteristic of the debate around income and satisfaction, 
the wider debates around economic growth and the view that happiness, not 
income, is the overall motivation device for humanity (Layard, 2005).  However, 
well-being can now be linked to a number of wider debates around the pursuit 
of economically, socially and environmentally balanced development.   
 
Research into well-being is moving away from the traditional conceptual bases 
of sustainable development and health towards newer fields of law (Posner and 
Sunstein, 2010) and wider public policy (Johns and Ormerod, 2007; Diener, 
2009).  Whilst the link between well-being and sustainability is somewhat 
debateable, the UK the Government Department with the responsibility for well-
being is the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).  Dolan 
and Peasgood (2006), moreover, submit that there is “very little evidence on the 
relationship between sustainability and well-being” (Dolan and Peasgood, 2006: 
p.37), and that more research is required on the relationship.   
 
Recent research into well-being found significant overlap between 
environmentally friendly living and greater well-being (Bacon et al, 2010) and 
highlighted the need for a holistic physical, natural and human focus rather than 
a solely socio-economic one (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009).  This growth in 
the debate has not been limited to academic circles; instead it has been 
matched by increasing curiosity amongst policy-makers.  However, this almost 
exponential growth in debate has yielded problems.  
 
Layard’s (2005) definition on the factors that impact on well-being could only be 
applied to western developed societies and even then only to certain groups 
within those societies.  For this reason a normative view of well-being is 
problematic, which presents a challenges for policy-makers.  For example, a 
decision to build a skate park on an open field for use by young people might 
enhance the well-being of some groups of young people (although not all), but 
would this enhanced well-being be felt by other groups in the community?  So 
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what promotes a greater sense of well-being may not do so for another group or 
the same group at a different time.   
 
Recent academic advances into the factors associated with promoting well-
being have presented practical problems.  Particularly: 
 
1. Veenhoven and Hagerty’s (2006) findings that present no link between 
the degree of government expenditure (on social welfare programs), and 
the level of happiness that the general population experiences and  
2. the inaccuracy of subjective well-being (Putnam, 2001; Gilbert, 2007; 
Kahneman and Thayler, 2006).   
 
These two findings challenge policy-makers’ efforts to promote well-being 
through public policy.  Instead of having specific policies whose primary aim is 
to promote well-being, would it be more effective to make the promotion of well-
being the secondary aim of all public policy? As Bok acknowledges that “almost 
everything a government does is meant in one way or another to increase the 
well-being of the citizenry” (Bok, 2010: p.205).   
 
Diener acknowledges these inherent problems of the perception of well-being 
policies “as a half-baked attempt to make people happy all the time” (Diener, 
2009: p.8).  Bok cites Jeremy Bentham’s principle of ‘net happiness’ in 
reference to this particular problem, citing Bentham in that “the overriding aim of 
government should be to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
of people by maximising pleasures and minimising pain” (Bok, 2010: p.4).  
Layard’s (2005) research on the causes of well-being is intended to be a 
modern incarnation of Bentham’s happiness principle, noting “we now have a 
society in which there is no agreed philosophical basis for public policy... 
pragmatic policy-makers claim to be doing ‘what works’” (Layard, 2005: p. 112). 
 
However, importantly, Bok (2010) doesn’t directly mention how Bentham’s 
greatest net happiness principle should be pursued.  In the recent well-being 
renaissance, public policy has pursued an interventionist role in regard to 
promoting well-being, whilst neoliberal commentators pursue the notion that 
governments cannot make people happy.  Instead, Wolf (2007) argues that 
happiness is something that should be pursued individually.  Therefore, a 
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neoliberal approach to the promotion of well-being might offer greater quality of 
life than the previous attempts.  This is particularly the case since, as Wolf 
(2007) highlights, classical liberalism is not undermined by this new science of 
happiness.   
 
Well-Being and Public Policy 
 
Layard (2005) cites that just six factors account for 80% of the variation in 
reported subjective well-being; divorce, unemployment, belief in God, quality of 
government, membership of non-religious organisations, and the level of trust 
felt within a society.  Obviously, policy-makers cannot simultaneously target 
policies against all of these six factors.  Policy-makers can however target some 
of them to reduce the variation of subjective well-being in the population.  
However, how can policies to promote well-being be understood and how can 
policies be developed to improve people’s well-being in the wider context that 
now includes the Big Society?  The Big Society is a flagship policy from the 
2010 Conservative Party general election manifesto, the aim of which is to 
create a climate that empowers local people and communities (Cabinet Office, 
2010).  The Times said the Big Society offers “an impressive attempt to reframe 
the role of government and unleash entreprenuerial spirit” (The Times, 2010).  
 
Bok (2010) observes, the politics of well-being is an emergent area of research.  
In a political climate that now includes both the Big Society and deep cuts in 
public sector expenditure, a more pragmatic - and ultimately more achievable - 
route to greater well-being for the population should be adopted.  An approach 
that engages multiple levels in a joined-up process may prove to be ultimately 
more achievable.  McMahon’s (2002) research found that a partnership 
approach between the local authority and local community groups offered a 
stronger approach to the development of the local level performance metrics.  
By fostering an enabling approach to community governance, local government 
could take the lead in the Big Society by developing policies to promote local 
well-being.  In many local authorities, a more generic enabling approach may 
already be in place, but often not in relation to promoting local well-being.  
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Rather, by adopting an enabling approach to promoting local well-being, this 
kind of approach would utilise McMahon’s (2002) partnership experience and 
allow an unfettered approach to promoting well-being.  It would embed well-
being as a goal in local as well as national policy, which would engender a 
multi-level approach that could prove ultimately more achievable.   
 
Whilst national government focuses on achieving macro-level goals that would 
prevent negative well-being (i.e. reducing unemployment and working to 
enhance the quality of government), local authorities could work to reduce any 
barriers to greater well-being by tailoring policies that could achieve the 
piecemeal bottom-up approach that HM Treasury (2008) outlined.  In the face of 
reduced expenditure and a shrinking role for the State, the Big Society (through 
the decentralisation of power) represents an opportunity for local authorities and 
community organisations to step forward to seize the opportunity to promote 
local well-being. Bacon et al acknowledge this is “particularly important during 
periods of recession and recovery” (Bacon et al, 2010: p.86).   
 
Schumpeter (1950) argued that times of economic uncertainty provide for 
innovative policy-making.  At a time when localism and well-being are matched 
as policy priorities of the Coalition Government, when local government will 
have to pursue a radically different approach to governance to meet growing 
demands with fewer resources, the Big Society represents a method of giving 
an additional impetus to the goal of greater well-being as the central aim of 
policy.  This method would be in line with the Coalition Government’s desire that 
well-being data has a more central role in policy-making (Hoskin, 2010; 
Stratton, 2010b).  Bok highlights that “government officials could draw upon the 
new research to rethink their priorities and make a more balanced effort to 
promote well-being (Bok, 2010: p.208).   
 
Some local authorities may be more encouraged to actively promote well-being 
locally with the news that it is to be measured – although a ‘driven’ approach to 
the promotion of well-being would significantly undermine the localism agenda.  
Nesta, however, notes the role that one local authority in the development of 
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social care provision that “reminds is that behind many central government 
innovations lie the important lessons from testing, developing and prototyping 
new ideas at the local level” (Nesta, 2010: p.16).  HoC (2002) findings would 
reinforce the validity of this ‘incubator’ role by highlighting local authorities’ that 
have pre-empted central government’s focus on well-being.   
 
Theoretical Approach 
 
The theoretical approach to well-being in this thesis reflects the philosophical 
position of the current academic research.  It must be stressed, however, that 
this research project developed as an iterative process that did not adopt a 
normative theory of the politics of well-being because a normative definition 
does not (yet) exist in the literature.  As Bok notes, current academic research 
into well-being has only developed a specific strand i.e. how to measure well-
being and the implications of well-being metrics for future policy: 
 
“after 35 years of intensive research … researchers have succeeded in 
doing what Bentham could not accomplish: to devise a way of measuring 
how happy people are and how much pleasure or pain they derive from 
the ordinary events and conditions of their lives.” 
(Bok, 2010: p.204) 
 
A normative theory of the politics of well-being may be elusive as Bok cites 
“almost everything the government is meant in one way or another to increase 
the well-being of the citizenry” (Bok, 2010: p.205).  However, a theory for well-
being in public policy could be attainable.  Diener outlines a hypothesis for well-
being in public policy reflecting that a “definition of well-being is similar, if not 
identical, to modern definitions of well-being in economics, where well-being is 
typically called utility” (Diener, 2009: p.5).  Nevertheless, although a macro 
theory for the politics of well-being may remain elusive; a more defined theory 
could be developed.  Therefore, whilst Diener (2009) outlines implications for 
well-being metrics in public policy, the use of the PoWB – and discretionary 
activity – could inform a theory for the role of local political institutions in 
developing well-being.  The development of a local government typology, 
through stratifying different types of local government autonomy, to classify 
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different categories of local authorities would contribute to the existing academic 
research on the politics of well-being.   
 
This thesis will adopt a holistic perspective, encompassing both theoretical and 
practical standpoints; that is to say, political science and local government.  This 
thesis will differ from those previously presented, by exploring the role of 
political institutions and institutional factors that have led to adoption or 
inhibition of the PoWB.  This thesis will explore whether the current legal 
arrangement (the PoWB) is sufficient to genuinely promote the well-being of 
local people, and whether there are further policy implications for the future of 
localism and local government autonomy.  Given the inherent difficulties in 
establishing a normative definition of well-being, which could translate into 
differences interpreting the PoWB, this thesis will adopt an interpretive position 
(Rhodes, 1981; Bevir and Rhodes, 2002).  Whilst the methodological discussion 
will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis, the approach that this 
research takes to the investigation will be an interpretive design because local 
authority officers’ and elected members’ perceptions and interpretations of the 
PoWB are crucial.  An interpretive basis for the research offers the best method 
to capture officers’ and members’ perceptions.   
 
This research project, however, will also adopt a multi-method approach by 
including a positivist element.  In order to provide additional validity, and verify 
existing trends and statistics, on the use of the PoWB, a survey of all local 
authorities in England will be included in the initial stages of the research 
process.  The survey will be limited to England because the PoWB is only 
available to English and Welsh local authorities.  Also, the differing nature of the 
devolved administration in Wales could affect the use of the PoWB so the 
decision was taken to limit the scope of this research to English authorities.   
 
Additional validity will allow this thesis to use the research findings to generate 
new statistics on contemporary nationwide usage of the PoWB.  If different to 
those previously presented, these statistics on use of the PoWB can be used to 
challenge previous attitudes on local authority officers’ and members’ attitudes 
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towards discretionary activity and exercising their autonomy.  Nevertheless, the 
bulk of the original data for this thesis will come from semi-structured interviews 
with local authority officers’ and elected members in case studies.  The case 
studies will draw upon examples of local authorities that have demonstrated 
ambitious use of the PoWB, and therefore able to provide additional insight into 
any common factors that would promote or inhibit the use of the PoWB by local 
government.   
 
Hypothesis   
 
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, there is currently a lack of academic 
investigation into well-being in public policy and its impact for the future of 
policy-making (Bok, 2010).  Moreover, there is little contemporary academic 
debate on how policy interventions have shaped community well-being, and the 
role of local political institutions in promoting local well-being.  This thesis will 
offer original insight into the role of local government in promoting local well-
being, how politics can promote well-being, and how officers’ interpretation of 
the PoWB affected its use.  This original knowledge will then inform a 
framework to conceptualise levels of autonomy for local government, and a 
contemporary typology of local government to distinguish between local 
authorities by discretionary activity.   
 
The preliminary hypothesis of this thesis is that the PoWB was not widely used 
by local authorities because local authority officers are overtly risk averse, did 
not fully appreciate the potential autonomy that the PoWB granted authorities 
and did not accept that the PoWB represented a power of first resort.  The 
attitudes adopted by local government officers and elected members may have 
been underlined when the projects highlighted by central government as 
examples of the usefulness of the PoWB were resource intensive strategic 
projects – not operational projects.  Therefore, it may not have emboldened 
local authorities to push operational boundaries of their autonomy.  This is 
because there were few – if any – examples of the PoWB enabling local 
government to act beyond their traditional operational purview. 
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This hypothesis is based on two assumptions.  Firstly, that the reported 15% 
(Williams, 2010) of local authorities have used the PoWB is inaccurate.  This 
figure may in fact significantly under-represent the actual use of the PoWB.  For 
example, local authorities may not advertise their use of the PoWB for fear of 
legal challenge.  This thesis will verify the accuracy of the reported low usage of 
the PoWB as an initial part of this research.  Secondly, that authority officers 
and members were able to use the PoWB.  That is to say, local government’s 
use of the PoWB was not restricted by central government.  Besides the 
legislative restrictions, this thesis will explore any further constraints on local 
authorities’ use of the PoWB.  This investigation will produce original evidence 
that will offer insight into local authorities’ use of the PoWB.  The following 
section will outline the structure of this thesis, and how this investigation will 
take form.   
 
Structure of Thesis 
 
The subsequent chapters in this thesis can be broadly divided into two 
categories.  Firstly, those chapters that are devoted to addressing philosophical, 
conceptual and theoretical issues. Secondly, chapters that outline the original 
data – the principal and tertiary authority case studies and the scoping studies 
with senior legal officers.   
 
Chapter 2 explores and critiques the existing academic literature on local 
government and well-being, providing a review of existing themes.  Current 
academic literature on local government suggests that it is comparatively weak 
because of a relative lack of fiscal and statutory autonomy; if this is inaccurate 
then it could represent a self-fulfilling prophecy.  If so, this would further 
undermine the drive towards greater localism.  Equally so, the focus on the 
duality of central-local relations may only serve to falsely emphasise the 
homogeneity of both governmental levels (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; Blond, 
2009).   
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By examining the current academic literature on tertiary authorities, this chapter 
will establish a hypothesis that conceptualises how tertiary authorities function 
within the artificial dichotomy of central-local relations.  Academic research into 
the role of tertiary authorities – Parish and Town Councils – is extremely limited.  
Contemporary evidence and analysis of the use of discretionary legal power 
(the PoWB) by tertiary authorities is scarce.  The data from the tertiary case 
study authorities’ on their use of the PoWB, and perceptions of central-local 
relations, will offer original insight to disestablish the homogeneity.  The original 
research into tertiary authorities in this thesis further underlines the original 
contribution to knowledge.   
 
Where chapter 2 explores the existing academic debate, chapter 3 establishes 
the rise of well-being in a contemporary domestic political agenda and maps the 
policy context since 1997 from which the PoWB has emerged.  Chapter 3 will 
outline an initial scoping study that was used both to triangulate the latter stages 
of the research and to provide contemporary nationwide evidence on use of the 
PoWB.  The initial scoping study took the form of a postal survey to all English 
principal tier local authorities.  Chapter 3 will also examine in detail the impact of 
the Local Authorities Mutual Limited (LAML) ruling on the use of the PoWB by 
local authorities.  Chapter 4 will provide an in-depth discussion on the main 
theoretical approaches, and research design, adopted in this thesis.  This 
chapter will identify, outline and justify the methods that will allow this research 
to most successfully achieve the objectives outlined in the beginning of this 
chapter.  Aside from the theoretical issues addressed in earlier chapters, 
relating to the subject matter and the philosophical basis for the research, this 
chapter will primarily deal with the research design.   
 
The design has three strands.  Firstly, the postal survey to gather nationwide 
data on officers’ perspectives on the PoWB.  Secondly, four case studies with 
principal and tertiary tier local authorities that have demonstrated use of the 
PoWB to offer in-depth perspectives on common factors instrumental in the use 
of the PoWB.  Each case study included four or five interviews with senior 
officers and elected members from the authority.  Lastly, the third research 
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strand, nineteen scoping interviews with senior local government legal officers’ 
to bolster the national data and provide in-depth legal perspective on the PoWB.  
Altogether, thirty seven interviews were conducted.   
 
As chapter 4 will outline the research design, chapters 5 – 8 will present the 
research findings from the case studies.  Chapter 5 and 6 will outline the 
findings from the two principal tier case studies and chapters 7 and 8 will to 
detail the findings from the two tertiary tier case studies.  Chapters 5 – 8 also 
will provide local and political context of the authorities and offer a thematic 
evaluation of the case study findings.  The findings fall into six broad themes, 
which are: 
 
 awareness of the PoWB, covers officers’ and members’ awareness of 
discretionary and specifically about the technicalities of the PoWB.   
 attitudes towards use of the PoWB, explores authority officers’ and 
elected members’ attitude towards exercising discretionary activity 
through the PoWB.   
 policy focus, which covers officers’ and members’ understanding of the 
background of the PoWB and its role in policy in each authority.   
 role of local government, which covers officers’ and members’ perception 
of the role of local authorities.   
 relationship between central and local government, covers the potential 
influence that central government can exert on local autonomy.   
 future challenges, will categorise potential common factors that would 
inhibit local government discretionary activity and prevent authorities’ 
exerting their organisational autonomy.   
 
The findings presented in chapters 5 – 8 will provide the basis for the categories 
in the local government typology.  The typology concept, using the case study 
authorities as examples, will be outlined in chapter 9.   
Chapter 9 will draw together the key findings from the four case study 
authorities and present an evaluation of the evidence.  The evidence from the 
four case studies, when combined with the data from the scoping studies, will 
present evidence on common factors that prohibited or promoted the use of the 
PoWB.  Chapter 9 will also discuss the impact that organisational capabilities, 
and the culture of an authority, have on the use of the PoWB.   
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The typology will classify local authorities into three broad categories by their 
demonstrated attitude towards discretionary activity.  Those classifications are: 
 
1. proactive authorities: this encompasses those authorities that 
demonstrate an outward-looking practical and ambitious approach to 
discretionary activity.   
2. cruising authorities: this includes those that have demonstrated limited 
ambition towards extra-statutory activity and limited use of the PoWB.  
They adopt a limited – almost overtly cautious – interpretation of the 
PoWB.   
3. the reactive local authority: this will include authorities that have similar 
capabilities as cruising authorities but demonstrate a narrow 
interpretation of the PoWB or exhibit a lack of organisational ambition.   
 
Chapter 10 will conclude the research by underlining the key findings, exploring 
the key issues and the ways in which these findings on the PoWB impact on 
perceptions of local government autonomy.  Chapter 10 will use the evidence 
from this research to distinguish between conceptualisations of local 
government autonomy.  The most significant distinction in a conceptual 
framework of an authorities’ autonomy is the distinction between strategic and 
operational types of autonomy.   
 
The distinction between types of local government autonomy may offer 
additional insight into authorities’ genuine autonomy.  Whilst the introduction of 
the PoWB may have increased the theoretical autonomy of local government, 
the imposition of performance metrics that allow central government to guide 
local outcomes (Pratchett, 2004) undermines local autonomy.  Furthermore, 
academic debate on local autonomy has included expressions such as ‘partial 
or earned autonomy’ (Wilson and Game, 2006) and ‘choice within constraint’ 
(Pratchett and Leach, 2004), however, the distinction between modes of 
autonomy has not been discussed in detail.   
 
Operational autonomy, which includes applied freedom and political freedom, 
covers individual authorities’ capabilities.  Strategic autonomy, which 
encompasses statutory freedom, covers local authorities’ theoretical ability to 
engage in discretionary activity.  The chapter will then conclude the research 
and highlight areas for further academic research.  Chapter 11 will conclude by 
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discussing any potential impact of the research findings on future implications 
for localism, and outline the impact from this research on the post-2010 debate 
on the General Power of Competence.   
 
Summary 
 
Stoker underlines that “there will remain a central role for elected local 
authorities as the over-arching ring holders in their communities, local 
authorities have through various pieces of legislation the capacity to perform 
this basic community leadership role” (Stoker, 2004; p.126).  New Localism 
offers a method to enhance the autonomy of local authorities; however this 
research will shed light on whether it fully enables genuine local autonomy.  As 
New Localism reduces the potential for uniformity, one consequence of 
institutional diversity is divergence between communities that has significantly 
territorial justice implications.  Pratchett addresses the territorial justice 
implications by highlighting the potential role of central government, stating that 
“central government has a primary role to play in ensuring territorial justice, 
equity and the collective provision of public goods” (Pratchett, 2004: p.369).  In 
highlighting the role that central government can play, there are implicit 
questions on the impact on central-local relations and questions on the impact 
of New Localism on central-local relations themselves.  New Localism is not 
without criticism (Walker, 2002; Pratchett, 2004).   
 
A similar assessment of the PoWB could be made.  The extent to which the 
PoWB supports and emboldens local authorities to pursue discretionary activity 
could be questionable.  This study will explore the impact that the PoWB has 
had on local authorities’ autonomy, generating original knowledge by providing 
a detailed perspective on autonomy, and how the take up of the PoWB has 
influenced autonomy.  The findings will provide assistance in examining the 
difference between ‘proactive’, ‘cruising’ and ‘reactive’ local authorities.  Whilst 
there is limited academic literature on the politics of well-being, the following 
chapter will outline and critique the main academic debates that relate to this 
research project, and discuss how they impact on the use of the PoWB.  
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Chapter 2: An exploration of the literature 
 
This chapter will provide a critical review of the existing themes in the literature 
on local government in the United Kingdom which underpin the key focus of this 
thesis. These are: 
 
 The shifts in central-local relations in the UK. 
 The growing focus on New Localism  
 The devolution of power beyond local government into communities.  
 The role that innovation plays in creating agile local government (Demos, 
2008) 
 The change in policy priorities for local government  
 The growing emphasis on well-being in public policy in the UK.  
 
These themes have been selected because they offer insight into the 
relationship between levels of government, the evolution of public policy in the 
UK and a potential explanation for local authorities’ activities that can address 
the research question.  To consider the current nature of the governmental 
relationship in contemporary Britain, a perspective on the recent history of inter-
governmental relations must first be established which provides greater insight 
into the renaissance of localism and the growth of well-being.   
 
Central - Local Government relations in the UK 
 
The basis of local government and the ultra vires principle 
 
Comparatively speaking, local government in the UK is statutorily weak 
(Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000).  A House of Commons report (2009) 
highlighted that the United Kingdom is one of the developed worlds’ most 
centralised democracies.  Whilst local government has the power and ability to 
lobby central government, the significant majority of financial and legislative 
powers remain in Whitehall.  Local Government’s “role and influence is clearly 
limited” (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000: p.254).  Although there are some 
exceptions to this statement, specifically local government’s powers to raise 
limited finance and pass by-laws, these exceptions are made at the discretion of 
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central government.  These relations are defined by; the absence of a formal 
written constitution, held together by case-law from Judges and statutes from 
Parliament (Loughlin, 2001), which is further compounded by the fact that local 
government is contained within the ultra vires principle (Morphet, 2008). 
 
“The ultra vires principle protects the community against possible 
tyranny, extravagance and foolish or politically motivation adventures by 
its local councillors.  …  it has been frequently argued that the ballot box 
is sufficient safeguard and therefore the ultra vires principle and the limit 
on s.137 discretionary spending are unnecessary” 
(Ellwood, Tricker and Waterston, 2000: p.8) 
 
The question of local government reform and the role of local authorities has 
been central to governmental relations in the UK since the end of the Second 
World War.  More specifically over the last 30 years, relations between central 
and local government in the UK have been strained; often combative rather 
than consensual or supplementary. Relations have been characterised as both 
a ‘complex game’ in which each side is manoeuvring for greatest strategic 
advantage (Rhodes, 1981), or even a ‘swinging pendulum’ (House of 
Commons, 2009).   
 
Wilson and Game make an important distinction between types of relations 
between central and local government - specifically administrative, functional 
and political - and that when central governments decentralise they “may 
choose to do so in different ways and to different degrees” (Wilson and Game, 
2006: p.25).  However, no single model can accurately portray the nature of 
relations between central and local government because it often differs over 
time (between governments) and between policy areas.   
 
Leach and Percy-Smith note that the term central-local only offers two sides to 
the argument, when in practice there are many more that only serve to 
“exaggerate the coherence and homogeneity of the centre” (Leach and Percy-
Smith, 2001: p.213).   
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Characterisations of the relationship between central and local government as a 
game (Rhodes, 1981) suggests that ultimately one side is superior to the other.   
 
Although this interpretation may have been accurate during the mid-1980s, it 
may not be the case currently.  This combative nature is partially the result of 
historical distrust between the two levels of government.  This distrust is easily 
displayed by a sense of unwillingness on the part of central government to 
devolve operational discretionary powers and financial freedom to the local 
level.  Ministers will not devolve power to local government whilst they are still 
held accountable for all aspects of public service both by the public and the 
media (IPPR, 2009).  
 
In a sense, this culture of central accountability only serves to reinforce the 
centralised political culture in the UK today; what Loughlin (2001) refers to as a 
state of ‘hyper-centralism’.   
 
Policy differences, centralism and localism 
 
In the intervening period between 1979 and 1997, over two hundred Acts of 
Parliament were enshrined in law that affected local government on an 
operational level.  In those years local government saw significant levels of 
change in the public policy landscape; central government reduced local 
government’s discretionary power, created quangos to oversee and scrutinise 
decisions, and built up central oversight of local government finance (Wilson 
and Game, 2006).   
 
Perhaps this centralising tendency is behind the actions of the 1979 
Conservative government.  Despite holding a greater share of councils under 
Conservative control than any other political party, the Conservative 
administration initially aimed a barrage of reforms at local government finance 
(Wilson and Game, 2006).   
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In the following parliamentary session of 1983, legislation was finally aimed at 
local government structure itself.  Although the stated reasons behind these 
reforms were that those institutions were redundant; some scholars have 
argued that there was a partisan aspect to this decision i.e. some Labour local 
authorities wanted greater public spending and the Greater London Council 
proved to be a rallying point for opposition to the Government (Atkinson and 
Wilks-Heeg, 2000; Wilson and Game, 2006; House of Commons, 2009).  
Central Government imposed policy changes on local government through 
restriction of finance or directly through statute, which often led to local and 
extremely vocal opposition.   
 
Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) highlight two separate occasions when Central 
Government imposed fundamental comprehensive structural reforms on the 
local government system; in 1972-4 and 1992-6, when the existing local 
government structure was reformed in favour of new arrangements.   
 
Walker (2000) highlights the ‘stress tests’ during the 1980s, in Liverpool in 
1984-85 and Hackney in 1996-97, when “services continued to be provided 
even as political regimes collapsed” (Walker, 2000, p.3).  Atkinson and Wilks-
Heeg highlight that the abolition of the Greater London Council is a prime 
example of the comparative weakness of British local government as “a 
scenario such as this would be unimaginable in a political system such as 
Germany where local government has certain rights enshrined in the 
constitution” (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000: p.255).   
 
Despite New Labour’s commitment to the European Charter for Local Self-
Government, local government in the UK lacks legal and fiscal autonomy from 
central government (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000).   
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 Figure 1: Local Authority Discretion (Wilson and Game, 2006) 
 
By the mid-1990s, local authorities lacked confidence.  This lack of confidence 
had been reinforced by over a decade of low investment in infrastructure and 
development (Morphet, 2008).  However, Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg uphold that 
despite the barrage of legal, structural and financial reforms, local government 
“was not reduced to a mere agency role, but instead managed to carve out 
creative autonomy in a number of areas” (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000: 
p.252).   
 
This view is echoed further by Pratchett and Leach (2004) and Wilson and 
Game who discuss local government’s ‘partial or earned autonomy’ (Wilson and 
Game, 2006: p.29), whilst Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg (2000) still consider that its 
status was ‘considerably reduced’ as a result of the level of reforms. 
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The temptation to assign one party a centrist label and another a localist label 
is, however, too broad and offers an overly simplistic perspective on the debate.  
Blond summarises that “market versus statist thinking is a crude false 
dichotomy” (Blond, 2009: p.7).  Walker cites research that highlights reforms to 
local government finance, offering an example of centralistic reforms launched 
by the Labour party; stating that “offering chambers of commerce a de facto 
veto on supplementary rate levies – harked back to the mid-1980s” (Walker, 
2000: p.2).  Mason and McMahon propose that the degree of central control 
over local government is growing, citing “Local Area Agreements are another 
means of de facto central control of local authorities” (Mason and McMahon, 
2008: p.40).  Equally so, the assumption that the 1997 general election result 
“heralded the prospect of a return to a more consensual mode of relations” 
(Midwinter, 2001: p.311) would, in hindsight, seem to be questionable.   
 
 
Figure 2: Local Government (Local Government Chronicle, 15th August) 
 
Great Expectations: local authority discretion  
 
Morphet terms the post-1997 era “great expectations” stating that “local 
authorities wanted to have their power restored and then to be left alone” 
(Morphet, 2008: p.11).  Mason and McMahon highlight that since 1997 and up 
until 2008 28 Acts of Parliaments have imposed new duties on Districts 
Councils alone, and that “Unitary and County councils … have seen even more 
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legislation” (Mason and McMahon, 2008: p.39).  Mason and McMahon also 
highlight the role that Government Offices and Regional Development Agencies 
play in local decision making, summarising that “regional offices have reportedly 
been imposing central government policies” (Mason and McMahon, 2008, p.41).  
This view was further reinforced by the LGA (2008) stating that government 
offices and regional development agencies are another means of ‘central 
control’.  Wilson and Game (2006) highlight the centralised role that government 
offices play in local decision-making.   
 
 
Figure 3: Institutional Landscape (Wilson and Game, 2006) 
 
Whilst the rationale behind the majority of these reforms was to reduce 
inefficient and wasteful bureaucracy in local government, and to enhance local 
democracy by increasing the functions of borough and district councils (House 
of Commons, 2009); it has also been suggested that the intent was greater and 
deeper centralisation (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000; Wilson and Game, 
2006).  There is, however, some dispute whether this intent was ever achieved 
(Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000). 
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A view from the long grass: local authority autonomy 
 
Two significant insights into Local Government’s autonomy from Central 
Government and its function were offered by committee investigations: the 
Layfield report in 1974 and the Lyons review in 2005 (House of Commons, 
2009).  Both reports recommended greater local autonomy in relation to local 
government finance and a more strategic role for local government; the 
recommendations from both reports were dismissed for arguing in support of a 
‘politically contentious’ local income tax (Morphet, 2008).  Morphet highlights 
that the Lyons review offered “an opportunity to consider once again to consider 
local taxes, which may return as a key proposal some 30 years after the 
Layfield Committee” (Morphet, 2008, p.103).  Both Committee investigations 
strongly advocated a localist position. Currently the power to raise revenue 
rests almost exclusively in Central Government, and this tends to shape Local 
Government’s limited power and influence (House of Commons, 2009).   
 
Mason and McMahon highlight that 75% of local spending comes from the 
Treasury; that “there is a lack of clarity” (Mason and McMahon, 2008: p.42) over 
local government finance through a mixture of central control over council tax, 
business rates and dedicated grants.   
 
Despite the House of Commons’s (2009) conclusions, of a growing focus on 
localism; Pratchett and Leach (2004) argued that a more centralised version of 
localism is actually taking place.  Pratchett and Leach state that local 
government is “heavily influenced by central government priorities, such as 
community safety, the list of priorities in community strategies is becoming 
depressingly familiar” (Pratchett and Leach, 2004: p.367).   
 
Pratchett and Leach also emphasise the quid pro quo nature of central-local 
relationship mentioned previously, stating that “if there is a balance, it is one 
which is greatly skewed towards central control / constraint” (Pratchett, 2004: 
p.367).  Pratchett and Leach, however, also argue that local authorities retain 
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significant autonomy over local policy-making, albeit within central government 
initiatives and priorities, stating that “the challenge is to identify the areas where 
discretion or choice still exists and to exploit such opportunities to their full” 
(Pratchett and Leach, 2004: p. 367).  Performance metrics represent evidence 
of centralised localism: “the centre not only defines the outcomes required in 
particular policy areas but also what constitutes good practice in a host of 
managerial contexts” (Pratchett, 2004: p.371).   
 
Though problematic and tense, Walker (2000) and Morphet (2008) argue that 
the system is strong, highlighting examples of episodes where the system was 
tested to the extreme limit and yet survived (Walker, 2000).  Whilst the Labour 
administration offered greater flexibility for local government – the PoWB 
(DCLG, 2008b) and a more significant strategic placing-shaping role – the 
prospect of freedom was accompanied by a centralising tendency e.g. the 
performance targets regime or the inability to raise finance.  This mixed 
tendency has been characterised as both greater choice within constraint 
(Pratchett and Leach, 2004) and as control ‘freakery’ (Stoker, 2004).   
 
Much of the literature on central-local relations focuses on two aspects of local 
government: legal authority and resources.  An alternative point of view of the 
centralist / localist blend would focus on the responsibilities rather than formal 
powers.  Morphet highlights that “central government and the civil service have 
always seen their strength in policy and legislation, leaving agencies and local 
government to deliver” (Morphet, 2008: p.112).  This raises the point of 
responsibilities but does not address the decline of local government freedom in 
relation to service delivery and the rise of quangos (Wilson and Game, 2006).   
 
This hints at the distinction between the sometimes adversarial but sometimes 
supportive or supplementary relationship between town halls and Whitehall 
Departments when in competition with other Departments.  It builds upon the 
work done on ‘departmental pluralism’, which has “been employed to describe 
the fragmented nature of decision making” (Richardson and Jordan, 1979: 
p.28).   
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Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) build on this and emphasise that the current 
literature focuses on formal structures and institutional perspectives of the local 
government aspect to the paradigm rather than local governance, further 
criticising the literature for a tendency to “exaggerate the internal cohesion and 
homogeneity of both levels” (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001: p.212).   
 
Central government does have the lions’ share of formal powers e.g. tax setting, 
passing laws and regulation.  However, local government has a significant 
amount of formal and informal powers i.e. local knowledge on the needs of the 
community and (to a degree) the ability to tailor policy delivery.  Morphet (2008) 
acknowledges that local government does lack confidence, to the extent that in 
some cases it only does what is statutorily required by central government and 
does not undertake further action to avoid exposing the organisation to greater 
external risk.  This hypothesis, that local authorities avoid action that may 
expose the organisation to risk, is also laid down as the main reason behind the 
low use of the PoWB.  However this scenario only serves to reinforce the belief 
that the power lies in the centre rather than the locality.   
 
Pickles hints at that belief but emphasises that local government has to step 
forward saying that “it’s not about giving away money anymore – it’s about 
giving away power – it’s about less intervention, encouraging communities to 
step up to the plate” (Pickles, 2010).  This requirement for ambitious local 
authorities to step forward is not a new phenomenon.   
 
New Labour passed a range of legislation to promote the community leadership 
role of local authorities (Sullivan, 2007).  The PoWB represents one key power 
in the achievement of this objective (ODPM, 2006).  Pratchett and Leach 
describe this agenda as allowing greater “choice within constraint” (Pratchett 
and Leach, 2004: p.366).  However, Sullivan (2007) highlights that local 
government has had a community leadership feature since the mid-nineteenth 
century (Sullivan, 2007), which Nesta cite as the “glory days of municipal 
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government” (Nesta, 2010: p.16).  Walker further echoes this point citing that 
since:  
 
“modern administrative machinery was created in the mid-nineteenth 
century to provide public health and urban infrastructure, there have 
been few, if any, profound differences over basic purposes between local 
officials and representatives on the one side and the denizens of 
Whitehall and Westminster on the other”  
(Walker, 2000, p.4) 
 
Local Government discretion: rediscovering community leadership 
 
Sullivan (2007) highlights that authorities’ rediscovered community leadership 
role then became a keystone of the Local Government Modernisation Agenda 
(LGMA).  Sullivan (2007) also highlights that this role’s significance has varied 
in parallel to changes in relations between central and local government; 
echoing the point made earlier by Midwinter that:  
 
“after nearly twenty years of conflict between central and local 
government, labour’s election victory heralded the prospect of a 
return to a more consensual mode of relations”  
(Midwinter, 2001, p.311) 
 
Characterising the tendency of central government to exert greater constraint, 
specifically over central policy priorities to ensure continuity over service 
provision, Pratchett and Leach (2004) illustrate the level of freedom held by 
local government in the delivery of services – which later is echoed by Morphet 
(2008).  This perception is advanced by the fact that the PoWB was initially 
welcomed by local authorities; some tempered their consideration with 
scepticism regarding the seriousness of central government on this subject 
(ODPM, 2006).   
 
The PoWB represented one more part of local government’s toolkit of 
discretionary powers that allows the freedom to pursue radical innovation in 
local policy-making.  The rise of innovation in local policy-making was one key 
aspect of the modern rise of localism.   
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The Rise of New Localism  
 
Why localism? 
 
Historically speaking, localism has been favoured for three broad reasons.  It 
offers: 
 
 the opportunity for political participation,  
 a viable institution to deliver tailored local services and  
 the opportunity to diffuse power and act as a balance off-setting central 
government  
(King and Stoker, 1996).   
 
Contemporary or ‘new’ localism has come to be considered as local 
government’s ideology and enshrines the belief that because local government 
is closest to the community it therefore is the best level of government to offer 
services that are the closest match to the needs of the community (King and 
Stoker, 1996).  However, Stoker (2004) highlights differences of opinion on how 
to best advance the new localist agenda, describing that for some advocates 
“established local government needs to be brought back into the frame as 
central to new localism; others are not so convinced and have other institutions 
to steer local governance in mind” (Stoker, 2004: p.117).  This localist belief 
does seem to be contradictory to the conclusions of the IPPR (2009) report on 
intergovernmental relations; which highlights the relative weak position of local 
government (in comparison with central government) but it also portrays a self-
reinforcing scenario that is highly centralist in its analysis.   
 
The term ‘New Localism’ has been used to denote New Labour’s approach to 
Local Government since 1997. It has been defined as a strategy aimed at 
devolving power and resources away from central control towards communities 
and the consumers of local public services (Stoker, 2004). Morphet cites that its 
origins lie in “pressures on government to consider whether it should divest 
more central power to the local level” (Morphet, 2008: p.106), and that the 
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primary motivation for new localism was economic in order to pursue more 
efficient government to promote the economic health of the State.  Bunt and 
Harris argue that “local solutions are frequently very effective … and they are 
often cost effective” (Bunt and Harris, 2010: p.3), because local solutions to 
problems allow for a greater degree of flexibility and heterogeneity when 
offering solutions to challenges.  Stoker justifies the case for new localism on 
three grounds:  
 
 firstly as a practical response to modern governance and social 
problems, 
 secondly,  to facilitate a more engaging form of democracy for the 
modern world, and  
 thirdly, because new localism engenders elements of trust and builds 
social capital within communities which further encourages civic 
engagement  
(Stoker, 2004).   
 
However, Pratchett asserts that “most studies of local autonomy and local 
democracy fail to distinguish adequately between the two terms” (Pratchett, 
2004: p.358).  Pratchett also develops an additional distinction over variations of 
local autonomy; “freedom from central interference, freedom to effect particular 
outcomes and as the reflection of local identity” (Pratchett, 2004: p.358) and 
further argues that ‘new localism’s’ focus was directed more towards the 
‘freedom to’ type of autonomy and that the PoWB “are an illustration of such a 
focus” (Pratchett, 2004: p.370).  This implicit conclusion is that New Labour’s 
localist agenda did not extend universal freedom (i.e. neither ‘freedom to’ nor 
‘freedom from’).  As the PoWB was directed to extend “freedom to”, local 
authorities ‘freedom from’ was significantly reduced.   
 
New Labour’s New Localism 
 
Some local government scholars have stated that New Labour’s electoral 
victory in 1997 would herald the triumph of New Localism because of its 
popularity within progressive politics (Midwinter, 2001; Stoker, 2004). Stoker 
stresses the emphasis by citing that “the call for a shift in the approach to 
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reform and future of governance has become quite fashionable within 
progressive political circles” (Stoker, 2004: p.117).  It is accurate that there has 
been significant effort on the part of the New Labour government to actively 
promote local authorities’ community leadership role.  However, others dispute 
that beneficial reform of local government is limited to progressive politics.  
Rejecting the notion that successive Conservative governments enfeebled local 
government (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000; Pratchett and Leach, 2004), 
former Conservative Minister Nicholas Ridley MP was a powerful advocate of 
local authorities as ‘enabling authorities’, where councillors met to allocate 
contracts to external providers who then in turn provided services cheaply - an 
early version of the strategic commissioning body.   
 
On the rise of strategic local government, Stoker surmises that “the world of 
local governance would benefit from further institutional diversity, but there will 
remain a central role for elected local authorities” (Stoker, 2004: p.126).  This is 
due in part to local government’s existing and historical capacity to perform a 
community leadership role, or legitimacy (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).  
Stoker also advanced the argument for further powers to be given to selected 
local authorities that “have the capacity to operate as the major strategic 
organisations for their area” (Stoker, 2004: p.126) as ‘charter councils’.   
 
Pratchett further supports the extension of additional powers to selected local 
authorities surmising that “expressions such as constrained discretion and 
earned autonomy lie at the heart of the new localism vision” (Pratchett, 2004: 
p.369).  Barrow, Greenhalgh and Lister (2010) emphasise this point, and call for 
the creation of ‘foundation councils’.  Barrow, Greenhalgh and Lister suggest 
that ‘Foundation Councils’ could launch “trials in devolving more power to local 
authorities should be held in a number of sympathetic and well-managed local 
authorities” (Barrow, Greenhalgh and Lister, 2010: p.i).   
 
A detailed examination of those local authorities that have actively pursued a 
greater role in the local community will highlight that political control over those 
councils’ is not limited to a single political party.  This fact would seem to cast 
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doubt on the claim that New Localism is limited solely to progressive politics 
(Midwinter, 2001; Stoker, 2004).  The scoping study outlined in chapter 3 will 
discuss the politics of new localism in further detail and offer contemporary 
evidence on political control of authorities that pursue an active community 
leadership role.  This fact is again compounded by the pledge that a new 
Conservative government would introduce a new General Power of 
Competence, which would replace New Labour’s flagship localist policy – the 
PoWB (Conservatives, 2009).   
 
Pratchett goes further by demonstrating that localism has reached the 
mainstream of British politics, citing an example that “the Local Government 
Chronicle goes so far as to suggest that the new localism could be one of the 
battlegrounds of the next general election, as political parties compete to 
demonstrate how they will secure greater local autonomy and democracy 
across communities” (Pratchett, 2004: p.369).  IPPR & PwC notes that “indeed 
it might be said that we are all localists now” (IPPR & PwC, 2009: p.4).  This 
seems to place additional doubt that localism is limited to progressive politics by 
suggesting that localism has now transferred into the political mainstream.   
 
Bunt and Harris (2010) follow IPPR’s (2009) conclusions that localism has 
become a mainstream political objective.  However, they add a qualification that 
in practice central government would find localism difficult to achieve as 
“centrally driven initiatives have struggled to make an impact on many of the 
complex issues confronting us today” (Bunt and Harris, 2010, p.4).  However 
Stoker, whilst theorising on the degree of rhetoric involved in New Labour’s 
localism, highlights that the mixture of localist and centralist policies: 
 
“represents a strategic political response to the possibility that the 
Conservatives might use localism to attack the control freakery, state 
paternalism and big spending plans that could be said to characterise 
many of New Labour’s policies”  
(Stoker, 2004: p.118). 
 
Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg adopt a more sceptical position of New Labour’s 
policy, citing that “the extent to which New Labour is actually committed to 
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giving new powers to local government is still a matter for debate” (Atkinson and 
Wilks-Heeg, 2000: p.254).  Highlighting that the proposal for local authorities to 
promote the well-being of the communities that they serve was originally absent 
from the draft Local Government Bill in 1999 (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000).  
Pratchett argues that New Localism is more than “a normative reworking of 
concepts around local autonomy and local democracy: it also has practical 
implications” (Pratchett, 2004: p.368).  Practhett further echoes Atkinson and 
Wilks-Heeg’s (2000) tempered scepticism over New Labour’s commitment to 
localism citing “the same government has also been heavily criticised for its 
continuing centralisation strategies” (Pratchett, 2004: p.368).   
 
Midwinter (2001) and Braybrook (2008) have highlighted central government’s 
aspiration that the PoWB represents a power of first resort: as an example of 
localism in practice.  DCLG (2009) statutory guidance reinforces this aspiration 
stating that local government need look no further for legal power than the 
PoWB.  Recent events would seem to imply that this aspiration has not been 
realised i.e. the London Authority Mutual Limited (LAML) ruling at the Supreme 
Court dealt the PoWB a severe blow (Ahmad et al, 2009; Crump, 2009; Eaton, 
2009).  LAML was an attempt by a group of London Boroughs to set up a 
mutual insurance company using the PoWB.  Following a protest from a private 
company, that to do so was to act in contravention of open procurement 
regulations, the Supreme Court ruled that the PoWB did not include attempts to 
realise local government efficiencies – even if those efficiencies were invested 
in community projects.   
 
The original LAML ruling by the Supreme Court and the subsequent Appeals 
Court ruling has dealt a severe blow to the PoWB.  Whether it is a mortal blow 
remains to be seen.  Even though joint action between Local Authorities (in 
terms of procurement, insurance and certain services) continues, the legal 
foundation that the PoWB is based upon has been damaged.  Cautionary legal 
officers may question DCLG’s (2009) aspiration that the PoWB represents a 
power of first resort.   
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Practical Localism 
 
Pratchett (2004) highlights that New Localism is not without its critics.  IPPR & 
PwC (2009) highlights a number of practical operational barriers to greater 
powers and responsibilities being exercised at the local level.  These include: 
 
 a lack of general consensus over which powers should be devolved – 
and to whom, 
  a mixture of scepticism and suspicion in Whitehall over the capabilities 
of local government,  
 public hostility to variations in service that would occur as a result of local 
level discretion over core services, and  
 a media culture that holds central government accountable for all public 
services.   
(IPPR & PwC, 2009) 
 
Morphet (2008) cites Whitehall’s scepticism as ‘elite contempt’ of local 
government.  IPPR argues that it is the focus on central accountability, which is 
the biggest barrier to greater localism as “they [politicians and policy-makers] 
are being blamed for things which they no longer have control over” (IPPR, 
2009: p.5).  Whether IPPR’s (2009) conclusion is accurate or not, it illustrates 
the potential political pitfalls to greater localism.  This conclusion is in-part 
echoed by Bunt and Harris, citing that “government has traditionally found it 
difficult to support genuine local solutions while achieving national impact and 
scale” (Bunt and Harris, 2010: p.3).  Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg reinforced the 
requirement for local government to act to solve radical social challenges, 
stating that “local circumstances often require local solutions” (Atkinson and 
Wilks-Heeg, 2000: p.270).   
 
Bunt and Harris (2010) propose a solution to the disjunction, offering an 
approach called ‘mass localism’.  As a method of combining local action with 
national scale, Bunt and Harris offer ‘mass localism’ as a practical solution by a 
different kind of approach that combines local action with national scale that 
“policy-makers should create more opportunities for communities to develop 
and deliver their own solutions and to learn from each other” (Bunt and Harris, 
2010: p.5).  However, Bunt and Harris’ (2010) ‘mass localism’ presents 
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difficulties in that a solely bottom-up or locally driven approach risks creating 
geographical differences between local government services or ‘post-code 
lotteries’.  Pratchett acknowledges the inherent risk, stating that “central 
government has a primary role to play in ensuring territorial justice … the centre 
can be expected to emphasise particular policy outcomes and to focus attention 
on particular priorities” (Pratchett, 2004: p.369).  Walker further reinforces the 
concerns about differences in levels of service stating that “along with local 
differences, go inequality, under provision of vital services and capriciousness 
in their deliver” (Walker, 2002: p.2).  New Localism itself would not directly 
cause greater inequality but through variation in local services greater variation 
in outcomes might occur.  Walker (2002) moves beyond the role for central 
government that Pratchett (2004) outlines, and argues that local differentiation 
will ‘exacerbate variation and inequality’.   
 
Morphet acknowledges the inherent tensions between “local discretion and a 
post-code lottery” (Morphet, 2008: p.98), citing that this tension is only amplified 
by the centralised nature of governance in Britain but highlighting the extent to 
which a ‘principle of universality’ can be maintained by the adoption of basic 
standards or ‘floor targets’.  This echoes Pratchett’s (2004) theory on the role of 
central government in ensuring territorial justice and to an extent the adoption of 
performance metrics.  Milliband argued in favour of devolution of power beyond 
local government calling for a “double devolution of power from central 
government to local government, and then from local government to citizens 
and communities”’ (Milliband, 2006).   
 
Localism beyond local government  
 
Morphet (2008) highlights the argument that the best way to achieve New 
Localism is to enhance the existing powers and embolden the existing 
structures of ‘local government and, town and parish councils’.  However, this 
also highlights the alternate point of view, which is based on the presumption 
that “local government does not provide the right skills and immediacy for local 
engagement in local service delivery” (Morphet, 2008: p.129).  Morphet (2008) 
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terms this contrary view ‘central localism’; whereas Miliband (2006) refers to it 
as ‘double devolution’, from central to local government and from local to 
communities, or hyper-localism.  King and Stoker cite that there is a third tier in 
British government, that of “the parish or community council” (King and Stoker, 
1991: p.55).   
 
Although there is little contemporary academic research into the role of third tier 
or sub-principal authorities in Britain; tertiary authorities or town and parish 
councils “must not be overlooked” (Wilson and Game, 2006: p.81).  The 1997 
Local Government and Rating Act enabled residents to petition their local 
authority for the establishment of a parish council in their area, and by 2002 
over 107 new parish councils have been created (Bevan, 2003).  By 2003, there 
were approximately 8700 parish councils in England (Morphet, 2008).  Leach 
and Percy-Smith summarise the problematic nature of parish councils as 
“parish councils may have plenty of legitimacy but very little real authority” 
(Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001: p.142), making an important distinction between 
legitimacy and authority.   
 
“They are the ultimate form of decentralisation, because services or 
powers are devolved to legally independent bodies, thereby avoiding 
much of the conflict of interest which makes decentralisation half-hearted 
within a single organisation” 
(Coulson, 1999: p.115) 
 
Parish councils’ usual functions are usually to maintain open spaces and 
common, church yards and community halls, and offer advice to principal 
authorities on local planning matters.  However some tertiary authorities are 
extending services into other areas such as preservation schemes, providing 
off-street parking and employing neighbourhood cleaners (King and Stoker, 
1991; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; NALC, 2009).  Wilson and Game (2006) 
highlight that most of these functions are discretionary; only the consultation on 
planning matters function is statutorily required.  As such, parish councils are 
still within the ultra vires framework, and as such have little discretionary power 
and funding.   
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“the most dynamic local councils deliver a wide range of services, 
sometimes as contractors, more commonly under a little known clause 
(section 101) of the 1972 Local Government Act , which allows a council 
to arrange a discharge of any of its functions by any other local authority.  
This has the advantage of enabling local councils to enhance (or reduce) 
the quality of the services provided, grass cutting for example, or more 
frequent disposal of litter than the district or county contractor might have 
carried out.” 
(Coulson, 1999: p.116) 
 
Tertiary authorities: a neglected opportunity 
 
The 2007 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act extended the 
PoWB to Parish Councils (DCLG, 2009).  From ‘Quality councils’ status, which 
allowed parish or town councils roles including extended responsibilities and 
functions, the extension of the PoWB to tertiary authorities aimed at creating 
‘enabling councils’.  This was aimed to encourage tertiary authorities to move 
away from the previous necessarily cautious approach towards a more 
innovative approach to community governance (DCLG, 2009).   
 
The 2007 Act, however, created four caveats for the use of the Power by Parish 
Councils (DCLG, 2009).  The 2007 Act also attached the same prohibitions to 
the Power as those attached for Principal Authorities. It also made previous 
discretionary legislation (i.e. s137 of the 1972 Local Government Act) 
redundant.  Tertiary authorities operate solely upon the locally raised precept to 
fund discretionary activity.  Morphet (2008) highlights that, should central 
government wish to fund town or parish councils in the future, new legislation 
would be required.   
 
Although Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) distinguish between legitimacy and 
authority, no such distinction about either the personal abilities of councillors or 
of the collective ability of Parishes themselves is made.  Whilst the (legal) 
authority of the Parish Councils has been enhanced by the extension of the 
PoWB, albeit with some fairly severe caveats, the (financial) ability of the 
council to act as innovative community leaders remains delicate.   
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Tertiary authorities’ usage of the PoWB still has the same vulnerabilities as 
principal authorities uses of the PoWB as the PoWB “cannot be used to raise 
money … nor can it be used to circumvent prohibitions, restrictions or 
limitations” (DCLG, 2009: p.4).  Thereby the ability of the PoWB to act as a tool 
to introduce innovation to tertiary authorities is reduced.  The PoWB, as a 
discretionary tool, was further reduced by the pre-conditions required from 
tertiary authorities under the Quality Councils status.  The caveats and pre-
conditions on tertiary authorities’ use of the PoWB will be fully discussed in 
chapter 3.   
 
Innovation and Agile Government 
 
Walker highlights that “innovation has been promoted by governments around 
the world as a key tool to improve public services” (Walker, 2006: p.311).  After 
the ‘power politics’ (Stoker, 1999) of the previous Conservative Administrations 
that was often suspicious of local government, the New Labour Government’s 
key public service reform aim was to foster innovation in all public service 
arenas because innovation improves efficiency (Mulgan and Albury, 2003).   
 
The New Labour administration wanted to foster innovation in local government 
in order to reduce bureaucracy and modernise the public sector, which was part 
of the LGMA.  One main aspect of that was to create a power of first resort for 
local government that authorities could regard as a license to offer creative and 
innovative solutions to local problems – the PoWB.  Mason and McMahon state 
that “freedom for public services would enable professionals to provide better, 
more responsive and more innovative public services” (Mason and McMahon, 
2008: p.7).  Barrow, Greenhalgh and Lister submit that “local government faces 
four main barriers to providing public services that deliver value for money to 
local residents: the command state, the inspection industry, service silos and 
financial dependency” (Barrow, Greenhalgh and Lister, 2010: p.2).  Barrow, 
Greenhalgh and Lister (2010) maintain that these barriers have prevented local 
government from producing innovative local services to social challenges.   
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Strategic local government 
 
In 2004, the New Labour Government commissioned Sir Michael Lyons to 
consider the future role and function of local government in the UK.  The Lyons 
Inquiry (2005) recommends for a greater strategic or ‘place-shaping’ role for 
local government echoed the conclusions of an earlier review into local 
government – the 1976 Layfield Commission.  Morphet (2008) cites that the 
actual delivery of New Localism was rebranded by the Lyons Inquiry, and 
replaced with the greater place-shaping role.  One of the key issues at the heart 
of the Lyons Inquiry was the requirement to strike a balance between immediate 
improvements to public services and efficiencies, and the necessary longer 
term investments for future prosperity.  Lyons concluded that the relationship 
between the centre and the locality must be redressed to help contribute to 
wider national objectives (Lyons, 2007).  Both sets of recommendations 
advocated a broad localist position; Lyons cited “the pressing need to inspire a 
sense of powerfulness in local government” (Lyons, 2007: p.ii).  Although Lyons 
(2007) did not discuss the need for greater innovation in the public sector, the 
Inquiry report stresses the need for ‘lean and efficient working practices’ i.e. a 
more agile form of local government.   
 
Walker cites that “innovation is complex and contested” (Walker, 2006: p.311).  
Pickles implies that local government has been lacking in ambition, recently 
stating that the Coalition Government’s policy programme is designed to 
“encourage communities to step up to the plate” (Pickles, 2010).  Lyons cites 
that “the challenge is to strike the right balance” (Lyons, 2007: p.12).  An off-
balance approach runs the risk of either over-emphasising the importance of 
frameworks that work in every area so the whole sector must travel at the same 
pace as the slowest component, or over-experimentation which runs the risk 
that many local authority areas spend time reinventing new approaches and 
therefore wasting officer time and further resources.   
 
Lyon’s conclusions on the route to greater innovation in local government 
follows the broadly localist perspective throughout the Inquiry 
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recommendations, citing that “central government should not routinely issue 
guidance on innovation – rather the family of local government should take 
more of the responsibility for this … providing information and good practice” 
(Lyons, 2007: p.12) as further central prescription could in effect reduce local 
innovation.  However, Walker cites that “theory and empirical evidence 
suggests innovation adoption is likely to be mediated by the external context 
within which an organisation sits” (Walker, 2006: p.314).  
 
Innovation in local government: mismatched requirements and capabilities?  
 
Nesta reflected on innovation in local government with regard to future 
organisational challenges and questions whether “local government has the 
right attitude and skills for the difficult times ahead?  Is the sector ready to face 
new demands with the energy and determination that will be required?” (Nesta, 
2010: p.15).  The report further highlights that there are a “well documented set 
of barriers within local government” despite the history of innovative municipal 
government, and that innovation is sometimes a ‘happy accident’ that is the 
result of individuals “who don’t take no as an answer” (Nesta, 2010: p. 15).  This 
statement raises the question of whether this is the case with the low use of the 
PoWB.  Is the low usage of the PoWB the result of the majority of local 
authorities’ officers interpreting the PoWB cautiously?  For those authorities that 
have proactively used the PoWB, has their use been driven by ambitious 
officers or elected members?  
 
This suggests that innovation is not completely divorced from external 
pressures.  In some cases external challenges may be the cause of the 
adoption of innovative practice.  Schumpeter’s (1950) argument that economic 
uncertainty provides the opportunity for innovation clearly links externalities with 
innovation.  IPPR argues that “the 2008 financial crash demonstrated with 
devastating effect serious flaws in the UK’s economic model” (IPPR, 2010: p.5), 
arguing for the importance of innovation.  IPPR argues that “contemporary 
economic policy-making needs to be centred on three core principles: it must be 
innovation-centred, pragmatic and aware” (IPPR, 2010: p.7), and these are 
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almost identical characteristics to those required by ‘agile’ governments 
(Demos, 2008).   
 
This thesis highlights examples of innovative practice in local government from 
reopening closed Post Offices in Essex to enhancing the emotional resilience of 
school children in South Tyneside.  The LGiD and NEF (2010) highlights that 
“as the UK lurched from a banking crisis into a full blown recession, Essex 
[County Council] and its partners recognised the need to act quickly and 
effectively” (LGiD and NEF, 2010, p.35).  Essex County Council launched a 
range of policy interventions to combat the effects of the recession, the 
measures included: 
 
 Providing financial assistance to economically vulnerable residents, 
 Increasing the capacity of local credit unions,  
 Increased its programme of reopening closed post offices, and 
 Launching the Banking on Essex initiative, which provides loans to 
businesses.   
(LGiD and nef, 2010, p.35) 
 
The examples cited by the LGiD and nef (2010) therefore highlight the 
importance of external challenges. However, external challenge would only 
present the catalyst to local innovation.  One result of ongoing reduction in 
public expenditure is local government facing calls for greater – more radical – 
innovation.   
 
Blond summarises that scale of the challenge facing the public sector in the UK 
saying “not only must they contend with ever increasing public expectations and 
societal challenges such as an ageing population, but they must do this in the 
face of the biggest shock to public finances in living memory” (Blond, 2009: p.5).  
The extent of the reduction in public expenditure and combined with the nature 
of the challenge has promoted commentators to say that ‘salami-slicing’ or 
shaving savings off existing budgets will not achieve the level of savings that 
are needed (Butler, 2010; Taylor, 2010).  Mason and McMahon (2008) state 
that with fewer regulatory requirements and lower levels of bureaucracy, a 
reduction of £15 billion a year in government spending could be achieved with 
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no loss of front-line services.  Whereas Blond proposes that “empowering 
frontline staff to drive service improvement can result in very significant savings, 
in the order of 20-40 per cent” (Blond, 2009: p.6).  To foster greater innovation 
in local government, central government needs to provide greater legal, 
financial and bureaucratic freedom.  Lyons also emphasised the importance of 
central-local coordination to improve local freedom, stating: 
 
“improving local accountability and governance rely to a large degree on 
local government changing its behaviours.  Central government needs to 
design a framework which encourages and enables local authorities to 
take responsibility for how their communities are governed, and to 
design, and demonstrate the value of governance structures which work 
for their locality.  No single model will work everywhere and too much 
central prescription could result in inappropriate local solutions and 
reduced innovation.”  
(Lyons, 2007: p.7)   
 
Can the reduction in public sector expenditure and the tightening fiscal 
environment act as a sufficient catalyst to engender radical innovation and 
inspire Lyons’ (2007) ‘sense of powerfulness’ and ambition?  Nesta questions 
whether “local government has the right attitude and skills for the difficult times 
ahead? (Nesta, 2010: p.15).  Demos (2008) highlight the importance (and 
potential) of agile government, citing a case study of a private company that 
was facing bankruptcy, inefficiencies, low productivity and low employee morale 
and ten years later the company had grown by over 900 per cent.  Demos 
(2008) emphasise the importance of agility by showing that agility offers 
government the ability to meet external challenges and respond to an 
increasingly ‘uncertain global environment’.  Agile government is defined as 
“understanding and meeting the needs of the citizens in the short term, adapting 
structures and services to address medium term trends, and shaping needs in 
the long term” (Demos, 2008: p.1).  In practical terms, for public sector 
organisations agility means: 
 
 Short term frontline responsiveness,  
 Strategic adaptation, 
 Outcome focus, and  
 Preventing or reducing problems before they arise. 
(Demos, 2008: p.5) 
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Board (2010), using the same example as the Demos (2008) research, 
emphasises the importance of leadership in fostering innovation.  Walker 
reinforces the significance for innovation adoption, stating that “the role of 
leaders in organizations is important” (Walker, 2006: p.315) but also 
acknowledges that innovation “needs to be understood as a complex and 
heterogeneous management strategy in public organisation” (Walker, 2006: 
p.330).  Leadership plays a decisive role in creating agile organisations.  Agile 
governance offers a more practical route to achieve innovation in public 
services.   
 
Innovation and Organisational Agility 
 
Demos cite that “innovation is a key aspect of agility because it implies a 
willingness to explore a variety of different approaches to find out what works.  It 
entails constantly developing the capacity of government to meet citizen needs” 
(Demos, 2008: p.23).  It acknowledges that “governments cannot become agile 
overnight” (Demos, 2008: p.23).  Bunt and Harris surmise that “it is not enough 
to assume that scaling back government bureaucracy and control will allow 
local innovation to flourish (Bunt and Harris, 2010: p.5).  Walker (2006) 
summarises the factors important in fostering (and facilitating) innovation in 
local government as the politics, the people and the partnerships involved in the 
process.  Demos reinforce the importance of people and partnerships in 
fostering innovation and achieving agility, as promoting collaborative working 
citing: 
 
“Finland’s central government wanted to become more problem-
focussed, it rejected structural change in favour of creating policy making 
networks of ministers and civil servants that work across departmental 
boundaries to deliver outcome goals”  
(Demos, 2008: p.23) 
 
However, structures and processes are only one part; a change in local 
authority culture and relationships are crucial in achieving innovation.  Walker 
corroborates this finding citing that “the external political environment is 
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extremely important” (Walker, 2006: p.315).  Demos (2008) and Board (2010) 
highlight that both leadership and the culture of an organisation is crucial in 
achieving agile government.   
 
The NEF’s (2010) cite that “almost every local authority in the country has 
developed or piloted some new service” (Wilson and Game, 2006: p.41).  
Through sharing best practice and fostering cooperative learning, local 
government is often much more innovative than central government.  This may 
be because some innovative projects are easier to deliver on a micro-scale or 
because of the scale of negotiation involved with some issues on a national 
level.  Yet, this is not a new phenomenon.  Nesta cites local government’s 
historical precedent as “ the glory days of municipal government in the late 
Victorian period saw the [local government] sector leading the way when it 
came to matters such as public health, gas and electricity provision, public 
parks and council housing” (Nesta, 2010: p.16).   
 
Local government can embed innovation within the local community, fostering 
creativity and growing new methods of delivering services and enshrining 
entrepreneurialism in local authorities (Nesta, 2010).  Furthermore Wilson and 
Game reflect that local authorities are engines of innovation that offer a limitless 
list of examples much more radical than those offered by central government 
(Wilson and Game, 2006).  Wilson and Game (2000), therefore, contrast with 
Nesta (2010). Nesta highlights that “despite a long history of fostering 
innovations, there are a well-documented set of barriers within local 
government” (Nesta, 2010: p.15).  Nesta also highlights that local government 
(as a sector) is breaking through institutional barriers citing that “the sector is 
already showing signs that the seeds of its new role in driving nationally 
relevant innovation have taken root” (Nesta, 2010: p.15).  The success of 
innovation in local government, however, is dependent on relations between the 
centre and the local level.   
 
Sullivan (2007) highlights that local government taking a role as innovative 
community leaders is not a new concept.  Morphet highlights that the “mass of 
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separate targets between agencies has been one of the significant hurdles of 
joint working” (Morphet, 2008: p.41).  Morphet (2008) also concedes that local 
authorities’ indidvidual ability to work in partnership with other bodies and 
promote community leadership depends on local need and priority.   
 
Well-being and the emergence of Active Localism 
 
Post 1997, a community leadership role has been reintroduced as part of the 
LGMA and some progress has been made in creating a more strategic agency 
role for local government, albeit at the cost of greater central control.  The Local 
Government Association argued that active civic leadership was a key 
commitment for modern local government by working in partnership “to promote 
local well-being, social justice and social inclusion” (LGA, 1998: p.6).  Pratchett 
(2004) highlights the Comprehensive Performance Assessment as an example 
of central control.  One exception to the centralising tendencies of recent local 
government modernisation was the PoWB.   
 
The PoWB enables local government to do anything they are not already able 
to do under the ultra vires framework.  Although the PoWB is not legally a 
power of general competence it did technically loosen the legal constraints that 
held local authorities in place and granted local government a degree of 
autonomy (Wilson and Game, 2006).  Sullivan defines community leadership as 
‘the pursuit of community well-being through strategic interventions that would 
not otherwise have happened’ (Sullivan, 2007: p.143).  The PoWB realised local 
government’s community leadership role and solidified their rediscovered role in 
legislation.   
 
Whilst the measures contained within the Local Government Act 2000 may 
have signalled the emergence a New Localist agenda, scholars seek to clarify 
the notion of New Localism.  This involves distinguishing between ‘new’ New 
Localists or ‘Active’ Localists and Old Localists (Wilson and Game, 2006).  
Perhaps this clarification should be expanded to cover legal duties offering local 
government greater autonomy?  An alternative is Pratchett’s (2004) ‘freedom to’ 
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distinction; the PoWB is the bedrock of Old Localism, whereas the future of 
Active Localism relies more heavily on a new Power of General Competence or 
a General Power of Competence.  Old Localism is characterised by power 
relationships, formal structures of local governance and focuses on financial 
control.  Active Localism accepts the role of central government in the power 
relationship and the freedoms acquired by local authorities (Pratchett and 
Leach, 2004: Wilson and Game, 2006).  Active Localism argues that many of 
the problems facing the public sector cross formal boundaries of democratically 
elected institutions.  A revision of the local governance structure may be 
required, with local authorities’ assuming a facilitator role rather than the focal 
point in the network; due to their ‘legitimacy’ (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001) 
and their practicality to respond to complex local governance challenges 
(Stoker, 2004).  This is an approach, which reflects the relationship developed 
between local actors in Bristol (McMahon, 2002; Wilson and Game, 2006).   
 
Whether or not the extent of future local government reforms will be seen as 
pervasive enough by some political scientists, politicians from all three major 
parties have made public statements that subscribe to a localist agenda (Wilson 
and Game, 2006; IPPR, 2009; House of Commons, 2009).  However, what type 
of localism has become the norm?  Many of the reforms of local government 
have represented the blunt edge of a centralising tendency; the PoWB 
represents a creative tool for local authorities to use with regard to policy 
making.  Despite this new tool for local autonomy and creativity, the future role 
of local government remains (for the moment) uncertain.   
 
Due to the 2008 financial crisis, and ensuing global recession, public finances 
have been strained and, as a result, the national deficit is at an all time high.  
With all the major parties talking about public sector spending cuts, centrally 
imposed tax increases and efficiencies throughout government, it remains to be 
seen whether any party will consider a structural reform of local government 
finance.  If a similar level of resource allocation and the spending formula 
remains stable then perhaps greater legal freedom for local government would 
help foster a more widespread localist agenda.  The 2010 Budget, however, 
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committed the Coalition Government to a vast programme of ongoing reduction 
in public expenditure, in order to reduce the scale of the deficit within the 
lifetime of one Parliament (HM Treasury, 2010).   
 
The 2010 Budget radically renegotiated the local government funding 
settlement, Communities and Local Government Secretary, Eric Pickles stated 
that “it’s not about giving away money anymore; it’s about giving away power” 
(Pickles, 2010).  Prior to the General Election, the Conservative Party published 
a draft Green Paper on localism.  It discusses the nature of local freedom and 
committed the Conservative Party to introducing a new General Power of 
Confidence and a discretionary power to levy taxes to support the local 
community (Conservatives, 2009).  The Coalition Government’s ‘manifesto’ 
committed the government to introducing a General Power of Competence and 
to promote a ‘radical devolution of power and greater financial autonomy to 
local government community groups’ (Cabinet Office, 2010).   
 
Whether these actions would promote a new form of ‘Active’ Localism remains 
to be seen.  Whilst there is a considerable amount legal speculation regarding 
the PoWB because of its initial lack-lustre take-up and the following Local 
Authorities Mutual Limited judgement, whether an un-tried General Power of 
Confidence would remove (or embolden) this uncertainty also remains 
questionable.  Even so, some proactive local authorities have used the PoWB 
to pursue an ‘actively’ localist agenda.  Although some local authorities that 
have used the PoWB and funded their projects through local area based grants, 
this activism has taken root regardless of the existing financial shackles placed 
upon local government.  If this level of activism remains constant then an 
actively localist agenda may well spread further to other authorities, and the 
active leadership role (rather than partner) may become commonplace.   
 
The Turn to Well-Being 
 
As highlighted earlier, the LGMA, and specifically the PoWB, was introduced to 
modernise local government.  Through modernisation, central government 
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aimed to restore local government’s confidence and empower authorities to 
engage in policy areas that had traditionally off limits; areas such as 
sustainability or well-being.  When introduced, the PoWB itself was the tool that 
enabled local government to engage in extra-statutory policy areas (such as the 
promotion of general well-being).  A growing debate, at the time of the 
introduction of the PoWB, was on sustainability and sustainable development 
(Dolan and Peasgood, 2006).  However, this policy focus drifted and matured 
into a debate on general well-being.   
 
The study of well-being in public policy and its implications for policy-making is 
an emerging area of interest (Bok, 2010).  Well-being has been a growing issue 
in public policy over the last thirty years.  It still remains, however, an 
evolutionary concept, and it is the latest in a series of policies that address 
social capital, resilience and social inclusion (Jordan, 2008).  The importance of 
promoting ‘well-being’ has been increasingly acknowledged as a key aim of 
social, economic and environmental policy interventions (Bacon et al, 2010).  
 
Bok also highlights that “the idea [of Gross National Happiness] has begun to 
catch the attention of other governments” (Bok, 2010, p.4).  The Stiglitz 
Commission is a significant development in the debate on well-being.  The 
Stiglitz Commission represents the first time that the Government of a major 
economic power has placed the promotion of well-being as a central goal of 
public policy.  The report recommendations have since led President Sarkozy to 
propose ten ‘happiness’ indicators, which measure the progress of French 
society ranging from recycling to relationships and tax credits to traffic 
congestion (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009).   
 
In the UK in 2003, the Sustainable Development Commission began to explore 
how policies might change with an ‘explicit well-being focus’ (Dolan and 
Peasgood, 2006).  In 2007, the Young Foundation began – in cooperation with 
central and local government, Professor Lord Layard and the Improvement and 
Development Agency (IDeA) – a three year research project to explore the 
practical examples of how local government can improve the well-being of local 
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people entitled the ‘Local Wellbeing Project’.  The initiative found that “wellbeing 
can be made a practical policy goal, both nationally and locally, and that it 
provides a very different way of thinking about changing needs to traditional 
approaches” (Bacon et al, 2010: p.7), offering contradictory findings to Johns 
and Ormerod (2007).  Whilst there remains much uncertainty over the study of 
the concept and its practical elements (Diener et al, 2009), conceptually, well-
being could be applied to a number of similar policy debates ranging from social 
capital to community cohesion (Layard 2005; Bacon et al, 2008).  Nevertheless, 
this growth – in populism of well-being – has not been entirely unopposed.   
 
The Coalition Government announced a review into developing a method of 
measuring people’s psychological and environmental well-being, echoing the 
Stiglitz Commission (2009) report findings by wanting a ‘combined well-being 
data set’ to have a central role in national policy-making (Hoskin, 2010; Stratton, 
2010b).  The movement away from Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to an index 
of general well-being could prove to be the beginning of an international trend 
amongst developed economies.   
 
Canada has begun to measure life satisfaction between the provinces and has 
found that the richer provinces are not generally happier (Stratton, 2010a), 
reiterating Easterlin’s (1974) original finding.  HM Treasury (2008), however, 
concluded that more research is needed, but that by necessity alone practical 
policies that promote local well-being need to be bottom-up in design and 
delivery.  Whether the research into well-being now provides a critical mass is 
uncertain.  Diener acknowledges the inherent difficulties in the use of well-being 
metrics as a criterion for success, and offers an alternative approach that would 
use “well-being measures to guide policy” (Diener, 2009: p.124) in a direction 
that would allow greater well-being to emerge.   
 
There is, as yet, little debate on how local government well-being interventions 
have impacted at a community level and little comparison of usage of the PoWB 
across the English local authorities.  This thesis will address this gap in the 
academic literature by carrying out a thorough examination of the capacity of 
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local authorities to promote well-being, and how their organisational capacity 
affects their take up of the PoWB.  An examination of the relationship between 
well-being and the role of political institutions will help identify what role the local 
authority political leadership plays in promoting well-being in a local area, and 
exercising an authorities’ autonomy.  The PoWB enables such an examination.   
 
Original research carried out as part of this thesis will explore the role of elected 
members as local leaders in the promotion of local well-being.   Wolf raises an 
interesting point over the issue of what form of governance arrangements 
should underpin the development of well-being in policy by asking “should we 
accept the common view that the new science of happiness has cemented the 
superiority of Scandinavian social democracy over Anglo-Saxon liberalism ... 
the answer is no” (Wolf, 2007).  Johns and Ormerod offer the conclusion that “it 
is clearly debateable whether government should presume responsibility for 
individuals’ emotional states” (Johns and Ormerod, 2007: p.19).  However, 
Aristotle treated the State as “one of the chief means through which the 
individual attains happiness” (Aristotle, 1905: p.3).   
 
Since 1997, and the introduction of the PoWB, local authorities have 
increasingly adopted projects solely orientated towards promoting the well-
being of local communities and residents.  Rowell highlights examples of 
authority well-being projects: 
 
 Bristol City Council’s Quality of Life survey, 
 Manchester City Council’s Community Guardians, 
 Nottingham City Council’s work with younger people, and 
 Thanet District Council’s well-being audit of wards that led to the creation 
of their Safer Stronger Community Fund. 
(Rowell, 2010: p.197) 
 
The introduction of the PoWB marked the beginning of a trend that shifted the 
debate from an implicit focus on well-being to explicit well-being focus in policy 
and projects.  Previously local authorities engaged in projects that would 
address a challenge or issue, which would also promote local well-being; the 
PoWB provided a shift in the debate and supported the emphasis on well-being 
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on the policy agenda.  Despite its comparative limitations, “local government, 
because of its position on the ground, often has the potential to respond in a 
more effective way than far away central government” (Atkinson and Wilks-
Heeg, 2000: p270).  Therefore, the gradual shift – emboldened by the 
introduction of the PoWB – also presents a fundamental change.  The gradual 
shift towards the emphasis on well-being began under Local Agenda 21 (LA21).  
Even though LA21 began as a global initiative, local authorities responded to 
the challenge by seeking new opportunities.  Whilst this could be taken as a 
demonstration of the reality of multi-level governance and the ‘hollowing out of 
the nation-state (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000; Jessop, 2004), a number of 
authorities exercised their autonomy by taking advantage of opportunities open 
to them.   
 
Post-1997, the New Labour Government stated that greater autonomy would 
only be made available after substantial modernization (Atkinson and Wilks-
Heeg, 2000).  Local authorities saw what began under LA21 extended to 
include poverty, health and sustainable development.  The Government 
Department with responsibility for well-being is DEFRA and this is evidence of a 
gradual policy drift – and perhaps the advantage of local over central 
government responsiveness.  The PoWB, however, marks the first explicit move 
to focus on well-being.   
 
Prior to this change, local authorities did not explicitly act to promote well-being.  
Although implicit action was taken, and projects engaged into, the promotion of 
local well-being was not the ultimate objective.  This gradual shift towards well-
being, has been mirrored by a burgeoning academic literature on well-being and 
the determinants of well-being.   
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the longest standing debates in central-local government relations over 
the last century “has been the extent to which its dependency on specific legal 
powers erodes local government’s role in delivery and its ability to lead and 
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serve its communities” (Morphet, 2008, p.37).  However, an equally – if not 
more – important debate relates to funding and local government finance.   
 
Morphet acknowledges that the year 2000 acted as a ‘watershed’ in the drive 
for greater localism.  Yet the PoWB, which was supposed to act as a power of 
first resort for local government (DCLG, 2008b; INLOGOV, 2008), has only 
been used by 15% of local authorities (Williams, 2010).  Did the PoWB act as 
intended or do local government officers still consider the role of powers in the 
traditional manner?  Furthermore, the gradual policy drift and growth of well-
being represent a fundamental shift in relations between central government 
and local authorities.  The mirrored modernisation of local government and 
development of well-being policies – both epitomised by the introduction of the 
PoWB – mark a new branch of debate.   
 
Morphet highlights that the “changes in local government have not attracted as 
much interest as other areas [of constitutional reform] and have remained 
unsung” (Morphet, 2008: p.36).  The counter argument that local authorities 
have a great degree of freedom within the existing legal constraints may 
account for the differing level of performance, the financial and political freedom 
that exists in local government in the UK remains to be seen.   
 
Although some local authorities’ limited ambition and autonomy may be the 
result of combative relations during the 1980s, and therefore lack of confidence, 
the view that local government was New Labour’s achilles heel led to tighter 
control of local authorities through “the rigid application of targets and spending 
direction, with far fewer degrees of local freedom” (Morphet, 2008: p.38) may 
have further exacerbated the problem.  While different scholars summarise the 
model of inter-governmental relationship in different ways, from a ‘complex 
game’ (Rhodes, 1981) to a ‘swinging pendulum’ (House of Commons, 2009), it 
could be correct to assume that “local authorities wanted to have their power 
restored and then to be left alone” (Morphet, 2008: p.11).   
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In addition to over two hundred Acts of Parliament between 1979 and 1997, 
since 1997, 28 Acts of Parliament have directly affect District Councils alone 
(Mason and McMahon, 2008).  Even though relations between central and local 
government are much more consensual than during relations during the 1908s, 
offering a simple left versus right analogy would seem to be overly simplistic 
(Walker, 2000; Blond, 2009).   
 
Since 1997, New Labour sought to res-establish local government’s community 
leadership role to allow a renaissance of innovative municipal government as 
part of the LGMA (Sullivan, 2007).  The interpretation of the vires framework 
dictates the ability of local government to respond to external challenges, 
particularly with regard to spending.  Post 1997 successive legislation has 
increased the degree of local government’s legal discretionary ability (Morphet, 
2008).  The challenge is for ambitious local authorities to recognise and 
capitalise upon opportunities created by these ‘implied powers’ (DCA, 2003; 
Morphet, 2008).  The Coalition Government seems to be attempting to address 
this challenge by “encouraging communities to step up to the plate” (Pickles, 
2010) and embracing the previously championed ‘localism beyond local 
government’ (Milliband, 2006).   
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Chapter 3 -  Local Well-Being: the Policy context  
 
This chapter will offer an insight into the policy context from which the PoWB 
emerged by highlighting the history of local government since 1997 and by 
providing contemporary evidence on the PoWB.  The contemporary evidence 
will assist later in creating a basis for a typology of local authorities.  It will 
provide examples of well-being policies in local, national and international 
political arenas.   
 
Understanding well-being: the policy context 
 
McMahon (2002) offers one example of local bottom-up design and delivery by 
a local partnership in Bristol to develop a range of Quality of Life indicators.  
The indicators began as a measurement of sustainability but were developed 
into a broader range of ‘traffic light’ well-being indicators.  While the indicators 
were initially designed to measure sustainable development, the purpose 
eventually drifted towards a more holistic Quality of Life indicator set.  These 
were composed of over 60 indicators such as unemployment, local pollution, 
absence from local school and levels of deprivation.   
 
Bristol’s indicators have informed local people about the quality of life in their 
area, which has led to “political, community or individual action for change” 
(McMahon, 2002: p.177).  McMahon’s (2002) research aligns with HM 
Treasury’s (2008) conclusion that viable policies need to be more composite.  
Although the measurement of indicators started as a top-down initiative, it was 
acknowledged that bottom-up indicators provide a more valuable insight.  The 
two approaches were developed into a single cohesive indicator set using 
information from European, national, regional, local levels and community 
groups to piece together a “multi-sectoral approach that strengthens 
partnerships with other agencies” (McMahon, 2002: p.185).  Aside from 
McMahon (2002) and Bacon et al (2010), work on well-being in local policy and 
the community there is little other research – and very little original academic 
research on the subject.   
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Layard (2005) cites that just six factors account for 80% of the variation in 
reported subjective well-being; divorce, unemployment, belief in God, quality of 
government, membership of non-religious organisations, and the level of trust 
felt within a society.  Obviously, policy-makers cannot target public policies 
against all of these six factors; it can however target some of them to reduce the 
variation of subjective well-being in the population.  However, how can well-
being (as a policy agenda) be understood and how can policies be developed to 
improve people’s well-being in the wider political context that now includes the 
Big Society.   
 
McMahon’s (2002) research found that a partnership approach between the 
local authority and local community groups offered a stronger approach to the 
development of the local indicators.  By fostering an enabling approach to 
community governance, local government could take the lead in the Big Society 
by developing policies to promote local well-being.  In many local authorities, an 
enabling approach may already be in place but often not in relation to promoting 
local well-being.   
 
By adopting an enabling approach to the promotion of local well-being, this 
approach would utilise McMahon’s (2002) partnership experience and allow a 
greater unfettered approach to promoting well-being.  Whilst national 
government focuses policy on achieving macro level goals that would prevent 
negative well-being (i.e. reducing unemployment and working to enhance the 
quality of government), local government and community groups could work 
together to reduce any barriers to greater well-being by tailoring local policies 
that could achieve the piecemeal bottom-up approach that HM Treasury (2008) 
outlined.   
 
In the face of reduced public expenditure and a shrinking role for the 
government, the Big Society represents an opportunity for local government and 
community organisations to step forward and seize the opportunity to 
emphasise the importance of promoting local well-being.  Bacon et al 
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acknowledge that this focus is “particularly important during periods of 
recession and recovery” (Bacon et al, 2010: p.86).  When localism and well-
being metrics are matched as policy priorities of the Coalition Government, and 
when local government must pursue a radically different approach to community 
governance to meet the growing demands with fewer resources, the Big Society 
represents a potential route to giving an additional impetus to the goal of greater 
well-being.  This would be in line with the Coalition Government’s desire that 
well-being has a central role in policy-making (Hoskin, 2010; Stratton, 2010b).  
 
However, Hatter (2010) also concedes that the limitations of a well-being or 
happiness metric as a gauge for public policy ‘need to be recognised’.  At 
present, there is severely limited coverage of the political institutions and policy-
makers; institutions and actors that shape public policy and can promote well-
being.  There has been little academic research into the role of local authorities 
in explicitly promote well-being through their statutory discretionary powers 
(Section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000 – the PoWB).   
 
Where the existing research into the use of the PoWB has focussed on the 
prevalence of the uses of PoWB, this thesis will attempt to gauge which factors 
have inhibited or facilitated local authorities’ use of the PoWB.  This research 
will be framed in a contemporary evidence base to establish how widespread 
the use of the PoWB has been.  This research on the PoWB will then be used 
to explore the appropriateness of developing a conceptual typology of local 
government to define different innovative types of local authority.  Furthermore, 
this research may offer insights that could impact on local authorities’ adoption 
of a General Power of Competence (GPC), especially given the potential for 
comparison between the PoWB and the GPC (HoC Deb 17 Jan 2011 c561).   
 
This review will aim to fill a gap in the literature by reporting upon recent 
research that locates the use of the PoWB within the broader debates on local 
government autonomy.  In light of the Coalition Government’s intended 
development of a General Power of Competence (GPC) for local authorities, 
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this original research will highlight lessons that could encourage further 
innovation in local government.    
 
The Power of Well-Being: the context 
 
The Local Government Act 2000 established a duty for local authorities to 
develop a comprehensive strategy to promote the ‘well-being of local residents, 
the area and those people present in it’ (Great Britain. Local Government Act 
2000: sc.4).  It also contained legal authority for local authorities to do so – the 
PoWB (Great Britain. Local Government Act 2000: sc.2).  The PoWB is “part of 
a range of tools which help local authorities to exercise their role as strategic 
leaders of their communities” (DCLG, 2008b: p.2).  The origin of the PoWB lies 
in the 1997 Labour general election manifesto, which stated that local 
government should be less constrained by central government (The Labour 
Party, 1997); the intention was that it would restore local government’s self-
confidence.  
 
However, there are significant limitations on the adoption of the PoWB.  The 
limitations of the PoWB were outlined earlier in this thesis in chapter one.  Of 
the limitations placed on the Power, the inability to raise capital or revenue and 
the requirement to demonstrate use of the PoWB are particularly relevant.   
 
“Departmental officials told us that the well-being power was one of the 
most important parts of the Act yet they have difficulty in providing 
specific uses of the power in the sense of pointing to concrete examples 
of things being done which could not previously have been done."  
 (HoC, 2002) 
 
These limitations were placed on all local authorities (principal and tertiary tier), 
however additional restrictions were placed on tertiary authorities.  The 
additional tertiary tier restrictions will be outlined in detail later in this thesis.  
The limitations stipulate that any project that uses the PoWB has to be financed 
by existing local authority funding or central government grant.  The LGA (2003) 
stipulates that “given these limitations, it is not always a simple question to 
determine whether a specific proposition can be pursued by a council under the 
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well-being power.  Financial issues area a particular are of uncertainty” (LGA, 
2008, p.3).  The Local Government Act (2003), however, provided local 
authorities with powers on borrowing, trading and charging (Great Britain. Local 
Government Act 2003).   
 
This enabled local authorities to begin charging for discretionary services, 
reinforcing an earlier pre-existing power (Great Britain. Local Authorities (Goods 
and Services) Act 2007), and to trade on a ‘commercial basis’ (Great Britain. 
Local Government Act 2003: sc.93).  A later clause in the 2003 Act placed a 
potential limitation on the ability to trade.  Section 94 allows the Secretary of 
State to revoke Section 93 wherever appropriate (Great Britain. Local 
Government Act 2003 :sc.94).  Wilson and Game (2006) highlight a similar 
aspect that could affect usage of the PoWB in that it is subject to ministerial 
interpretation.  This recurrent element of central oversight over local 
government power may prove to be a significant contributing factor in the limited 
use of the PoWB.   
 
Whilst Section 94 of the 2003 Act (Great Britain. Local Government Act 2003) 
allows for an element of central government control over the level of charging 
for discretionary services that could affect legal officers’ input, in conjunction 
with the PoWB, local authorities are now permitted to borrow and charge (on a 
non-profit basis) for services.  For the first three years since the inception of the 
PoWB, discretionary finance was unavailable.  The Local Government Act 
(2000), furthermore, abolished a previous discretionary finance clause - Section 
137 of the 1972 Local Government Act, which allowed local authorities to “incur 
expenditure for certain purposes not otherwise authorised” (Great Britain. Local 
Government Act 1972: sc137).   
 
“section 137 of the Local Government Act 1972, as amended by 
Schedule 2 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, provides a 
local authority with the power to spend a liited amount on activites for 
which it has no specific powers, but which the authorities considers ‘will 
bring direct benefit to the area, or any part of it or all or some of its 
inhabitants’”.  
(Ellwood, Tricker and Waterston, 2000: p.8) 
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The 1972 Act’s discretionary finance clause was also limited on a per capita 
basis of how much local authorities could spend and was recognised of ‘limited 
value’ given the restrictions; however its usage was extremely widespread.  The 
discretionary spending (or charging) limit for tertiary authorities is £3.50 per 
local government elector (Ellwood, Tricker and Waterston, 2000).  Whilst this 
figure represents a modest limit, the population served by tertiary authorities 
can differ tremendously from under 100 to 30,000.  Therefore, the maximum 
discretionary finance available (under the limit) to a tertiary authority would be 
£105,000.  For the lowest tier of local government in England, this amount – 
whilst not comparable to principal tier authorities’ budgets – could represent a 
significant discretionary budget.  ODPM found that “92% of local authorities 
used s137  ... average use was 31% of the available financial limit” (ODPM, 
1999, p.1). 
 
Figure 4: Use of s137 in 1996/97 by type of local authority 
Section 137 spend as a % of the limit Counties Mets London Unitaries Districts All authorities 
Over 90% 0% 4% 8% 14% 7% 6% 
76% to 90% 3% 0% 4% 9% 11% 9% 
51 to 75% 6% 11% 19% 45% 26% 23% 
31 to 50% 25% 14% 8% 23% 20% 19% 
11 to 30% 25% 18% 38% 5% 20% 21% 
1 to 10% 22% 39% 19% 4% 10% 14% 
0% 19% 14% 4% 0% 6% 8% 
Base (no of authorities) 32 28 26 22 192 300 
Average s137 spend as a % of the limit 21% 19% 33% 56% 45% 31% 
 (ODPM, 1999) 
 
Whilst 73% of respondents’ s137 expenditure took the form of grants to 
voluntary and community organisations (e.g. Citizen’s Advice Bureau, a social 
enterprise or charity), a minority of respondents reported using s137 
expenditure to support economic development, planning issues, and crime 
prevention (ODPM, 1999).  Although s137 was perceived to be an ancillary 
power or a power of last resort by local authorities, only 23% of local authorities 
73 
 
stated they would favour changes to s137 with the majority holding a strong 
view that s137 offered essential flexibility within the vires framework (ODPM, 
1999).  Furthermore, a small minority of local authorities actually felt that s137 
emphasised the promotion of well-being of their areas and the residents 
(ODPM, 1999).  Therefore the removal of s137 (and thereby the ability to 
provide discretionary finance) reduced local authorities’ abilities to engage in 
extra-statutory services and their operational autonomy.   
 
Ellwood, Tricker and Waterston (2000) offer an analysis of the use of s137, by 
tertiary tier authorities (parish and town councils).  Ellwood, Tricker and 
Waterston highlight that whilst the Local Government White Paper (DETR, 
1998) offered local authorities greater discretionary power (the PoWB), it did not 
extend that power to tertiary authorities, which would “continue to rely on s.137 
to spend money on activities outside their specific power” (Ellwood, Tricker and 
Waterston, 2000: p.7).   
 
Importantly, the two most common changes suggested by local authorities to 
encourage discretionary activity or community activism were the replacement of 
the s137 power with a general power of competence and the removal of the 
financial limits placed on discretionary activity (ODPM, 1999).  These two 
proposed changes have significant impact on the PoWB and, its successor.  
Prior to the creation of the PoWB, ODPM offered an important consideration 
offering that: 
 
“it is important for the proposed new duty to focus on the ‘how’ as well as 
the ‘what’ of promoting the economic, social and environmental well-
being of their areas”  
(ODPM, 1999: p.7). 
 
The ‘how’ aspect of the consideration (i.e. exactly how authorities can promote 
well-being) may have contributed, albeit in a minor way, to the prevalence (or 
absence) of the use of the PoWB.  This is, in part, to the conceptual difficulties 
in establishing ‘how’ to promote people’s well-being and the limited availability 
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of examples of operational methods which local authorities have engaged to 
promote local well-being.   
 
Initial research conducted between 2003 and 2007 into the practical 
perspectives of the PoWB concluded that, “there is still a relatively low level of 
knowledge and understanding of the Power amongst important stakeholders at 
local, regional and central levels” (INLOGOV, 2008: p.4) and that “councils are 
not fully aware of the opportunities provided by the Power to improve well-
being” (DCLG, 2008b: p.1).   
 
This initial research may have highlighted a broader theme within local 
government, specifically that local authorities have more discretionary power 
than they are fully aware of.  Through the PoWB, used in combination with the 
Local Government Act 2003, local authorities could engage in any project to 
enhance the well-being of the local people.  Moreover, the NLGN (2010) 
highlights that the Local Government Act (2003) is also overshadowed by an 
element of uncertainty – due to oversight and prescription from central 
government.  This burden is in addition to Section 94 mentioned previously.   
 
Alternatively, by using the PoWB, combined with the European Trade Act 2004, 
a local authority could stipulate that suppliers must source produce from the 
local area (Rowell, 2010).  Whilst this action might not represent Best Value, it 
could well promote the economic well-being and future sustainability of local 
businesses.  Such an action would require a significant level of political and 
managerial commitment within the local authority.   
 
The ‘low level of knowledge and understanding’ (INLOGOV, 2008) could be the 
result of lack of training and awareness of the PoWB, and what it enables.  
Indeed local authorities’ lack of awareness of the ‘opportunities provided’ may 
be a similar result of lack of training, but part a wider picture regarding a lack of 
ambition in some local authorities.  This lack of ambition could be the result of 
the changing objectives for local government, but similarly could be rooted 
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deeper in the more combative era of intergovernmental relations during the 
1980s.   
 
Despite this critical initial review (INLOGOV, 2008; DCLG, 2008b), there has 
been little further investigation as to why the take-up of the PoWB has been 
problematic and usage has been so limited.  The remainder of this chapter will 
draw upon an initial scoping study (that took the form of a postal survey) that 
was undertaken to identify the common factors which encourage (or inhibit) 
local authorities to use their power to promote well-being, and attitudes to the 
PoWB and its potential replacement – a General Power of Competence.   
 
The Power of Well-Being: a Scoping Study 
 
The study took the form of a postal survey to all the English local authorities2.  
The initial finding of the survey was that 50% of local authorities responding 
have so far used the PoWB.  This result is a much higher figure than suggested 
in existing literature.   
 
The remainder of this chapter will examine a number of key characteristics of 
the local authorities that have used the PoWB, including local authority 
structures, party control, level of knowledge of the PoWB, and the relevance of 
the policy area that the PoWB was predominantly used in.   
 
Local Authority Structures 
 
The majority of responses (64%) were received from District Councils (see 
Figure 5).  One inference that could be drawn from the data is that district 
                                                          
2 Methodological Footnote: The study outlined in this paper took the form of a 
postal survey, which was sent to all Local Authority Chief Executives in 
England.  The study period lasted from September-December 2009. A quarter 
of those sent out were returned.  Those responses provided evidence of senior 
local government officers’ views of the PoWB, both as a method for promoting 
well-being and as a route to pursue innovative policy-making in their local 
authority.  Given the character of the PoWB and the differing nature of the 
devolved administrations, the study was limited to local authorities in England.   
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councils are particularly likely to use the PoWB because their limited range of 
functions (compared to upper tier councils) ensures that they more likely to look 
for more creative interpretations of their role, particularly as it relates to 
engaging with local communities over local issues.   
 
Alternatively, another inference could be that because District Councils are 
smaller organisations, which therefore have smaller departments with fewer 
staff, they adopted the PoWB to use as a broad enabling power.  While most of 
the high profile examples of uses of the Power have tended to come from larger 
unitary councils, rather than from district councils, this may reflect those specific 
organisations having greater influence, larger press relations departments or 
that the gains made in such projects were larger and therefore attracted more 
attention.   
 
Figure 5 – Local Authorities: Structures. 
 
 
Party Control  
 
Another trend emerging from the data (see Figure 6) was that the majority of 
responses that had used the Power came from local authorities that were 
controlled by Conservative majorities. This may be more reflective of the fact 
that the Conservative Party – at the time the survey was conducted 
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(September-December 2009) – held control over more local authorities than any 
other political party.  However, well-being may not be a partisan issue, given the 
differences in community leadership between local authorities controlled by the 
same political party.  Essex County Council and Barnet Borough Council are 
both controlled by Conservative majorities yet are pursuing divergent policy 
agendas and attitudes towards local governance.  Essex adopted an 
interventionist policy stance – working to prevent post office closures and 
reopening closed post offices as customer service centres (Swinford, 2008), 
whilst Barnet adopted a ‘no frills’ approach to community governance to ensure 
lower council tax for local residents (Moore, 2009; Booth, 2010).   
 
Figure 6 – Local Authorities that used the Power defined by political party control. 
 
 
One aspect of the survey casts doubt on whether or not party control of the 
local authority has a significant impact on whether or not to use the Power.  
When asked about the initial proponents of the use of the Power, the greatest 
majority of respondents reported that local authority officers initially suggested 
how to use the Power.  This finding may be more reflective of local government 
officers’ greater knowledge on aspects of policy rather than a specific 
determination on the role of councillors in the decision to promote local well-
being.  Equally so, this finding does (to an extent) remove partisan politics from 
the debate.   
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Use of the Power of Well-Being 
 
A strong trend in the survey data was the level of understanding of the PoWB - 
a higher proportion of respondents stated that understanding of the PoWB was 
‘broad’, than thought that it was ‘limited’ (see Figure 7).  Respondents felt that 
understanding of the PoWB was broader in local authorities than in central 
government (60% in local authorities compared with 56% in central 
government).  This challenges the initial finding from the INLOGOV study; 
specifically on the low level of knowledge of the PoWB amongst key 
stakeholders (INLOGOV, 2008).   
 
Figure 7 - Officers’ Views on understanding of the Power. 
 
Another trend was the high level of understanding that respondents felt other 
agencies held of the PoWB – specifically 58% in voluntary organisations and 
59% in local public sector bodies.  This could be due to the level of interaction 
between local authorities and local organisations in relation to community 
governance.  
 
A fundamental reason for this level of understanding could be the result of local 
governance arrangements between local authorities and other local partners 
e.g. a Local Strategic Partnership (LSP).  Particularly if the promotion of well-
being had been placed as a key strategic priority of the LSP, as in South 
Tyneside, then a higher level of understanding would be present.  However, a 
DCLG (2007) evaluation of LSPs revealed that only 8% were making use of the 
PoWB (see Figure 8).  This may not reflect the percentage of LSPs that were 
 
Broad            Limited 
 
a. In your local authority 22% 38% 33% 4% 
     
b. In central government 13% 43% 20% 1% 
     
c. In the Voluntary Community sector 32% 26% 4% 1% 
     
d. In local public sector bodies e.g. Police, 
NHS 
30% 29% 7% 1% 
79 
 
using the Power as a secondary measure - nor does it cover other polices with 
the aim of promotion local well-being -   this finding does raise the question of 
how exactly the well-being agenda is affected by cross partnership working in 
the local area.  The Audit Commission argued that:  
 
“the promotion of economic, social and environmental well-being was 
more likely to be successful where national and local priorities are 
fully aligned and where local partners achieve coherence in 
establishing their priorities and targets”  
(Audit Commission, 2004: p.2). 
 
The evidence so far would seem to suggest that where priorities are fully 
aligned between local partners then a higher level of commitment and 
understanding would be present in the LSP.  The impact of this for research on 
well-being is that if the promotion of well-being were to be made a key priority 
by the LSP then there might be a greater chance of overall success, due to the 
larger number of institutions working towards the objective.   
 
Figure 8 – Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and the Power (Source: DCLG 2007) 
  2004 2006 
The LSP is aware of the Power 
No. of positive 
responses 
271 194 
 % of all LSPs 89 92 
The LSP has considered making use of the 
Power in pursuing its objectives. 
No. of positive 
responses 
53 40 
 % of all LSPs 17 19 
The LSP has made use of the Power in 
pursuing its objectives. 
No. of positive 
responses 
14 16 
 % of all LSPs 8 8 
 
Of the respondents that had not used the PoWB, some cited legal uncertainty 
regarding the extent of the PoWB as justification for inaction.  One potential 
course of legal uncertainty referred to by respondents was the ruling against 
Local Authorities Mutual Limited (LAML), which ruled that the PoWB cannot be 
used solely to save money (Eaton, 2009).   
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LAML was established by a group of London local authorities to provide mutual 
insurance to realise efficiency savings, which would then be used to fund 
projects that would promote the well-being of communities in the local authority 
areas.  The local authorities involved in the project thought that LAML was 
justified under section 2 of the PoWB because the realised efficiencies would be 
used to promote well-being.  Upon legal challenge the ruling was made against 
LAML on the grounds that the PoWB did not provide legal reassurance to 
realise efficiency savings regardless of the final destination for the funding 
(Eaton, 2009).   This friction point over the exact boundary between innovative 
municipal government and commercial activity could also humble a future 
proposed discretionary power.  The NLGN (2010) highlights that “councils could 
use their competitive advantage provided through taxpayer subsidy to be anti-
competitive” (NLGN, 2010, p.24).  The salient point is that any general power 
clause would not, unless gauged correctly, provide the desired effect to 
engender greater local freedom; particularly if other factors on local authorities 
act as a brake on community leadership.   
 
Another equally possible explanation for lack of use of the PoWB could be the 
unwillingness to expose the organisation to what is perceived to be an external 
‘risk’.  This theory underlines the criticisms of legal officers for risk aversion and 
adopting an overly-cautious approach to the interpretation of discretionary 
power provisions.  In the following parliamentary session (2009 – 2010) the 
Conservative Party attempted to remedy this by inserting a GPC clause into the 
2009 Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Bill (Great 
Britain.  Decentralisation and Localism Bill, 2010).  However, the New Labour 
Government instead inserted a specific provision that would allow local 
authorities to enter into grouped or co-operative mutual insurance companies 
(Great Britain. Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 
2010).  The GPC clause was originally announced in the Conservative Party’s 
Localism Green Paper, which would offer “freedom for local councils to act in 
the best interests for residents” (Conservatives, 2009: p.3).   
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The Decentralisation and Localism Bill proposed to offer a General Power of 
Competence to local government to “do anything that individuals may do” 
(Great Britain.  Decentralisation and Localism Bill, 2010: p.13).  A GPC would 
allow for local authorities to act in the same manner as individuals, except incur 
debt.  If the GPC does not include finance then it could fall foul to the 
restrictions that may have resulted in limited use of the PoWB.  The proposed 
GPC could be used alongside the Tax Increment Finance Scheme (held within 
the same bill), in a similar manner to the use of the PoWB in conjunction with 
supplementary legislation - the Local Government Act 2003 - to provide finance 
for proposals.   
 
This proposed ‘general power’ clause differs to previous lobbying attempts for a 
discretionary power.  Prior to the 2010 General Election, the LGA presented a 
draft Local Government Bill, which included a Power of General Competence 
that proposed that “a local authority should have power to do anything which it 
considers is likely to be of benefit (whether directly or indirectly) to (a) the whole 
or any part of the area, or (b) all or any persons residents or present” (LGA, 
2010: p.7).  A General Competence clause is seen as the “gold standard of 
legal freedoms for councils across developed western democracies” (NLGN, 
2010, p.8).  House of Commons (2009) concluded that local authorities required 
greater autonomy and sufficient formal powers highlighting that  
 
“we have considerable sympathy with the case for local government to 
be given a general power of competence … if local government is able to 
accumulate enough evidence that the well-being powers are falling short 
of a power of general competence to the extent that it’s impeding it’s 
local leadership role, then we recommend that the government should 
introduce a power of general competence for local government”  
(House of Commons, 2009: p.32).  
 
The absence of a General Competence clause for English Local Government, 
presents one of the most significant differences – besides the absence of a 
written constitution – between English and European Local Government.  
Although, it must be highlighted that not all European Local Government 
systems have a General Competence clause, the ODPM (2006) highlights 
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several countries that have written constitutions and General Competence 
clauses, which enables them to act on the behalf of residents and local 
communities.  The ODPM makes reference to two particular European 
countries with systems that rival English Local Government, France and 
Sweden.  Nevertheless, the ODPM (2006) also acknowledges that despite their 
constitutional advantages and a General Competence Clause, French and 
Swedish Local Government underwent decentralisation reforms i.e. 
constitutional protection.  John highlights that despite the systemic reforms 
autonomy may only be skin deep, citing that: 
 
“Many Napoleonic countries, such as France, have constitutional 
protection for local government, but his does not prevent central 
government ministries making crucial decisions that affect local choices.  
Nor should blanket provision, such as a [power of] general competence, 
encourage observes to think local authorities enjoy a strong 
independence.” 
(John, 2001: p.33) 
 
The ODPM (2006) does, however, highlight that whilst the exact legal definition 
of a General Competence clause may differ between countries and legal 
systems, an ultra vires principle is also always present.  The ODPM notes that 
“General Competence is not a power to ‘do anything’ but a presumption that it 
can be done unless prohibited or in breach of a wider principle” (ODPM, 2006: 
p.28), which would therefore seem to suggest that it does not represent a power 
of first resort.  However, the PoWB – which Central Government proposed 
would act as a power of first resort – was “not a power of general competence, 
although it apparently gives a wide and general power to act within what could 
be seen as the main remit of Local Government” (ODPM, 2006: p.25).  Although 
neither form a power ‘to do anything’ (ODPM, 2006), the PoWB would seem to 
have fallen short of Central Government’s intention.   
 
The LGA (2010) highlighted the LAML ruling as such an example of the PoWB 
falling short of central government’s desire that the PoWB represent a power of 
first resort.  Initial research into the adoption and use of the PoWB found a lack 
of awareness (INLOGOV, 2008; DCLG 2008b) would further support the 
proposition that the PoWB fell short.  There is an important distinction between 
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the proposed general power clauses that should be highlighted.  The 
Decentralisation and Localism Bill (Great Britain.  Decentralisation and Localism 
Bill 2010) offers a GPC whereas the LGA (2010) called for a power of general 
competence, which House of Commons (2009) had highlighted earlier.  This 
distinction could be entirely semantic; however, given the difficulties legal 
officers had regarding the PoWB, the distinction could be an extremely 
significant one.  Whether a GPC is more restrictive than a Power of General 
Competence remains to be seen.  The Decentralisation and Localism Bill 
highlights that whilst the general power clause would offer local authorities vast 
freedom to conduct discretionary functions, it would also be limited by 
secondary legislation.  The general power clause would remain within an intact 
ultra vires regime.  The NLGN argues that the current legislative framework 
“suffers from significant shortfalls, stymies innovation and undermines true 
localist responses to the major financial, economic and societal challenges 
facing communities” (NLGN, 2010: p.4).  NLGN (2010) then compounds the 
critique by highlighting the lack of available finance and the reliance on other 
sources of capital and revenue to support the use of the PoWB.   
 
To remedy the problem highlighted in the current legislative framework, the 
NLGN (2010) called for the abolition of the ultra vires rule.  The NLGN (2010) 
highlights the case for additional powers, outlined by several local authorities to 
House of Commons (2009).  NLGN continues to maintain that the ultra vires 
rule “acts as a disincentive to think innovatively or to push the boundaries of 
reform” (NLGN, 2010: p.19) and that it is becoming clear that “the current 
legislative framework cannot provide the flexibilities to achieve these ambitions 
(NLGN, 2010: p.23).  Nevertheless, despite the PoWB, local government suffers 
from a ‘complexity of legislation that inhibits confidence in innovation (House of 
Commons, 2009).  Some local government officers argue in support of the ultra 
vires rule alongside a general power clause as stated in the NLGN report  
 
“local government is due to get [a] general power of competence and I 
wouldn’t want to underestimate that because the reality is that some of 
the time we get very nervous about doing stuff.  All of us work under 
statute of what to do. And the worst thing you can say to us is, you don’t 
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have vires, that’s career threatening, that really is.  So a general power of 
competence will give us more confidence.”   
(NLGN, 2010: p.19) 
 
The viewpoint that the PoWB represented a power of first resort for local 
government (Braybrook, 2008; DCLG, 2008b; Eaton, 2009) needs to be 
revised.  The PoWB has been used as a power of first resort by some local 
authorities; however the PoWB has not acted as a catalyst for local authorities 
to launch innovative community leadership policies as central government may 
have presumed it may have (NLGN, 2010: p.14).  Furthermore there has been a 
staunch “reluctance [by some local authorities] to push its boundaries” (DCLG, 
2008b: p.1).  The NLGN cite many underlying reasons behind the lack of take 
up of the PoWB: 
 
 The actual limitations of the PoWB; 
 The legal, conceptual and practical confusion around the PoWB’s exact 
scope; 
 Inhibition surrounding a perceived lack of local capacity for its use; and  
 The negative effect of unsuccessful attempts to use it.  
(NLGN, 2010b: p.14) 
 
Whilst a slim majority of survey respondents felt that current legislation is not 
sufficient to genuinely promote well-being (57%), the percentage of respondents 
that felt further legal power was required was lower (50%).  This may be 
reflective of the belief amongst respondents that further ‘general power’ 
legislation is not the best route to being able to genuinely promote well-being, or 
that the legal discretionary power cannot be considered in isolation from the 
financial or operational considerations.  Leading local government lawyers have 
questioned the need for and the legal basis of a GPC (Ahmed, Keith-Lucas, and 
Randall, 2009; NLGN, 2010b).  Is greater discretionary power the best route to 
achieve innovative practice in local government as community leadership 
organisations?  The survey reveals a paradox that whilst the current legislative 
framework may not be sufficient; the data reflected that the majority of local 
government officers did not require a further power of general competence.  
When combined with the responses on access to greater amounts of finance 
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and fewer performance metrics, respondents seemed to reinforce the belief that 
local government wants freedom and finance and then to be left alone (Wilson 
and Game, 2006).   
 
The Scoping Study: implications for the research 
 
The study revealed that the PoWB was used the most in economic policy areas 
- 36% of respondents indicated that their local authority use of the PoWB was 
focussed in economic policy areas – perhaps showing that some local 
authorities are using the PoWB to pursue traditional forms of economic growth 
and development.  Usage of the PoWB in social and environmental policy areas 
was lower – at 26% and 20% respectively. However, 28% of respondents 
indicated that their use of the PoWB was to improve quality of life for residents.  
These findings on the use of the PoWB again illustrate a discrepancy existing in 
local government about the true potential of the PoWB – with the highest 
proportion of respondents using the PoWB in economic policy areas.  One of 
the biggest potential points of confusion is what the Government meant by 
‘economic’, ‘environmental’ or ‘social’ well-being – which objective should local 
authorities aim for?  This builds on the linguistic challenges covered in chapter 
2, but may be particularly relevant in this case, as the choice of name of the 
power (the PoWB) added to the inherent confusion over its potential.  The 
NLGN (2010b) surmises this point by highlighting that “it has been unclear what 
exactly encompasses community well-being” (NLGN, 2010b: p.16).   
 
Whilst there is a menu of national indicators that could be used to measure 
aspects of well-being, currently there is no comprehensive well-being indicator 
set and the majority of respondents (79%) felt that central government should 
not establish such an indicator set.  The majority of respondents (75%) also felt 
that the measurement of well-being should not become mandatory at the local 
level.  Large numbers of respondents stated their organisation already 
measures well-being – albeit under the ‘Health and Well-being’ agenda – which 
again reflects that respondents felt that more indicators are not necessary to 
measure well-being.  Although the survey was extremely beneficial to the thesis 
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by provided a contemporary empirical base, the wider implications of the survey 
results provide much more insight into the research area.  Crucially, the survey 
framed the next phase of the research (i.e. the interviews) but the survey results 
actually provided some unexpected results - specifically regarding the legal 
insufficiency of the PoWB and its potential replacement.  The survey assisted in 
enabling the research findings to make broader inferences based on the 
general trends, which were then explored in greater depth in the interviews.   
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Chapter 4 – Methodology 
 
Aims and objectives of this thesis 
 
The aim of this piece of research is to evaluate local government’s use of the 
Power of Well-Being and establish what factors may have encouraged or 
inhibited its use.  This aim will be accomplished by meeting the following: 
 
 Critically analyse the existing literature on local government, to establish 
the historical context of localism and inter-governmental relations. 
 Explore the concept of inter-governmental relations in order to map a 
coherent theory on the tensions between local and central government. 
 Develop a comprehensive typology of local authorities by identifying 
“proactive” and “reactive” local authorities.  
 Gauge what research already exists into the PoWB, with particular 
attention paid to case studies of the usage of the Well-Being powers. 
 Develop new trends on the usage of the PoWB by collecting original data 
from local and national perspectives.   
 Develop further analysis on the future of localism under new political 
administrations, specifically with regard to the impact of cuts in public 
expenditure on the PoWB and how they might impact local authority 
activity.   
 
As highlighted earlier in this thesis, whilst serious research into well-being is still 
in its relative ‘infancy’ (Bok, 2010) and the wealth of research is growing 
‘exponentially’ (Veenhoven, 2007), the politics of well-being remains in an 
embryonic state (Bok, 2010).  This thesis is an attempt at gauging the politics of 
well-being at the local authority level and to understand how the politics of well-
being affect local government’s discretionary activity.  This chapter aims to 
identify and justify the methods that would be most successful in meeting the 
above objectives.  Initially, the most appropriate theoretical approaches that 
would deliver the most reliable results will be identified.   
 
Theoretical considerations 
 
One of the first considerations of this thesis was an ontological choice between 
two theoretical positions, positivism and interpretivism.  Positivism is a school of 
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thought that is rooted in the idea that the scientific approaches from the natural 
sciences can be adapted to the social sciences that statistical logic can be 
derived from survey research and standardised interviews give access to the 
facts of the social world (Gilbert, 1993).  The central tenants of positivist 
research are: 
 
 Patterns, trends and regularities exist in the social world, just as they do 
in the natural world. 
 These patterns and regularities exist independently of each other and are 
waiting to be discovered. 
 These trends exist through a careful linear causal process, i.e. through 
cause and effect.  There are no random events.  
 These patterns exist naturally; they are not created through research.   
(Denscombe, 2010) 
 
The second theoretical position, interpretivism, focuses on the “meanings that 
shape actions and institutions, and the ways in which they do so … in short, 
interpretive approaches study beliefs, ideas or discourses” (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2000: p.131).  Whilst there are various different methods under the blanket term 
of Interpretivism, the basis is a shared assumption that understanding of social 
reality cannot be gained without understanding meanings (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2010) and a rejection of positivist themes (Denscombe, 2010).  The core 
themes of interpretive research are: 
 
 Social reality is subjective rather than objective and can only be 
understood through human actions.   
 Research participants react to being under study.  Participants exhibit a 
level of self awareness that does not exist in the natural world.   
 Participants can react to the knowledge being produced by the research.  
The knowledge has the ability to be absorbed by them to interfere with 
the initial findings of the research.  
 It is impossible to gain an objective perspective on the research; social 
research can be influenced by the values, expectations and 
interpretations of the researcher.  
 Grand over-arching theories are not possible.  Since explanations can be 
(and inevitably may be) influenced by the researcher’s values, it is 
difficult to assume that one theory can explain the social world.  
(Denscombe, 2010)  
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In this world there are no ‘brute data’ whose meaning is beyond dispute” 
(Yanow, 2000: p.5), and this thesis firmly maintains that to offer an analysis of 
local government’s use of the PoWB (and of factors instrumental in decision to 
use it) an Interpretive position must be adopted.  Furthermore, given the 
research emphasis on the politics of well-being, when considered with the 
subjective nature of well-being, an Interpretive position would seem to be a 
prerequisite.  Yanow (2000) notes that, policy language should leave no doubt 
in the audience’s mind as to its meaning.  This clarity may be found missing in 
the PoWB.  Yanow cites that: 
 
“when policy language is examined, for example, a comparison is often 
made between the words of legislation and the projected or implemented 
actions in the field, under the assumption that policy words can and 
should have univocal, unambiguous meanings that can and should be 
channelled to and directly apperceived by implementers and policy-
relevant publics”  
(Yanow, 2000: p.6). 
 
Some political scientists, however, offer criticisms of interpretive theory 
maintaining that: 
 
 It cannot allow for the material constraints on social action 
 It cannot account for the solidarity and persistence of institutions 
 It lacks the necessary critical power 
(Bevir and Rhodes, 2000: p.149-150) 
 
Yet Yanow offers that interpretive theory enables a research method to explore 
the difference between “what implementers do, rather than what the policy 
“says” in its explicit language, constitutes the “truth” of policy (and thereby the 
state’s) intent” (Yanow, 2000: p.9).  Furthermore, a simple positivist approach 
may not provide the correct level of insight because the perceptions of the 
PoWB are necessary in order to establish trends on its use.  Whilst statistical 
research could gauge levels of usage, general trends could not capture the 
attitudes towards the PoWB and therefore the most valuable element of the 
research – ‘the why aspect’ – might be excluded.  However, as will be 
mentioned later in this chapter, a quantitative element was added to the initial 
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stages of this research in order to triangulate the research and target the 
substantive qualitative element later in the research process.  Therefore 
interpretive theory will be more likely to provide more accurate results because 
it takes into account the practical reasoning behind the decision to use of the 
PoWB, allows for both the focus on ‘meanings’ and the distinction between the 
explicit and implicit aspects (Yanow, 2000; Bevir & Rhodes in Marsh et al, 2000; 
Brannen, 2005).  Ultimately, for these reasons, an interpretive approach was 
chosen to be used in this research.   
 
Designing the Research 
 
By adopting an interpretivist approach, a significant aspect of the research 
would inevitably be qualitative.  Although the initial research strategy 
determined that a solely qualitative approach would be adopted, iterative 
enhancements to the research design meant that a quantitative aspect (in the 
form of a postal survey questionnaire) was added to enable triangulation and to 
frame the later stages of the research.  This will enable the thesis to infer wider 
conclusions about the PoWB and the factors that influence local authorities to 
use it.  However, the substantive bulk of the research for the thesis remained 
qualitative.   
 
Furthermore, whilst the initial plan favoured conducting interviews with only 
local government officers, it was recognised that the perspective of local 
authority elected members would be particularly helpful in providing a more 
holistic picture of the PoWB and factors associated with its usage.   
 
It was determined that this thesis would be composed of three strands of 
research.  The first strand would be a scoping study to triangulate issues for the 
in-depth research.  The second strand would be composed of nineteen scoping 
interviews with senior legal officers from local authorities on the legal basis of 
the PoWB.  Finally, the third strand would be composed of four in-depth case 
studies of local authorities that have used the PoWB with each case study 
comprised of roughly five interviews.  In deciding to adopt these methods, it was 
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determined that time constraints on the research process would need to be 
taken into account.  To establish a national perspective and harness various 
local trends, a degree of flexibility over the type of interview questions and the 
ability to adapt the questioning was required in the research.   
 
These requirements could be fulfilled by using qualitative methods, but not by 
solely using quantitative methods, as quantitative research may only offer a 
limited range of responses (Devine, 2002).  However, to apply an element of 
validity and to attain a high level of rigor in the research, a multi-method design 
was adopted in this inquiry.  Casebeer and Verhoef (1997) highlight that multi-
method research can often produce more interesting or applicable results.   
 
Morse (2002) highlights that increasing reliability and validity in quantitative 
research can be an appropriate route to attaining rigor in qualitative research.  
However, this research is, to an extent, internally valid (and therefore rigorous) 
because of the breadth and variety of the case studies and interviews within 
each case study.  Furthermore, these findings offer deeper insights into local 
authorities’ uses of the PoWB and can be applied to offer insights into local 
government activity and autonomy.   
 
At the beginning of the research project, a work placement had also been 
completed in a local authority in the North East of England.  This placement 
offered great benefit to the study as it provided an insight into local government 
operations.   
 
During this time the participant’s workstream mainly involved monitoring 
emerging legislation and issues that could impact upon council operations; as 
well as working on special projects that emerged on an ad hoc basis.  This 
placement provided the researcher with a wealth of information through 
observation of working with local authority officers – at different levels of 
seniority – and local councillors at difficult period of organisational 
transformation.  This placement helped by offering the researcher a greater 
understanding of priorities, challenges and demands on local government 
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officers and elected members, not just in that local authority, but across many 
others, by gaining an insider perspective on policy development.  Through the 
workstream, the researcher gained an in-depth understanding of the competing 
challenges faced by local authorities on a daily basis, which is not an 
understanding easily accessible to researchers without any previous 
experience.   
 
Although this could impact negatively upon the research, by losing objectivity 
from the research area and therefore potentially becoming pre-occupied with a 
single perspective, having this experience offered the researcher a distinct 
advantage in establishing legitimacy in the research interviews.  Furthermore, it 
enhanced the researcher’s understanding of both the local government sector 
and the policy development process from a local authority perspective (Bryman, 
2004). 
 
As highlighted, the existing literature on the PoWB supposed that it represented 
a power of first resort for local government (Braybrook, 2008).  However, initial 
research showed that this was not the case as few local authorities were 
actually using the Power (DCLG, 2008).  Interpretive policy analysis offers the 
ability to discern between the ‘word’ and the ‘deed’ (Yanow, 2000), thereby 
allowing researchers to differentiate between the intended meaning (i.e. what 
the authored text sources says) and the variant meanings (i.e. what the 
constructed sources says) (Yanow, 2000: p.9).   
 
Furthermore, the existing literature on the nature of well-being demonstrates 
that, whilst the politics of well-being is a new area of research, well-being itself 
is a social concept and that well-being can be influenced by a variety of factors.  
Therefore, for these reasons, using solely quantitative research methods might 
not provide a thorough analysis on the reasons for the use of the Power and 
might limit insights into the behavioural and organisational aspects that relate to 
the use of the PoWB.  This thesis will, however, use the supposition that the 
PoWB represented a power of first resort (Braybrook, 2008) as a benchmark 
against which its use will be assessed.   
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The case study approach 
 
“the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of 
case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why 
they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result”  
(Yin, 2009: p.17) 
 
Yin (2009) demonstrates the appropriateness of using case studies as a 
research method by stating that although alternative methods (i.e. archival 
analysis and survey method) would offer answers to the research, only the case 
study method is more explanatory and could allow the research to dovetail with 
operational or organisational links over time; rather than solely accounting for 
the frequency of an occurrence.  Yin, however, also highlights that survey 
methods can be extremely useful in trying to plot the ‘prevalence of a 
phenomenon’ (Yin, 2009: p.9), which this thesis used to provide contemporary 
evidence on the use of the PoWB and establish the context of the research.   
 
Whilst the case study method is a ‘distinctive form of empirical inquiry’ (Yin, 
2009), and for this thesis a multiple-case study was decided to be the most 
appropriate research method, many researchers tend not to use the case study 
method in favour of surveys or experiments.  This disdain towards the case 
study method is, perhaps, the result of less than rigorous research (Yin, 2009).  
Whilst a lack of rigour is less likely to be found when using other research 
methods, it is possible for bias to enter into the use of other research methods 
but in case study research “they may have been more frequently encountered 
and less frequently overcome” (Yin, 2009: p.14).  Devine (2002), however, 
highlights that this potential lack of critical objectivity is applicable beyond case 
studies to the wider context of qualitative research. 
 
A further concern about the suitability of case study research relates to whether 
or not case studies can be generalised to infer wider results.  However, this 
research project will use a multi-case study method that will increase the degree 
to which the research findings can be generalized to apply to the wider sector.  
94 
 
Even so, this will enable the research results to be expanded and ‘generalize 
theories’ (Yin, 2009) but not to provide detailed list of the prevalence of the 
usage.  Moreover, Devine states that the findings from a single in-depth case 
study can be corroborated by using other in-depth case studies (as well as, or 
potentially alongside, other research methods) to establish similarities and 
variances; as such providing a ‘limited test of confirmation’ (Devine, 2002: 
p.207).   
 
Devine further highlights that qualitative research methods “can have [a] wider 
significance beyond the time and place in which it was conducted” (Devine, 
2002: p.207).  Whilst this research offers an insight into local government’s use 
of the PoWB, it also offers a significant insight into contemporary inter-
governmental relations in the England and could provide useful lessons for local 
government powers in the future – particularly the use of a General Power of 
Competence.   
 
It was decided that the main qualitative method used in this investigation was to 
be interviews.  Interviews were employed in two of the strands (the case studies 
and the scoping interviews); and they enabled access to a greater wealth of 
information relating to the research question.  In conducting interviews, it 
provided the opportunity to gauge local government officers and elected 
members’ views and perspectives of the PoWB, and interpretations on its 
usefulness as a power of first resort for local government.   
 
The initial research conducted on the PoWB, into local authorities’ usage of the 
PoWB (INLOGOV & UWE, 2007; DCLG, 2008; 2008b), may have influenced 
the perception of the researcher on the use of the PoWB.  To counter this 
potential perception and to provide a more contemporary account of levels of 
usage of the PoWB, a scoping study was carried out.  This allowed any 
perceptions to be based on contemporary evidence.  Whilst interviews are an 
invaluable tool for qualitative researchers, semi-structured interviews allow 
greater freedom for the interviewees to explain answers in further detail and 
allow the interview to raise any issues of interest as the interview progresses 
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that may be especially relevant to the research question.  The alternate, a 
structured interview, would not allow as much freedom as semi-structured 
interviews and might not allow the interviewer to fully tailor the interview to 
individual circumstances.  The decision to make the interviews confidential 
ensured that the researcher could remain in control of the research process, 
assured the participant’s of anonymity thus enabling officers and elected 
members to speak freely.   
 
An alternative methodology that was briefly considered was using focus groups 
of local government officers and members.  The use of focus groups in the 
research could have produced a wealth of material for the thesis, from debate 
on the nature of the specific power to the nature of central-local relations.  
However, it was felt that this method might not be beneficial for the thesis as a 
whole.  The focus groups could have become dominated by a specific 
perspective or obsessed with a specific topic, which may not have produced the 
best data.  Furthermore, less confident or less vocal participants might have 
been intimidated from airing their views if the group had become dominated by 
a specific perspective.  Indeed, if the focus groups were composed of elected 
members then, given the variety of political parties involved, there was a risk 
that the debates could have resorted to a discussion on political parties, which 
may have become counter-productive.  Moreover, it would have been difficult to 
ensure anonymity in the focus groups which may have affected their answers – 
particularly the answers regarding the role of local government in the future with 
reduced public spending.   
 
Finally, focus groups would involve getting multiple local authority officers and 
members in a room at the same time or on multiple occasions that, given the 
time constraints on both the research inquiry and the research participants, may 
have proved to be impractical.  Therefore it was decided that semi-structured 
interviews in multiple-case studies, in combination with a questionnaire and 
further semi-structured ‘scoping’ interviews (to provide more detailed insights) 
would be the best methodological approach.   
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Selecting the case study authorities 
 
It was decided during the first stages of the research that the case studies 
should represent a cross section of local government in the UK.  As such the 
case study authorities had to be a mixture of local authority organisational type, 
size, geographical location, population served and political party in control.  
Since the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 (Great 
Britain.  Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007), the 
PoWB has also been devolved to Town and Parish Councils.  As very little, if 
any, contemporary academic research focuses on the role that parish councils 
can play in local communities and the growing emphasis (and prevalence) of 
parish councils, it was decided that the research should comprise of all levels of 
local government – including Town and Parish Councils.  Given the decision to 
include all levels of local government in the research, it was decided to separate 
the case studies into two strands; one for the principal authorities and another 
for the tertiary authorities participating in the research.   
 
As stated the main qualitative research method in this thesis was semi-
structured interviews, and the majority of data will come from the case studies.  
Selecting the local authorities to approach to be case study authorities was 
particularly difficult.  The case studies would be separated into two groups, 
principal authority case studies and tertiary authority case studies.  Within the 
principal authority case studies, a broad range of interviewees were sought.  A 
broader range of interviewees (i.e. interviewees from across the authorities’ 
directorates and not from a single directorate that could affect the findings) 
would ensure balanced findings.  Therefore, in each case study, interviewees 
were sought from policy, financial, legal and the chief executive’s departments, 
as well as an elected member.  These potential interviewee categories were 
outlined in the original letter to the Chief Executive.  The final individual 
interviewees, however, were identified by the authority’s Chief Executive.   
 
The majority of the Tertiary Authority case study interviewees, however, were 
elected members – given the comparative size of authority types.  
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Nevertheless, the Tertiary Authority case studies also included at least one 
authority officer as well.  Although, similar to the Principal Authority case 
studies, the respective interviewees were identified by the Chairman of the 
authority, who serves a chief executive type function.   
 
Given the absence of a published document that listed every local authority that 
had used the PoWB, selection involved reviewing the limited literature on the 
subject to establish which local authorities published examples of usage.  The 
first step was to eliminate those local authorities that had identified themselves 
in the postal questionnaire and had stated that they had not used the PoWB.  
The second step, the literature search, led to the Local Well-being project; a 
three year study of three local authorities on how they promoted local well-being 
(Bacon et al, 2010).   
 
It was decided that to contact each local authority a letter would be sent directly 
to the Chief Executive as this would enable a swift decision to be made, and 
would assist in gaining access to the relevant officers within the organisation if 
the Chief Executive had already approved the research.  However, after 
contacting the three local authorities that originally took part in the Local Well-
Being Project, and discussing the research with policy officers, only one local 
authority agreed to take part in the research.  The other two local authorities 
offered apologies that they would not be able to take part in the research as the 
relevant policy officers with the knowledge and experience of using the PoWB 
had left the authority, which itself was an interesting finding that could contribute 
some explanation regarding low usage of the PoWB.   
 
As a result of reviewing the academic literature on contemporary local 
government, two leading local authorities were targeted and approached as 
other potential case studies.  However, unfortunately, both came back offering 
their apologies citing that the relevant policy officers had left the authority, and 
no other policy officers had experience or knowledge of the PoWB, which 
further compounded the growing trend (and relevance) of this finding.  After 
further reviews of secondary data, a number of other potential case study 
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authorities were identified.  These potential local authorities were approached 
about participating in the research.  However, unfortunately whilst some 
authorities reported that the relevant officers were no longer employed by the 
authority other respondents stated that due to current demands and pressures 
on officers and members they would be unable to commit to participating in the 
research project.   
 
From a further review of the secondary sources, the remaining two case study 
authorities were identified and approached.  Following some negotiation, further 
explanation of the research objective and what the research would entail, both 
of the identified case studies agreed to participate in the research.  Their 
agreement completed the first strand of case studies – the principal authorities 
group.  Given the relatively recent extension of the PoWB to Tertiary authorities, 
the sample group (for the second case study group) was relatively small.  This 
was further compounded by the powerful restrictions placed on the tertiary 
authorities when adopting the PoWB.  The conditions placed on tertiary councils 
required the council to have: 
 
 A qualified clerk, 
 A minimum two thirds of the vacancies on the council filled at the 
last ordinary elections,  
 80% of councillors trained in the use of the PoWB, and  
 Published a statement of intent as to community engagement.  
(DCLG, 2009:  p.6) 
 
Following a conversation with several policy officers at the National Association 
for Local Councils (NALC), a number of potentially eligible case study councils 
that could use the PoWB were identified.  As highlighted, Tertiary Authorities 
have not been able to use the PoWB for very long, and very little academic 
research has been conducted on the use of the PoWB by tertiary authorities.  
Therefore, Tertiary Authorities had to be approached about participating in the 
research on an individually.  Furthermore, participation in the research project 
had to be approved at a meeting of the council, where individual members could 
be identified to take part in the research.   
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Whilst the views of elected members of the councils are crucial in providing a 
holistic perspective on the PoWB, it was also essential to include the views of 
officers from the Tertiary Authorities to offer a balanced perspective, in case the 
members presented an unbalanced view.  However, when these factors were 
combined, it substantially increased the timescale involved in carrying out the 
research.   
 
Nevertheless, two of the councils contacted ultimately agreed to participate in 
the research.  Whilst these councils had only used the PoWB in a limited 
manner, the manners in which the PoWB had been used differed to the extent 
that it would be possible to infer wider generalisations about the uses of the 
PoWB by tertiary authorities, and the relative freedom that it offers them.  As 
highlighted earlier, an important consideration when gathering participant case 
study authorities was that they would be varied enough to offer a cross-section 
of local government; so that broader inferences could be made about the nature 
of the PoWB.   
 
Selecting the scoping interviews 
 
The second strand of interviews, on the specific legal aspects of the PoWB, was 
slightly easier to arrange than the case study authorities.  Although the interview 
participants were all senior local government officers and therefore extremely 
busy, given the limited commitment required of each participant, taking part in 
the research as a scoping interview would involve a much lower commitment of 
officers’ time than taking part as a case study authority.  Furthermore, it was 
essential to maintain the variety amongst the interview participants to ensure a 
decent cross-section (the same as the case study authorities), which would 
enable the thesis to make wider inferences about the attitudes of senior local 
government legal officers on different aspects of the PoWB.  This cross-section 
was established across the same themes as the case study authorities i.e. size, 
political party in control, local authority organisational type, population served 
and geographic location.   
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The second strand of the research, the scoping interviews, offered a national 
perspective on the PoWB.  Although this perspective cannot be regarded as 
holistic nor exhaustive, the scoping interviews (all with senior lawyers from local 
authorities) offered a wider perspective that could build upon the findings from 
the in-depth interviews from the case study authorities.   
 
Aside from the two strands of qualitative interviews, it was decided that 
documentary analysis should be undertaken to provide the context to the 
interviews.  Policy documents, relating to Tertiary Authority’s use of the PoWB, 
would be analysed from an interpretive perspective to establish the local “truth” 
of the PoWB besides that “authored” (Yanow, 2000) perspective that it 
represents a power of first resort for local government.  As public documents, 
however, the audience was clearly established and their purpose was clearly to 
inform; the documentary analysis provided crucial context for the case study 
authorities.  However, the qualitative aspects of this thesis were designed to 
operate alongside a smaller quantitative aspect as well.  It was decided that the 
quantitative element would offer an element of rigour and robustness to the 
research, which would furthermore enhance the degree that the research 
findings could be generalised.  Moreover, to enhance the rigorousness of the 
research and to establish a contemporary evidence base for the thesis, it was 
determined that the quantitative element would be carried out before the main 
qualitative elements.   
 
In selecting the scoping interviews and the case studies, one main issue arose 
from both which was accessibility to interviewees.  Although this issue occurred 
in both scoping and case study interviews, it was primarily an issue in the latter.  
As taking part as a case study authority would involve sacrificing senior officer’s 
or elected members time, and since at least five interviews were needed per 
case study, this allocation seemed to be a prohibitive factor for some local 
authorities that were contacted.  This was accentuated by the time that this was 
research was being conducted, particularly as individual local authorities were 
facing potential funding cuts from central government and continued policy 
changes in response to ongoing recession.   
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For the research, these consequences impacted on the accessibility of officers 
and members.  Whereas an authority may be able to spare officers to take part 
in a scoping interview (i.e. only an hour), officers or members taking part as a 
case study (i.e. sacrificing between five to ten hours) caused some participants 
to reluctantly decline participation in the research.  These factors, when 
combined with the fact that the sample was limited to those local authorities that 
had already used the PoWB, reduced the number of prospective case study 
authorities and proved a fairly significant access issue.  It was not, however, 
ultimately prohibitive.  Whilst some local authorities responded, declining due to 
staff commitments, case study authorities were identified.   
 
Questionnaire  
 
Whilst a comprehensive review of the existing literature provided the context for 
the thesis, there was no contemporary evidence on the levels that local 
authorities had used the PoWB.  Although the significant majority of research 
conducted in this thesis is undertaken from a qualitative perspective, it was 
determined early on in the research to support the literature review with a 
questionnaire.  In the context of this research, to avoid confusion, throughout 
this thesis the questionnaire refers to a postal survey that was sent to potential 
respondents for them to fill in themselves.  Gilbert highlights that sometimes a 
questionnaire is a “document that containing a set of questions for respondents 
to complete themselves and sometimes to mean the list of questions which an 
interviewer reads out to respondents” (Gilbert, 1993: p.96).  Yin highlights the 
usefulness of using quantitative data in combination with the case study method 
for two reasons.   
 
“First, the data may cover the behaviour or events that argue the case 
study is trying to explain – typically, the ‘outcomes’ in an evaluative case 
study.  Second, the data may be related to an embedded unit of analysis 
within your broader case study” 
(Yin, 2009: p.133) 
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Gilbert highlights that “the main argument against using postal questionnaires 
have generally been that the response rate is low (many postal surveys do not 
achieve more than 50% rate of return)” (Gilbert, 1993: p.96).  Whilst the rate of 
return is an issue of concern for many researchers that use postal 
questionnaires, the postal questionnaire used in this research offered a rate of 
return of roughly 26%.  Yin (2009) cites that whilst the main research question is 
aimed at a higher level, and the qualitative data can explore or describe the 
events at this higher level, the quantitative element can establish important 
aspects of the research.   
 
In the context of this thesis, the research question explores the role of local 
government’s use of the PoWB (and the case study authorities provide original 
data on their usage) whilst the questionnaire offers the contemporary context 
i.e. Yin’s (2009) ‘outcomes’.  Furthermore, the quantitative element was decided 
upon because, whilst a valid cross-section of local authorities was established 
in the case studies, due to time constraints, it would not be possible to conduct 
research in every local authority in the UK and this questionnaire offered a basic 
template that would enable wider generalisations to be made.   
 
Aligning qualitative and quantitative research methods: multi-method research 
 
Realising the potential benefits, it was decided that this thesis should adopt 
multiple research methodologies.  There are two main reasons for combining 
the research methods within a single research project: 
 
 “First it may be that using one method does not allow the researcher to 
address all aspects of the research question.  
 Second, many researchers argue that combining methods increases the 
validity of research, because using a variety of methods means that one 
method serves as a check on another”  
(Read and Marsh, 2000: p.237) 
 
Whilst Read and Marsh highlight that quantitative and qualitative methods are 
used by researchers to find different things, it is also highlighted that “while 
there are differences, these can easily be overemphasised” (Read and Marsh, 
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2000: p.232).  In considering combining research methods, the key issue is over 
ontological and epistemological differences, and importantly how they impact on 
the methodology.  During the twentieth century, social science research has 
been dominated by quantitative methods and positivist perspectives.  Whilst the 
“postmodern turn in sociology has led many to reject quantitative 
methodologies” (Read and Marsh, 2000: p.236) and this thesis maintains a 
substantial qualitative bias, it also acknowledges the importance contributed by 
using quantitative methods to compliment the qualitative aspects.  Hammersley 
surmises that 
 
“each has its own strengths and weaknesses as an approach to the 
conduct of social research.  It is these strengths and weaknesses that lie 
behind the rationale for integrating them. “ 
(Hammersley, 1992: p.59) 
 
With the separate strands of the research design finalised, namely the 
interviews and the scoping questionnaire, the ethical implications for the 
research design were considered.  As the two strands of semi structured 
interviews were doubly-anonymised (i.e. the interviewee’s name and the 
authority’s name were withdrawn) the ethical implications of the interviews were 
minimised.  Furthermore, as only the interviewee’s role was referred to any 
potential ethical issues (in being able to identify interview participants) were 
reduced to an absolute minimum.  The implications for the questionnaire 
however, were further reduced because respondents had a choice whether or 
not to respond. Moreover, the questionnaire itself was fully anonymous.  With 
three separate strands composing the research design, the integration of the 
different elements of the fieldwork would be carefully conducted to fully achieve 
a multi-method research project that realises the potentials benefits of both 
methods.  As mentioned, the postal survey was conducted to triangulate the 
latter stages of the research and provide national perspectives on the PoWB – 
and local government’s attitude towards discretionary legal power.   
 
The scoping interviews, all conducted with local authority legal officers, were 
meant to underline the findings from the postal survey.  None of the scoping 
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interviews were geographically biased, all the interviewed were varied by 
geographic location that could remove the possibility of local or regional 
networks that promote usage of the PoWB.  The findings from these interviews 
were then used to further refine the initial results of the survey, and to provide 
additional validity to the trends emerging from the postal survey.  The in-depth 
case studies however, offered the bulk of the qualitative data for the research 
project.  As highlighted, the key findings - from the case studies - provided the 
bulk of the data that assisted in the development of the typology for 
discretionary activity.  The data emerged into three fairly clear classifications, 
which formed the basis of the typology.   
 
In summary, for this thesis, it was decided that using both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods would ensure a greater degree of validity and 
rigor for the research findings, and by maximising the advantages of both 
methods it offer a greater wealth of data.   
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Chapter 5 - Case Study findings: Principal authorities 
 
Over the following four chapters, the main findings from the case studies will be 
mapped out.  Each chapter will present the main findings from a case study.  
The first two chapters will present the evidence from the principal tier (i.e. 
unitary, county or district authorities) case studies.  The findings have been 
categorised into a number of key themes that will assist in a thematic evaluation 
of the findings later in this thesis.  These are,  
 
 Awareness of the PoWB 
 Attitude towards the use of the PoWB 
 Policy Focus 
 Enhancing autonomy, rebuilding local authorities’ capacity 
 ‘New’ localism or New ‘Localism’ 
 Futures Challenges 
 
These findings will also assist in capturing the different attitudes of officers and 
members towards its usage and, finally, in developing a contemporary typology 
of local government in the UK.   
 
Local Authority A  
 
The local context  
 
Local Authority A is a large unitary authority in the North of England.  In the 
2001 Census, the authority area registered a population of 307,190 people of 
which 99.9% were white and 0.1% of the population were of black minority 
ethnic background – far below the national average of 9.1%.  A primarily rural 
area - with a significant proportion of the total area included in a National Park - 
the area also includes significant areas of coastline, hillside and moorland.  
Although the traditional economic basis of the local economy lies in industry, 
since 2000 the local economy has been growing at a strong rate, whilst 
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diversifying into non-traditional areas such as tourism – with roughly 1.3 million 
visitors per year.   
 
Despite this strong growth trend, the area remains one of the weakest regional 
economies in the UK.  The area remains a satellite economy, being bordered by 
smaller geographic but bigger population areas with higher value labour 
markets.  It is one of the most rural counties in England, and as such one of the 
most sparsely populated with roughly 160 people per square mile.  Authority A 
has 48% of the total population in the urban centres, which are concentrated in 
the south-east corner of the authority area.  However no urban settlement in the 
area has more than 39,000 residents.   
 
The consequence of the population concentration is that the bulk of the 
employment base of the area is also concentrated in the south-eastern corner 
of the authority area.  The net unemployment of the authority area (before 
financial crisis in 2008 the area had an unemployment rate of 2.8%) remains 
broadly consistent with national trends, although rock-pools of higher than 
average unemployment remain in some urban areas.  The average wage in the 
authority area is significantly lower than national average levels.  This is, in part, 
due to a high proportion of the labour market being constituted of either part-
time or unskilled employment.  A further consequence is that a relatively high 
proportion of urban areas served by the authority fall into the worst 10% in the 
UK in terms of deprivation (IMD, 2007).   
 
In 2009, the authority was reorganised into a single Unitary Authority from a 
single county council and six district councils.  This reorganisation was 
conducted in pursuit of simpler and clearer public services being delivered in a 
more cost-effective manner.   
 
The political context 
 
The largest political group in Authority A at the time of the research being 
conducted was the Liberal Democrats; although no party holds overall control of 
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the authority.  Whilst there are a number of contrasts within the local authority 
area, traditionally, the urban areas offer strong support to Labour whilst the 
more rural parts of the authority area represent a bedrock of support for the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats.  Below is a table outlining the 
breakdown of the political groups in Authority A at the time that the research 
was conducted.    
 
Figure 9: Breakdown of elected members in authority A by political party 
Total number of Councillors 67 
Number of Liberal Democrat Councillors 25 
Number of Conservative Councillors 17 
Number of Labour Councillors 17 
Number of Councillors from other political parties 8 
 
The local context that the research was conducted in is significant because it 
offers insight into factors that can affect local politics and how the authority 
operates, and offers information on any significant issues facing the authority.  
The staff levels, together overall resources available to the authority, and the 
size of the area that it serves may affect both the capabilities of the authority 
(i.e. the ability of the authority to act), the approach that it might take to local 
governance (i.e. whether a joined-up approach is plausible) and whether it 
focuses on strategic level governance or on community level governance.   
 
Furthermore, Local Authority A also has a high prevalence of Town and Parish 
Councils.  There are over 120 Town and Parish Councils in authority A that are 
served by well over 1200 Town and Parish Councillors.  Given the function of 
Town and Parish Councils, and that they have the power to provide additional 
services for their local areas, could this offer significant insight into the level of 
activism in Authority A? That is to say, given that Authority A is a Unitary 
Authority, does it focus on strategic growth and interventions whilst the Town 
and Parish Councils focus on community level governance?   
 
This may offer an important consideration for the findings on the usage of the 
PoWB, particularly as - since 2009 - Town and Parish Councils can also use the 
PoWB.   
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Awareness of the PoWB 
 
Awareness of the PoWB in Authority A is high.  Indeed, one member of the 
senior management team had a history of using the PoWB in other local 
authorities.  
 
“I did have some involvement in, not the drafting but advising the Chief 
Executive of the authority that I worked in at the time in terms of what he 
was saying to Hilary Armstrong and Stephen Byers.  At that point we 
were founder members of the New Local Government Network ... So I’ve 
got a little bit of history on the PoWB.” 
 
Another member of the senior management team also had previous experience 
of the PoWB, again at another authority. 
 
“The first time I really used it was when I was at another local authority, 
we had quite a neat little project in a small village.  It was an old mining 
village, back to back houses and it was housing market failure.  So we 
bought the houses from the owners at above market value using the 
PoWB, because it then facilitated a huge public investment in the 
housing market renewal and it created a lot of financial value.” 
 
In some cases officers’ awareness of the PoWB was narrow  
 
“whether it’s understood throughout the organisation I think is 
questionable, because I think the majority of councillors or majority of 
council staff wouldn’t come under the sort of legal definition”.   
 
Amongst the senior management team awareness of the PoWB remained high.  
Furthermore, awareness of the policy context and conceptual basis of the 
PoWB was noticeable, one interviewee citing  
 
“I think within the senior councillors and senior management team it’s 
well understood”.   
 
A policy officer opined that the origin of the PoWB was more abstract, than a 
mere solution to practical problems,   
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“I think it came from a political, ideological position almost, in terms of the 
Labour Government of that time working around broader considerations 
about health and quality of life.  That was certainly the political driver for 
it, it’s not that much different now.” 
 
However, a legal officer cited that the change engendered by the PoWB is more 
subtle; the opportunities allowed by the PoWB were designed to promote a 
greater sense of ambition in local authorities, to enable an organisational 
change.  
 
“In many ways, when you sit down and look at something you say ‘well 
you do it because of the PoWB’ but when you sit down with the lawyers 
they might say ‘well actually you can do it because of that’.  I think the 
very fact that it’s there encourages people to think that it is possible and 
maybe also encourages the lawyers to be a bit more broadminded 
because they know they’ve got something to hang it on - if all else fails.” 
 
Awareness of the PoWB may be narrow on some levels of the organisation, this 
seems to vary between levels of governance (i.e. between Principal and 
Tertiary Authorities) and service directorates; however interviewed officers and 
members were found to be relatively well informed on the scope of the PoWB.  
This finding also implicitly questions the degree of accuracy of the levels of 
usage of the PoWB across the UK.  As a finance officer commented on the 
levels of usage of the PoWB amongst English local authorities: 
 
“actually, if you just look at the hard facts, you’ve got no way of analysing 
‘well did people go down this route’.  So my gut feeling is that it’s 
probably used by more authorities than is generally accepted; certainly 
talking to colleagues within the region everyone seems to have examples 
of things they’ve looked at a little bit differently.” 
 
Attitude towards the use of the PoWB 
 
One senior legal officer summarised his attitude towards the PoWB, citing that: 
 
“I suppose I take the view, if the local authority feels that it’s something 
which would be of benefit to the residents then it gives us the legal 
authority to do it – if there isn’t other clear legal power on which we’d sort 
of hang the action.” 
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Whilst the PoWB seems not, in the opinion of officers interviewed in Authority A, 
to be a ‘power of first resort’, the attitude of local authority officers and elected 
members showed that the PoWB is a broadly enabling power.  Importantly 
several officers recognised that there are some significant (de facto) inhibitors 
to the adoption of the PoWB.  One member of the senior management team 
stated: 
 
“I think lawyers are reluctant to use it.  It’s been me that’s said ‘can’t we 
use the well-being power’ rather than the lawyers.  I don’t think the chief 
legal officer here would be among the people I’ve just criticised though.  
Generally, as a community, I think they found it quite a hard concept, it 
was too slippery, which is why I like it.  Two more things, first of all the 
fact that in most cases you do have another power you can use it under, 
and secondly the inability to use it to raise money.  So you can do 
anything except prohibited stuff, and stuff that makes money so I think 
that’s a major inhibition to its usage.” 
 
Whether or not these inhibiting characteristics act as a preventative measure 
that counters the enabling nature of the PoWB - for local government as a 
whole - remains uncertain.  However, in authority A, this does not seem to be 
the case.  In fact, officers and members in authority A seem to have adopted 
the attitude that despite the inhibiting measures that accompany the PoWB, it 
still represents a ‘catch-all’ power. This underlines the inherent requirement that 
the local authority needs to have the ambition to use the PoWB.  One member 
of the senior management team succinctly summarised the point; 
 
“it does give us quite far reaching powers to do things but then a lot of it 
comes back to has the organisation got the appetite.  Is it prepared to do 
things a little bit different and take a risk?” 
 
One elected member, however, also argued that authority A is a unique 
authority.   
 
“…because of how rural we are, and whether there is the capacity to do 
things within the authority, resources, financial and physical. There are a 
number of things which come together to inhibit its use, not least the fact 
that most of what we do is through other means so it’s not relied upon” 
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The attitude towards the PoWB is emphasised by one legal officer’s 
acknowledgment that whilst some local government officers found the concept 
that the PoWB was based on too ‘slippery’, the senior management team in 
authority A were ambitious in their perception of how the PoWB can be used.   
 
The PoWB was exactly the “slippery” concept that enabled them to use it.  As 
the PoWB was not proved that it could not be used in particular scenarios, and 
therefore did not have parameters nor restrictions - beyond the ultra vires 
principle - it could be used a general power.  Furthermore, the setting is 
important, as one elected member recognised that authority A is unique 
because of the area that the authority covers and the organisational capacity of 
the authority.   
 
One officer cited that the main factor that facilitates the use of the PoWB is 
basically “when you haven’t got another power”.  As highlighted previously, the 
PoWB has an inherent requirement that the local authority has the ambition to 
take action.  Given the acknowledgement without accepting the limitations on 
the PoWB - and instead working around the restrictions - it would be fair to 
argue that authority A demonstrates a proactive attitude towards the use of the 
PoWB. 
 
“I think the natural approach from a legal officer is to say ‘is there a 
particular power that would enable this, check, yes, and if not then I’ll 
default’ so it’s a bit of both really.”  
 
Whilst officers and members in authority A recognise that the PoWB itself does 
enable a greater sense of legal autonomy, members particularly, acknowledge 
that this sense of legal freedom must be matched by operational and financial 
autonomy.   
 
However, greater organisational autonomy - in the sense of the authority’s pro-
activity and ambition - can bypass some of the (de facto) restrictions attached to 
the PoWB.   
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Policy Focus 
 
One policy officer from authority A, who had no history of using the PoWB in 
their former authorities, tried to offer background into its origin.  As a “slippery” 
concept, the basis of the PoWB may have had some impact on the level of 
usage:  “the definition of well-being is a philosophical one, which is the 
happiness that David Cameron is clearly very keen on.”  The PoWB seems 
primarily to have been used as a power that enables intervention when no other 
alternative exists.  Rather than a power of first resort, it might be more accurate 
to describe the PoWB as a power of last resort.  Instead it seems to represent a 
catch-all power that encourages local authorities to intervene and enables them 
to do so.   
 
There doesn’t seem to be a defined policy area that PoWB has been used in; in 
Authority A it seems that the PoWB has been used to promote a more holistic 
quality of life for residents.  However, a finance officer from Authority A 
acknowledged an inherent problem with using of the PoWB.  
 
“There’s a kind of Audit Commission definition which is measurable 
improvements in the quality of life, principally in the three elements of 
well-being.  The problem there is that the Audit Commission is quite tick 
boxy and it was basically output measures; so number of jobs or 
whatever it was, doesn’t really give you the outcome.  You need 
something else behind that.” 
 
One member of the senior management team highlighted a previous practical 
example of usage of the PoWB by Authority A, which lies outside of local 
authorities’ traditional remit.  The authority used the PoWB to authorise the 
purchase of a frozen food factory that was likely to close – as a result of the 
recession.  The closure of the frozen food factory would have had a devastating 
impact on the local community, therefore the senior managers and elected 
members decided to intervene to support the factory using the PoWB.   
 
“Recently here we’ve done the frozen food factory … we used the PoWB 
for that.  Plus there were broader social and economic issues at stake, a 
company of 200 in a community of 4500.  So it wasn’t just the company 
itself; it was the impact on the community and the 200 people and their 
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families suffering unemployment.  So there was quite a strong case 
there. ” 
 
A legal officer highlighted that from his point of view authority A was acting in a 
way that would traditionally be classified as ultra vires, but the PoWB provides 
additional assurance to traditional ‘grey’ areas that lack enabling legislation.  An 
example given by another officer further highlighted the ability of local 
government to positively intervene on behalf of the local community, which 
ultimately had the objective of enhancing the local quality of life.   
 
“we were concerned that a local college faced quite a difficult financial 
situation, they would struggle to borrow the money themselves and it 
would certainly be more expensive than for us to access the money.  So 
because we’re trying to forge a strategic partnership with them, we were 
able to use that power to borrow money to help them with cash flow and 
we’ve got security for that because we put a charge against some of their 
assets.  So from our point of view, it’s quite safe.”  
 
Most of the examples provided by the officers and elected members interviewed 
in Authority A emphasise the interventionist role of local authorities with regard 
to community leadership.  Most of the examples also underline the strong link 
between promoting well-being and local authorities’ community leadership.  One 
member of the senior management team argued that: 
 
“there’s a clear link between the statutory basis for the PoWB and the 
community leadership role.  It gives, in theory, the local authority 
flexibility to do things that couldn’t have done before.  … the recent one 
up here had clear and measureable benefits for the local people, and we 
the council got a lot of credit for doing something that councils don’t 
normally do.   
 
However, as well as recognising local authorities’ community leadership role, 
the examples of Authority A’s usage of the PoWB have also drawn attention to 
the fact that most of the usages of the PoWB were to promote economic well-
being in the area.  In recognising the negative effect that unemployment would 
have on the quality of life of local residents, Authority A promoted well-being 
through pro-actively combating unemployment.   
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Enhancing autonomy, rebuilding local authorities capacity 
 
Although Authority A is relatively new, due to a recent restructure, and large – 
both organisationally and geographically - its provision of public services is seen 
by officers and members as core services plus community leadership.  The 
authority would look to intervene where it saw market failure that would 
negatively impact on local communities.   
 
Officers and elected members interviewed reflected that whilst the authority 
would be a provider of core public services, authority A also adopted a 
moderately interventionist approach to community leadership due to the attitude 
of the senior management team and the elected representatives.  One senior 
elected member argued that the use of the PoWB is motivated by the culture of 
the authority citing “it comes back to ‘has the organisation got the appetite’.  Is it 
prepared to do things a little bit different and take a risk?”  Equally, authority A 
roughly follows the traditional model of local government as the provider of 
public services - which seems to reflect the additional or ancillary status that is 
attributed to the PoWB.  One senior legal officer reinforced the argument that 
the PoWB has an ancillary status, stating that: 
 
“a lot of the stuff that we do currently has a basis in statute, the economic 
development stuff and social care whatever, you have usually got a 
power you can do it under.  It’s only when you haven’t that it [the PoWB] 
becomes valuable … it’s not on the tip of everybody’s tongue.” 
 
All of the interviewees in authority A concluded that the model for local 
government was to fulfil a community leadership role, particularly a proactive 
leadership role.  As previously highlighted the PoWB enshrines local authorities’ 
community leadership role, by allowed local authorities to exercise their 
autonomy.  Although even with the PoWB, the level of local authority activity as 
community leaders ultimately rests on the ambition of the authority.    
 
However, whilst agreeing with the broad sentiments that the PoWB allowed 
authority A to exercise greater operational flexibility and exercise their 
autonomy, another officer placed some caveats on usage of the PoWB.   
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“it [the PoWB] does allow us to be creative but only at the margins.  
When we’ve come to a brick wall in terms of other legislative 
permissions, you start thinking outside the box and I think a lot of the 
examples you’ve got is people thinking outside the box.” 
 
Whilst there is no standard model local authority or method for public service 
provision - due to local geographic, organisational, or demographic variation 
that could impact on service requirement - interviews conducted with officers 
and members of authority A seem to reflect that the authority would provide 
‘community leadership plus’ (i.e. the core public services plus additional 
community leadership positive interventions), therefore fulfilling a broader 
strategic leadership role.  However, eventually, the organisational capability and 
ambition of authority A may have been the deciding factor that resulted in the 
proactive approach to community leadership.  As previously identified, 
generally, legal officers are pointedly blamed for being the cause of inaction and 
in the case of authority A.  Interviewees suggested that the chief legal officer (in 
authority A) did not belong in that category.  Moreover, generally, officers and 
members realised that local authorities had to be more innovative and ambitious 
in their approach to community governance but that this would remain to be 
dependent upon local authorities’ “appetite” and senior officers’ risk aversion.  
One elected member argued that:  
 
“it’s about taking the handcuffs off, if central government is honestly 
committed to localism let us get on with it! Don’t overburden us with 
regulation and performance management that forces us down a way our 
communities don’t want, and we don’t want.” 
 
Furthermore, this organisational ambition would have to be matched by a 
political ambition that would enable local authorities to respond to external 
challenges and fully adopt their community leadership role.  A member of the 
senior management team within authority A argued that the onus is on 
authorities to step forward, and break free from risk averse attitudes.   
 
“at the local level I think we probably need to be a bit bolder.  We tend 
when we’re under pressure to act in the safest way.  It’s scarier to take 
risks, if you’re in a blame culture you won’t take risks.  In this authority, 
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we’re trying to encourage taking controlled risks - not invest in bank-type 
ideas – but let people have their head.  Let junior staff come up with 
ideas, let middle managers come up with ideas, and enable and 
empower them to do it … we do have a paradigm shift to take this 
forward.  Whether or not we’ll achieve that I don’t know, it’s not 
something you achieve overnight, but I think if you’re serious about 
localism let us get on with it.” 
 
The findings from officers and elected members interviewed in Authority A, 
suggests that the local authorities’ role related in part to their ambition (i.e. 
willingness to take risks) and the degree of independence from central 
government (i.e. local authorities ability to exert autonomy).  A senior policy 
officer reflected that local authorities’ role was to provide community leadership, 
however sometimes that leadership took communities to places that they “don’t 
want” due to central government interference.  The types of services provided 
by authority A could be seen to be non-traditional (because of their proactive 
attitude towards intervention in local communities) and largely undefined; 
although still providing a community leadership role.  As authority A is a large 
unitary authority, which may impact on the level of service provision because of 
the available resources and organisational capability, some officers felt that 
made the authority more reliant on community (or potentially tertiary level) 
infrastructure.   
 
“look at a map, we’re huge.  We’re spread all over the place and rely on 
that community based infrastructure, but of course even at that level they 
may not get it right, it depends on the culture and leadership.”  
 
‘New’ Localism or new ‘Localism’  
 
Although much of the debate on relations between central and local government 
focuses on the centralist vs. localist implications, officers’ and elected members 
interviewed in authority A reflected that neither really was the case.  One senior 
financial officer from authority A argued that: 
 
“the big debate at the moment is that central government are talking a lot 
about localism but actually imposing quite a lot of constraints.  
Specifically transparency is the latest one; we’ve got to make all this 
information available, so on the one hand they’re talking about localism, 
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which you would think would be generated at the grassroots level, but 
they are still specifying quite a lot of things at national level.  I don’t think 
anything they’re doing enhances or detracts from the PoWB.   
 
Wilson and Game’s (2006) more complex model that allowed different levels of 
localism and centralism to exist simultaneously is closer to officers’ and 
members’ perceptions.  A multi-polar model of intergovernmental relations 
might be more appropriate that enables government departments to 
simultaneously exert varying degrees of localism.  One officer cited that this 
was because “you’ve got SILOs right the way up … there’s a huge element of 
right hands not knowing what left hands are doing”.  While one senior policy 
officer reflected that there was a disjunction between the rhetoric and the reality; 
 
“despite the rhetoric about localism, and taking the handcuffs off enabling 
people to respond locally, I don’t know if we’re seeing that or we will see 
that in future.  At the end of the day somebody has a bee in their bonnet 
and makes some money available for X so it has to be spent on X, so the 
fact that you might want to get that and spend it on Y is irrelevant.  So 
there is a disconnect, a mismatch between real localism and the fact that 
there are still central dictates.  There’s a million ways in which we get 
centrally controlled.”  
 
One member of the senior management team highlighted the opportunity for 
autonomy within the current system of central government control.  The officer 
highlighted an example from the authority, which seems to reflect that local 
authorities have enough discretionary powers to exercise their operational 
autonomy if they wish but that authorities lack ambition to use their powers.  
One member of the senior management team explained that 
 
“we’re looking at things in tandem with the 2003 Act, having our own 
companies for generating energy for example because we have all the 
natural resources up here and I think we would have been looking at the 
PoWB along with the 2003 Act if that wasn’t sufficient to do that but the 
General Power of Competence in the Localism Bill will presumably come 
in before we can get to that point.” 
 
The same senior officer also recognised that (at the time the research was 
conducted) the Localism Bill contained 142 regulatory powers for the Secretary 
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of State, which may affect the degree of overall localism that the Bill would 
enable.   
 
“there’s a lot more that central government could do to let go but none of 
them have the courage to do it, because of the inequalities that they 
perceive that might create … General Power of Competence, I mean 
how general is it going to be.  They’re not really prepared to let go that 
much.”  
 
Therefore, to an extent, the officers and members interviewed in Authority A 
acknowledge that central government does exert control (whether through 
performance metrics, funding control or regulatory powers) over local 
authorities.  However, officers and members interviewed reflected that the level 
of control was also varied by the degree of subservience exhibited by particular 
local authorities. One senior legal officer from authority A argued that “I’m not 
sounding jaundiced here but in a sense any local authority worth its salt 
wouldn’t need a PoWB”.   
 
Future Challenges 
 
The biggest potential challenge to local authorities’ community leadership role 
was perceived by one officer in authority A to be the reduction in local 
government expenditure.  The officer outlined two opposing schools of thought. 
 
“One is if you’ve being really cynical, if you withdraw money, if you 
withdraw finance, actually there’ll be nothing to fill the gap so it just won’t 
happen.  The other school of thought would be, let’s say there’s a youth 
club, the council is providing the youth club and put money into it.  This 
youth club is on a Friday night but now the council can’t afford it.  
Actually there’s so much demand there and so many people want it that 
somebody steps into the breach and says ‘we’ll do it for you’.  In some 
places that will happen and in some it won’t.  The places it’s most likely 
to happen will probably not be places like this one.  It will be people of 
means, who have the time because they’re not working.  It’s just what’s 
called the ‘usual suspects’, who are people who can be school 
governors.  It’s usually the people of means who have that sort of time, 
the articulate middle class, some of that will happen but in others that 
won’t.  It’s not because, in some areas they’re not as civic minded, it’s 
just because they’re trying to keep their head above water because of 
their economic situation.”   
119 
 
 
Another officer was slightly more optimistic about the perceived challenge that 
the reduction in council expenditure presents to local authorities, and 
recognised that the reduction also presents local authorities with an opportunity 
to act more innovatively.  One senior financial officer from authority A argued 
that:  
 
“the scale of the cuts we’re all going through clearly limits our ability to 
act across the board but also it’s a bloody huge nudge – to think 
creatively.  Not just the mantra of shared services, cutting senior salaries, 
because that’s not the solution.  It can be part of the solution but it’s not 
‘the’ solution” 
 
On the relationship between the impact of the spending reduction and local 
authorities’ use of the PoWB and their wider community leadership role, one 
officer challenged the narrative that the spending reduction automatically meant 
that local authorities would be doing fewer things.   
 
“one assumes we’ll generally be doing less of everything but there’s no 
reason why we wouldn’t look to use the PoWB just because the funding 
is going down.” 
 
Another officer further challenged the automatic (reductionist) presumption, 
explaining that the ongoing challenge facing local government was an internal 
cultural issue that shapes local authorities’ activism, instead of the current 
challenge offered by the reduction in local government expenditure.  The same 
officer further highlighted that the severe reduction currently facing local 
authorities actually presents an opportunity to further develop councils’ 
community leadership role.  
 
“I think it’s the cultural issue behind the organisation not the legal power, 
is the organisation minded to try and do things?  So overall, I think it’s 
one of the best powers we’ve probably got.” 
 
Equally so, another officer – and an elected member in authority A – reflected 
that local government’s weakness is the result of a longer term strategic 
problem.  One senior elected member argued that “it varies from authority to 
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authority, but if you raise 25% of your own income you’re doing well these days- 
we’re so dependent on government grants”.  However, the elected member 
interviewed carried this reflection further, citing that the reduction in local 
authorities’ expenditure may ultimately prove to be a false economy.  
 
“I call it lumps in the carpet.  Press it down and it creates an inefficiency 
somewhere else, particularly in the north-east.  I’m sure people have told 
you, all the jobs we’re having to take out there is nowhere for them to go.  
So we are just creating unemployment, and that’s a huge cost to the 
state.  So I think there are flaws in the strategy so that’s bound to affect 
that.” 
 
Whilst the current reductions in public sector expenditure represent a 
contemporary challenge to local authorities, in the longer term it may not 
represent a critical threat.  This would be especially accurate if the underlying 
issue of local government finance represents a more strategic threat to local 
government autonomy.   
 
One interesting note throughout the research conducted in authority A, is that 
the Local Authorities Mutual Limited case was not made reference to as an 
impact factor on their use of the PoWB.  The main factors from officers’ 
perspective were the organisational culture inside the authority, and the political 
and managerial will to drive the use of the PoWB.  The interviews conducted in 
authority A reflected that officers and members recognised that there were 
different degrees of localism, and that the PoWB represented a ‘catch-all power’ 
that offered local authorities greater operational manoeuvrability.  However, 
officers reflected that activity from the centre (whether the reduction in public 
sector expenditure or the imposition of performance metrics) served to reduce 
the level of strategic autonomy allowed by the PoWB.   
 
A number of officers, however, also reflected that individual local authorities 
could seize the initiative from central government - working within the same 
constraints - in order to increase their own operational autonomy.  This seems 
to reflect the ‘choice within constraint’ hypothesis (Pratchett and Leach, 2004).  
This finding seems to suggest that although authorities have similar degrees of 
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flexibility, some authorities may exert more autonomy than others due to 
individual officers or members efforts to pursue localism.  Furthermore, this 
implicitly highlights the low level of awareness in some local authorities and 
suggests that certain authorities may have more operational discretionary 
power than they recognise – due to their low level of awareness.   
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Chapter 6 - Case Study findings: principal authorities 
 
Local Authority B 
 
The local context 
 
Local Authority B is a small Metropolitan Borough Council in the North of 
England.  In 2008, in the Comprehensive Performance Assessment, the Audit 
Commission judged that the authority was improving strongly in comparison 
with other councils, and that it demonstrated a four star overall performance. 
The authority covers a range of territory including coastal and urban areas, 
developed industrial areas and green belt land.  Whilst the range of landscape 
varies significantly, the geographic size of the authority is a small with an area 
of less than 25 square miles.  Created by the local government reorganisation 
of 1974, the authority has its main administrative centre in the largest town, with 
several community centres in the surrounding smaller towns.  At the 2001 
Census, the population served by the authority was 152,785 people, of which 
2.7% were from a black and minority ethnic background – above the regional 
average.  Prior to the financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent recession, the 
area had employment rates below 67% (NERIP, 2009) – below both regional 
and national averages.  Furthermore, at the same time, the unemployment rate 
was above regional and national averages above 9% (NERIP, 2009).   
 
Traditionally, the local economy was built on a firm bedrock of heavy industry 
i.e. ship building, coal mining and manufacturing.  With the decline of heavy 
industry, the basis for the economy has shifted and newer industries - notably 
the services sector and tourism – have been attracted to the area. However, 
heavy industry still remains a considerable proportion of the local economy, 
specifically high-tech manufacturing and precision engineering. The 
consequence of the traditional emphasis on heavy industry is the development 
of urban areas that now face social tension and levels of deprivation, and have 
historical problems regarding the levels of unemployment and benefit claimants 
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in the area.  The average Indices of Multiple Deprivation rank, for the area, was 
38 in 2007 (DCLG, 2007).   
 
The political context 
 
The authority is controlled by a Labour majority; traditionally, there is a strong 
swell of Labour support in the local area.  Elections usually return Labour 
candidates with a significant majority; therefore, this could create a strong 
working majority for the Labour group in the council chamber.  Below is a 
breakdown of the political groups in authority B (figure 10) 
 
Figure 10:  Breakdown of elected members of authority B by political party 
Total number of Councillors 54 
Number of Labour Councillors 36 
Number of Conservative Councillors 3 
Number of Liberal Democrat Councillors 2 
Number of Councillors from other political 
parties 
13 
 
The context (generic and political) of the authority is significant because of the 
impact and influence that this context has on the abilities and capabilities of the 
authority.  The size of the authority may prove to be crucial because it could 
enable activity to be more focussed on specific groups or specific areas, or 
could enable a joined-up approach that might prove more difficult in a 
geographically or organisationally larger local authority.  Politically, the context 
of the authority is significant due to the dominance of one group.  If the PoWB is 
found to be a partisan device then the dominance of the Labour group in 
authority B could prove to be significant.  The dominance of the Labour group - 
as it is used to wielding considerable power and decision-making responsibility - 
may offer political stability that could increase the usage of the PoWB.   
 
Awareness of the PoWB  
 
Within the authority, overall awareness of the PoWB is mixed.  Awareness of 
the origins of the PoWB was also mixed.  Some policy officers stated that “we 
124 
 
thought of it as happiness … we weren’t actually calling it well-being at the time, 
so we actually set out to make our residents happy”.  Some legal officers 
believed that the broader context is “much more difficult to pin point” but that the 
PoWB “widened our scope to those sorts of things [that other people meant by 
well-being]” and that it allowed “a means of giving local authorities more 
flexibility in, in them being able to develop policies or programmes”.    
In some cases, awareness of the PoWB was extremely limited.  Other cases 
seemed to exhibit confusion over the precise nature of the legal Power that was 
used to enable projects.  One policy officer highlighted the differing levels of 
awareness about the PoWB, and other officers’ confusion over its usage, 
stating that: 
 
“I rang our finance and legal departments yesterday and we don’t think 
we actually had to enact anything; just actually saying that we had the 
Power was enough” 
 
The awareness of the PoWB itself was high.  However, one finance officer 
acknowledged that awareness of the PoWB probably had been higher in the 
past “if you’d asked eight or 9 years ago the answer would have been ‘oh yes 
we know about that’, I don’t think that awareness will be as high now.  I think 
passage of time will have dissipated that”.  The relatively high level of 
awareness was most likely the result of a high-profile communications strategy 
within the council to raise the profile of the PoWB and its uses and, a policy 
officer from authority B recognised that: 
 
“We did a lot of work to make sure that every employee understood what 
our vision was.  You could walk down any corridor and see details about 
our vision. Culture and well-being is right at the top of vision, so 
whenever someone looks at what the council’s setting out to do they’re 
going to see it, hear it, and know it” 
 
The authority’s internal communications strategy was built upon the national 
fanfare that accompanied the original launch of the PoWB. 
 
“I think when in it came in with a bit of a fanfare, you know we’re going to 
have these well-being powers and the then Secretary of State, I think it 
was John Prescott, they said you know this is great, new powers for local 
authorities” 
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Furthermore, officers seemed to be in favour of the PoWB generally.  One 
senior policy officer from authority B argued that “I would say that you know as 
officers working within the authority they are generally aware of the existence of 
the Power”.  However, some seemed unsure as to the usefulness of the PoWB 
itself.  One member of the senior management team stated that “since the 
actual powers of well-being, if you look through policies and reports (certainly 
here) it’s not mentioned anywhere”.  Whereas, a legal officer from authority B 
recognised that: 
 
“it’s difficult isn’t it, because that sort of use of the Power [in general 
terms] is unlikely to ever be subject to scrutiny … I’m not saying they go 
through the thing and it’s quoted into a cabinet report saying this is the 
Powers bit, but nobody is ever going to scrutinise that” 
 
Nevertheless, one use of the PoWB by this authority was challenged by the 
Audit Commission on a value for money basis.  The use of the PoWB related to 
a high resource project that trained local secondary school teachers – in the 
USA – to promote emotional resilience in classrooms.  The basis of the Audit 
Commission’s challenge was that authority B did not provide a cost-benefit 
analysis alongside the project.  One senior policy officer from authority B 
outlined the project.   
 
“When we did this work, we were challenged by the Audit Commission.  
What they were saying to us was that they wanted a financial appraisal 
of our well-being programme and they wanted to know why we hadn’t 
done a standard project assessment.  We were spending this money, but 
really had we done a cost-benefit analysis?  So we said to them that we 
were using the powers of the Local Government Act 2000 – we were 
using the Well-Being powers, but actually we’re not sure that we ever did 
actually use the powers.  We think that we did things that we were 
always allowed to do, so we frightened the Audit Commission by saying 
that we were using the PoWB.  So it actually helped us – in a way – to 
remove the burdens of the Audit Commission.  So where they were 
regulating us and saying ‘you’re spending X million on this programme to 
send teachers to America to learn and then teach emotional resilience, 
where’s your cost-benefit analysis?’ We actually said ‘well in the 2000 
Act it says that you can do whatever you feel necessary, so please go 
away’ and they did.” 
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Officers were well aware of the Local Authority Mutual Limited ruling and the 
challenge to the basis of the PoWB, as well as the challenge that they faced 
from the Audit Commission.  However, the awareness of elected members of 
the PoWB was not as in-depth or wide-ranging, although awareness of generic 
well-being – and well-being as a policy objective – was high, specific knowledge 
regarding the PoWB itself was lower than it was amongst officers.   
 
Attitudes towards the use of the PoWB 
 
One finance officer summarised his attitude towards the PoWB as mixed, 
stating that: 
 
“I suppose I understand it to be a means of giving local authorities more 
flexibility in developing policies or programmes which can support the 
community where they don’t have any specific statutory powers, to allow 
them to go into other areas of service provision which maybe they’ve not 
hitherto been involved with.  I think the key theme is flexibility, if it’s 
something they feel is of benefit to the local community and the local 
area, then, as long as there’s not any other law prohibiting them from 
doing it then they should be allowed to do it so I suppose it’d change the 
default position from being ‘we’re setting you up as a public body and 
here are the things you’re allowed to do and here are the things you’re 
not’ to the default position being ‘we’re allowing you to do everything, 
unless there’s something specifically saying you can’t do that.” 
 
The attitude of the officers towards the PoWB seems not to be that it represents 
a ‘power of first resort’.  The PoWB seems instead to have (unconsciously) 
enabled the local authority to act or intervene in areas that it traditionally 
wouldn’t intervene in.  One senior legal officer argued that the PoWB “does, I 
guess, underpin a lot of the things the council does but perhaps not always 
recognise what it’s doing”.  This seems to suggest that the PoWB allowed 
authority B to stray out of their traditional comfort zone, and engendered a shift 
in the culture of the local authority.  Although this influence is debatable 
amongst the officers themselves, one policy officer stated that: 
 
“Maybe if we’d been a smaller authority – not a metropolitan authority – 
then there may have been something there that they might have had to 
do, but being a metropolitan authority everything seems to come under 
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our remit anyway.  So I don’t think we were doing anything that we 
wouldn’t have been able to do anyway” 
 
The PoWB does seem to have represented a power that enabled or 
empowered local authorities to act, and therefore it would seem that officers did 
not regard the PoWB as a power of last resort.  Equally, it was not regarded as 
a power of first resort either, merely as a supplementary power that could back-
up existing statutory powers – if required.  So officers in authority B seemed to 
regard the PoWB as an ancillary power that supported the authority’s activity or 
provided assurance.   
 
“There were obviously issues with councils abilities to take actions that 
they wanted to.  The example in the planning context which is often 
quoted is, I know there’s a separate power for charging for services, 
which has come in, but it’s an example which authorities got tripped up 
on, which was charging fees for pre-planning application advice.” 
 
Officers also recognised another factor that may have impacted on the adoption 
of the PoWB in authority B.  One legal officer summarised the (sometimes 
contradictory) nature of local authorities’ operational autonomy.   
 
“I mean we’ve never been prevented from doing something because we 
don’t have the powers, thinking about local examples, councils have 
always been encouraged to think outside the box etc and get into other 
areas of business, but we are hamstrung by requirements on not making 
profit, not making surplus, and you think ‘well why not, if it’s there and it’s 
cross subsidising other services that the council is providing’.  So, there’s 
the element of the arm still a little bit up our back and we can’t act in a 
truly commercial manner because we can’t make a surplus if we’re 
providing another service.  We can cover our costs, but we can’t make a 
profit.” 
 
Officers’ perception of discretionary powers available to local authorities, and 
local authorities’ legal versus operational autonomy was emphasised by one 
finance officer stating that “we don’t have full flexibility, and maybe perhaps we 
shouldn’t because we’re a publicly funded body.  You can’t say behave on one 
way, but actually we’re going to constrain you in others”.   
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The views expressed by legal and finance officers seem to highlight a level of 
uncertainty regarding the operational use of the PoWB; a degree of uncertainty 
that could have negatively affected the adoption of the PoWB.  This is 
particularly the case if local government officers and elected members do not 
view powers as the tools for innovation in the traditional manner, but instead 
perceive a range of factors that facilitate innovation in local authorities.  The 
majority of officers in authority B broadly agreed with the preposition that most 
non-legal local government officers do not consider vires or their local 
authorities’ legal ability to act when considering a specific policy or project.  One 
senior legal officer argued this point, stating “I think, at the end of the day, it’s 
not something which at the moment I think exercises the minds of most officers, 
is the reality”.  Whilst it could be said that authority B had been traditional in its 
approach to service provision (i.e. the authority undertook projects that were 
statutorily required), this is not currently the case in the authority.  However, 
whether this change is a consequence of the PoWB or the result of ambitious 
leadership within the authority remains uncertain.  While the PoWB was 
intended to represent a power of first resort – that was intended to engender a 
greater degree of confidence (and autonomy) in local government – some of the 
attached constraints, in fact, had the opposite effect.  One senior legal officer 
from authority B argued that the PoWB was sometimes contradictory, stating 
that:  
 
“We want you to do everything you can, you can do anything that’s going 
to benefit the community but we are still going to constrain you on what 
those things are.  So mixed messages, and mixed messages then result 
in people not doing things because they think ‘hmmm, can’t do that, I 
don’t get it, I don’t understand what’ll happen” 
 
This recognition of the impact on the PoWB was further refined by another 
officer.  This officer highlighted that - leaving the PoWB aside and considering 
the legal guidance on its use - the guidance “doesn’t really take you anywhere”. 
 
“It tells you in broad terms that you can and can’t do but doesn’t really 
give you any practical examples.  There may well be a lengthy 
government document which says these are practical examples of the 
use of the PoWB, I don’t know.” 
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Policy Focus 
 
The broad focus of the PoWB seems to be that of an enabling power, rather 
than a power specifically for a policy area (e.g. economic regeneration).  The 
PoWB, in the broader context, acted as an enabling power so that authorities 
could act in areas that traditionally they didn’t have the responsibility for - 
specifically within the health and well-being agenda.  The PoWB allowed this 
local authority to intervene to make local residents happier.  
 
“We weren’t actually calling it well-being at the time, so we actually set 
out to make our residents happy … it was right about that time there was 
some negative publicity about ‘happy-clappy councils’.  So we thought 
long and hard about it and came up with the term well-being – to us it 
was the same” 
 
Although the local authority officers classified their intervention under the health 
and well-being remit, a distinction was added  
 
“it was about residents being happy so it wasn’t just their health or 
physical health, it was also about their emotional health.  We started 
looking at health and well-being because that’s what we found that 
people were looking at, but really when we looked under the surface 
it was really health; that’s what they were taking about”.   
 
One elected member from the authority highlighted a potential 
misunderstanding between local and central government over the exact final 
objective of the policy agenda.  
 
“I think there’s a lack of understanding from the national perspective 
about what well-being is, what has it come from.  Has it got a product 
that comes from the end of it?  Is the government saying that if 
everyone’s feeling happy healthy and content we’ll get more work out of 
them?  Or is the government agenda just to make everybody feel healthy 
happy and content?” 
 
However, the PoWB was adopted in a number of other policy areas to enable 
the authority to intervene in areas that traditionally they may not have been 
involved in.  Whilst other examples of uses of the PoWB are not under the 
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health and well-being remit, the rationale behind other policies and projects was 
(ultimately) to promote the well-being of local residents.  One senior legal officer 
from the authority argued that: 
 
“the council has a number of employment schemes, business support 
schemes, where it engages with third party providers to support getting 
people back into work or starting new businesses.  I think this is one area 
where the PoWB helped the council its work on partnerships.  Through 
one partnership, the council’s acting as a developer on new buildings on 
estates on the riverside.”   
 
The broad-brush nature of well-being promotion that the PoWB allowed, was 
summarised by one of the elected members; citing that the authority: 
 
“had a lead member for culture and well-being.  We had lead 
members doing different elements of well-being, like emotional 
resilience then we changed the portfolio holder and we had a new 
elected member for culture and well-being, who understood it very 
well.  She helped everyone understand what it was all about, which if 
I go back was about happiness.  The things we were doing weren’t 
about emptying bins and providing services for residents but about 
doing things for their enjoyment so we provided a lot of events – free 
events – that we did, which again we didn’t have to they aren’t 
statutory but the idea is for community engagement.” 
 
The PoWB allowed the authority to intervene to promote well-being, or 
happiness, (i.e. to act in areas that traditionally local authorities had no authority 
to act in), and it seems to be perceived by officers and members as a power of 
assurance.  This allowed the authority more flexibility to act in non-traditional 
areas.  One senior elected member argued that the PoWB enabled the authority 
to engage in actions that they have no statutory responsibility for – such as 
promoting the well-being of local residents “on what we do to develop the well-
being of local people”.  Importantly, officers also highlighted the limitations of 
the PoWB; specifically, restrictions that have been placed on local authority 
activity as a result of using the PoWB (i.e. the availability of finance and the 
impact that the LAML ruling had on local authority use of the PoWB).   
 
“The problem with LAML, the purpose behind was the provision of 
insurance, in broad terms.  Whereas if you were doing a company 
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that was for legal services, as long as it’s remit, but were the 
companies there, were the local authorities in setting up LAML doing 
something they otherwise wouldn’t do – basically provide insurance.  
Whereas legal services, they already provide legal services … it’s a 
thing that would be happening anyway.” 
 
One finance officer accepted that the LAML judgement had had a detrimental 
effect on local government discretionary activity, but stipulated that the 
judgement itself was not a judgement on the PoWB.  The LAML case and 
subsequent ruling acted, instead, to frame the boundaries of the PoWB, which 
over the longer term may increase the adoption of the PoWB.   
 
“I think it’s still the case from a legal standpoint, ok it wasn’t a well-being 
judgement on LAML, but at the same time it doesn’t mean that the 
power’s not there and can’t be used.  If it’s a smaller project you might 
think let’s just run the risk on the basis that what’s the likelihood of it 
being challenged.  But, I can see, certainly for things involving any 
significant expenditure or reputation that’s a major issue.” 
 
Another officer highlighted that the availability of resources (specifically finance) 
would ultimately have affected the level of intervention or activism within the 
authority, citing that “finance oils all the changes - there’s not much you can do 
without resources … I think if there’d be more resources there yes, we would 
have probably done more.”  However, something much more fundamental to 
the adoption and usage of the PoWB was found to be lacking.  One officer 
stated that “I’m not really sure – at that time – anybody understood what the 
Power actually was and how to use it”, which highlights the fundamental lack of 
understanding about what the PoWB actually enabled.  In a more theoretical 
sense, it also offers an insight into the role of local authorities and particularly 
the relationship between central government and local authorities.   
 
Enhancing autonomy, rebuilding local authorities capacity 
 
The model for local government in authority B is seen by officers to be very 
particular, very defined and unlikely to follow trends from other areas of the 
country “to be honest with you it’s unlikely many other authorities will follow that 
model of outsourcing everything”.  One senior financial officer reflected that: 
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“this authority, which is very Labour dominated, very traditional and sort 
of northern, the council will be the core enabler of services rather than 
the provider and I think it will be that, you know in a few years there will 
be a lot of different external bodies who are now providing a lot of the 
services which were previously provided internally” 
 
Equally so, officers identified the impact that factors can have on the role and 
activity from the council; externalities that could drive local authority activity in a 
certain direction i.e. economic or social factors.  One senior legal officer 
acknowledged the impact that these externalities could have on local authority 
activity, arguing that : 
 
“The factors that are driven by economic circumstances within the 
borough because as one of the more deprived areas within the region 
there has been a lot of emphasis placed upon how the council can act as 
a stimulator for the local economy.  So one of the factors will be what’s a 
priority for the council and if the priority isn’t, we’ll provide school 
services, we’ll provide social care services, we’ll cut the grass, we’ll 
empty the bins, it it’s more than that how do you achieve more than 
that?” 
 
The majority of interviewees in authority B concluded that the role of their local 
authority was to act as a community leadership organisation; although, 
importantly, there was a split between officers and members in relation as to 
whether this was ultimately a proactive or reactive leadership role.  One senior 
legal officer argued that, due to the local context of the authority, the community 
leadership role is particularly significant, stating that: 
 
“The community leadership role, particularly here, which is a deprived 
area and realistically the council, has to play a massive role, particularly 
in terms of local enterprise etc.  It’s not going to deliver.  The area is not 
going to regenerate itself effectively, and we aren’t going to get 
businesses coming in here unless we’ve got heavy local authority 
involvement.  One example from my area is planning obligations, one of 
the things we try to secure now through the planning obligations process 
is targeted recruitment and training, having social clauses in our sc.106 
agreements.  So we identify targets for apprenticeships, work experience 
and require them to go into schools when a new development is taking 
place.”   
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It was felt that their community leadership role was accomplished by developing 
a two way relationship with the wider community.  One senior policy officer 
reflected that “the community would say to us ‘help us to do this’ so that they 
would be able to have allotments and planting days with older people, and 
intergenerational work with younger people as well.  So it was all about the 
community telling us and leading the whole”.  Whilst this relationship was 
recognized, it was also acknowledged that local authorities - more generally - 
had to be more innovative and radical in their approach to governance.  One 
senior policy officer argued that “local authorities will have to work in new ways 
to achieve improvement and fulfil their new place-shaping role.  Incremental 
change is not enough”.  It was also accepted that the level of ambition within the 
authority - irrespective of organisational capability - could affect the level of local 
authorities’ community leadership i.e. that of perceived vulnerability of the 
authority to external risk.  One senior financial officer argued that: 
 
“local authorities are a bit like sheep.  They always wait for somebody 
else to go first and see what happens ‘before we do that, who else has 
done it’” 
 
If this finding represents a wider trend amongst local authorities, then the impact 
of the LAML case on the wider local government sector may represent a mortal 
blow to the perceived freedoms that the PoWB offered.  In this authority, it 
would seem that the LAML judgement highlighted some weaknesses involved in 
the PoWB that has reinforced the relative risk-averse nature of legal officers in 
the case study authority.  One senior legal officer from authority B argued that 
“you have issues of legality.  You’ve had public officials, who are naturally 
cautious, politicians are naturally cautious, they’re risk averse.”  However, 
another officer highlighted that whilst the LAML judgement might have dealt 
damage to the PoWB and affected its adoption, the LAML scheme itself may 
have been a unique project.  One senior financial officer reflected that: 
 
“you take LAML, I guess, one of the things is in that maybe again to do 
with the size of the authorities.  I’d be amazed if the authorities in the 
North East would have ever conceived of doing something like that.  The 
question is probably a good one, because I don’t think it’s within the remit 
of most local authorities” 
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The recognition of the organisational size of a local authority as a factor – by a 
minority of officers in authority B – is an interesting finding, although it does not 
reflect the findings echoed earlier in this thesis regarding the levels of usage of 
the PoWB amongst district councils.  This thesis has so far highlighted 
anecdotal and original research to show that the size of an authority itself does 
not significantly influence the degree of innovation that is exhibited.  Although 
some of the larger local authorities are well cited for their innovation, this does 
not automatically imply that all larger local authorities are more innovative than 
smaller district level authorities.  The contrary may be more accurate.  Whilst 
larger authorities might have greater organisational capabilities than their 
smaller counterparts, this research reflects that smaller authorities can be more 
responsive and have a greater impact – albeit in a more targeted manner.   
 
‘New’ Localism or New ‘Localism’ 
 
One officer offered the view that the relationship between levels of government 
was more akin to ‘jailor’ and ‘inmate’, characterising central government as 
creating constraints and placing ‘shackles’ on local government.  
 
“I know there’s talk of extending this PoWB to something wider, I know 
it’s been mooted by the current government, but it’s really looking at 
those areas where there are constraints and removing those constraints.  
I think, as well, taking away any shackles which arise from, having to 
justify to outside expectorates” 
 
One clear example of the perceived method of placing constraint on local 
authorities was highlighted by one of the elected members of the authority, 
citing that central government would encourage councils to achieve more and 
broaden their scope of intervention whilst taking away local authorities’ 
resources.  
 
“you’re having one conversation with the government, they’re saying ‘well 
you can do anything you want, whenever you want, whatever’s positive 
for your community you can do it’ but in the next conversation ‘oh by the 
way, we’re taking 23 million pounds from your budget.” 
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Another officer within authority B emphasised this perceived level of control that 
central government has over local government by offering an insight into the 
local government finance review (commissioned by the Coalition Government 
after the 2010 General Election).  The officer highlighted that local authorities 
would want more freedom from central control so that more local autonomy 
would enable councils to take a more active role in their communities.  
However, the officer also highlighted the political influence that local 
government could potentially hold over central government:   
 
“Reviews of local finance have been particularly painful in the past, look 
at Layfield and Lyons, and obviously you have the thorny issue of local 
taxation which has brought previous prime ministers down.  It’s an area 
where they tread with fear and trepidation because it’s political dynamite.  
Now you know you have poll tax and they got it wrong, they got it wrong 
really badly.  There’ll be some little bits that come out of it, and really 
what local authorities would want from it is greater freedom to raise their 
own revenue, greater freedom over council tax greater freedom to 
borrow and invest using their assets as collateral and being able to keep 
any proceeds from local economic growth.”  
 
This raises the question of whether the ‘shackles’ that central government has 
placed on local government are also de facto shackles on central government.  
One elected member of authority B highlighted that some interventions can only 
be successfully pursued at the local level.  Therefore central government is 
reliant on local government, and as such, enhances the performance pressure 
on local authorities.   
 
“the people want to pull the estate down.  Let’s go in and talk to the 
properly, so we got a company to do a full interview survey of 700 
houses in this part of the estate.  They went in and came back, and 79% 
of the residents wanted it pulled down.  So we pulled it down.  Now we’re 
in the middle of rebuilding it.  If you go and knock on the doors of people 
now and ask ‘what’s your house like’ they say fantastic.  That is a sense 
of well-being … that’s the yardstick I can measure it by - at a local level.” 
 
Therefore, to an extent, central government would seem to be reliant on local 
government to either achieve or facilitate at the local level on the behalf of 
central government objectives; potentially something more akin to a partnership 
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model of relations than that of parent and child.  However, even if this were the 
case, several officers in authority B have highlighted that central government 
would be the senior partner in the arrangement.  One senior financial officer 
argued that “you can spend your money on anything you want but actually 
you’ve only got tuppence ha’penny”, reflecting that what central government 
offered councils was “freedom without resources”.  One of the biggest 
operational challenges that seem to run throughout the authority is that of 
funding, which is (justifiably or not) perceived to be the greatest constraint on 
local authority activity.  In the current challenging financial environment, severe 
reductions in public sector expenditure and local government funding may 
emphasise future challenges on local authority activity.   
 
“At the moment when budgets are tight, you’ve got people saying ‘well 
you can’t do that’.  My impression is that although the new government 
may bring in this power [a General Power of Competence], how much 
official guidance or suggestions on usage and how it can’t be used I don’t 
know.” 
 
Future Challenges 
 
The issue of local government funding is an especially important one, at a time 
when local government is facing severe reductions in funding, as expenditure is 
seen by some to be the key to local authorities’ discretionary services.  One 
officer in authority B outlined the two opposing points of view aptly, stating that: 
 
“public bodies are going to have to become more innovative and look at 
different ways of doing things, using different powers to do things 
differently which they haven’t done before.  The counter to that is then if 
they haven’t got the power to do it, all this regeneration stuff and Big 
Society isn’t going to get done.  We’re going to cut the grass, we’re going 
to empty the bins and clean the streets, and that’s all we’re going to do.  
None of this wider regeneration or social stuff; we’ll do core services, 
statutory services.  No discretionary services, no extras.  The law says 
that you’ve got to provide a library service so that’s what we’ll do.  That 
might be going back 30 or 40 years but that’s what some local authorities 
will do.  Never mind about promoting economic regeneration, we just 
provide some services” 
 
The two bodies of thought referred to by the officer highlight two different 
perspectives on the current spending reductions facing local authorities.  Given 
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the sheer number and variations between local authorities across the country, 
different interpretations on current and future challenges to local government 
are to be expected.  One elected member from authority B acknowledged that 
the funding reductions would limit discretionary services and local authorities’ 
wider role in the community.  The same elected member also recognised that 
“the engine of innovation is challenge”, which was reinforced by another officer 
within authority B who stated that - in the longer term - the current challenge 
may promote innovative practices in some local authorities.   
 
“where is the desire to innovate if you don’t have to financially?  If you 
don’t have to from public expectations then you won’t be innovative.  I 
think often you get this, services get sort of captured by the provider, so 
who provides the services; will they want to do something differently? 
Why would they want to?  They’ve been the ones providing the services 
for the last X number of years.  So they’re not going to write themselves 
out of job.  If it clearly works, I’m going to keep doing it.  Turkeys don’t 
vote for Christmas.” 
 
The immediate nature of the expenditure shortfalls (i.e. the front-loading of the 
reduction in spending) may present an immediate challenge to larger local 
authorities, as the lack of preparation and planning may prevent them from 
considering new innovative service-delivery models and instead force ‘salami-
slicing’ style efficiencies across the organisation.  Therefore a structural and 
holistic reform of local government operations may provide a more flexible, 
independent, adaptable system of providing local government.   However, the 
immediate threat posed by front-loaded cuts does not just affect organisationally 
larger authorities.  The impact of reductions in public sector expenditure on 
discretionary activity in smaller, local authorities is seen to be extremely 
detrimental, especially in the short term.  Asked whether the reductions in public 
sector expenditure were likely to affect local authorities’ discretionary services 
and their community leadership role one officer in authority B said “it absolutely 
is for us”.  Another officer stated that: 
 
“being a deprived local authority, we got a lot of money through area 
based grants and that’s what we mostly used to fund our initiatives.  So 
although the emotional resilience programme was very expensive, all the 
research pointed to the fact that we’d get benefits back from reduced 
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anti-social behaviour, schools exclusions and better attainment.  We 
used our area based grant money because we said that the whole 
borough is deprived and we’re covering the whole borough because we 
covered almost all of our secondary schools in it.” 
 
Reductions in the public sector are being felt further than just local authorities – 
as another officer highlighted: “the pressure on our partner’s budgets as well is 
huge.  The pressure on health, as you can imagine, is just tremendous”.  The 
officer continued to outline further discretionary services and special projects 
that the council commissioned that were continually being re-appraised to 
examine their value for money.  In the long term, however, there seems to be a 
re-appraisal of local government’s role in providing public services.  One officer 
outlined that the future might see a greater (and wider) role for local authorities 
in public services, although this might be more of a facilitator role that delivers 
services via community initiatives.   
 
“Possibly in the next four or five years if that’s all implemented we’re 
going to have a big change in the way that the local authority will 
operate.  The local authority is responsible for social care and you’ve got 
a body responsible for health care, and within the healthcare they’ve got 
all the preventative stuff, but the local authority have got a responsibility 
around health needs as well so you’ve got two bodies who are trying to 
improve people’s health.” 
 
In the short term, due to the front-loaded rather immediate nature of reduction in 
public sector expenditure, a significant risk for smaller local authorities is that - 
whilst more flexible in the longer term - in the interim it could lead to limited 
action in local communities.  Officers in authority B acknowledged the Big 
Society agenda, and that it could lead to greater community-based action as 
neighbourhood groups’ advance to fill the service-gap left as the government 
withdraws.  They also recognised that the ultimate result might be wider 
variations in service provision as a result. 
 
“you could argue that where services are no longer being provided and 
volunteers don’t step into the breach, it means that there’s no demand for 
it.  It’s almost like a perfect market; if there’s demand for it and people 
want it to happen they will go ahead and make it happen.  If they don’t it 
won’t; so was it needed in the first place?  That’s our point of view, but no 
I think it will - in some areas - there is an understanding that there isn’t 
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this army of people who are going to step into the breach.  So they will 
seek to preserve those core services that are withdrawn in other areas of 
the country.” 
 
In summary, the interviews carried out in authority B have reflected that the 
PoWB offered local authorities greater operational freedom to conduct or 
engage discretionary services, but only at one level.   
 
The PoWB enabled local authorities to do more things than traditionally they 
were allowed, but it did not carry any attached revenue or capital.  The 
relationship was characterised by one officer as “freedom without resources”.  
From the perspective of officers that were interviewed, in the contemporary 
environment that includes severe restrictions to public sector expenditure, those 
resources (both financial and otherwise) are going to become much sparser.  
However, this may be a short term issue.   
 
In the longer term, the structural reforms to local government (i.e. the 
abandonment of performance metrics, establishment of a broader General 
Power of Competence, and the scrapping of legal burdens on council 
operations) may engender a more agile form of local government that has a 
greater sense of local autonomy.  While the attitude of council officers and 
elected members did not reflect that the PoWB represented a power of first 
resort to the council, neither was it reflected that the PoWB represented a 
power of last resort.  The PoWB was perceived to allow greater choice within a 
system of legal shackles (the ultra vires principle) and increasing levels of 
constraint on local government activity.   
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Chapter 7 - Case study findings: tertiary authorities. 
 
The following two chapters will present the evidence gathered from the Tertiary 
Authority (Town and Parish Council) case studies.   
 
Local Authority C 
 
The local context 
 
Local Authority C is a Parish Council in the South of England.  In the 2001 
Census, the authority area registered a population of 4,956 with most of the 
population living in the main village and a number of smaller hamlets.  A 
primarily rural area, the authority is within an area with the fifth lowest 
population density and the third largest land area in the region.  The authority 
represents the closest level of local government to the community, whilst also 
being served by principal authorities i.e. the area is effectively served by three 
levels of local government (County Council, District Council and Parish 
Council).  
 
As the most local level of government, the authority has responsibility for 
community relations and local issues working with police, principal authority 
officers and community groups on crime, planning and traffic issues.  
Furthermore, the authority has an important role in shaping the community by 
undertaking projects to benefit local residents, alerting relevant authorities that 
arise, and helping the other tiers of local government keep in touch with their 
local communities.  Before the financial crises and subsequent recession, the 
economic basis of the wider area that the authority sits within, had a higher 
proportion of the population employed in education and health (28.8%), 
wholesale and retail (20.5%) and manufacturing (13%) than the national 
average.   
 
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the authority area had the third highest number 
of business start-ups in the South West.  During 2008, the number registered 
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business start-ups in the area decreased by 3.9%, slightly above the national 
average (3.2%).  Although the employment rate in the area decreased - by 
3.1% - at the beginning of the financial crisis (2008-2009), the employment rate 
remained higher than the regional and national averages.  The unemployment 
rate in the area is 5.8%, significantly below the regional and national averages.  
A considerable majority of the area is classified as least deprived, only two 
wards being classified as being among the most deprived 10% nationally (ONS, 
2004).  In 2008, as a method of ensuring a minimum benchmark set of 
standards, the authority was awarded ‘Quality Council’ Status.  The authority 
reached the required standard by demonstrating: 
 
 An electoral mandate 
 Qualifications of the clerk 
 Community engagement and communication 
 Code of conduct 
 Published accounts 
 An publicly-open annual general meeting, and  
 By promoting local democracy and citizenship.  
(Commission for Rural Communities and DCLG, 2008) 
 
The political context 
 
The wider area, which the authority sits within, is dominated by the Liberal 
Democrats and the Conservative Party.  At time the research was conducted, 
the largest political group on the upper-tier principal authority was the 
Conservative group, thus controlling the council.  Although both parties maintain 
considerably sized groups on the principal authority, the Conservative group 
maintains a healthy majority over the Liberal Democrat group.  Therefore the 
stability of the Conservative Party’s majority on the principal authority could 
potentially impact on relations between principal and tertiary level authorities.  
Furthermore, a number of councillors that sit on the Parish Council also 
represent their communities on the principal authority.  This is significant 
because it offers insights into the potentially close linkages between the 
different levels of government (i.e. whether a closely co-ordinated approach to a 
local issue is more - or less - likely to occur).  However, political groups on 
142 
 
tertiary authorities do not operate in the same manner as political groups in 
principal authorities.  The councillors in tertiary authorities more often act as 
representatives of their community and their resident’s interests - rather than 
political actors. 
 
The wider context of the authority offers an insight into the conditions in the 
local area, potential issues that might affect the community, and how the 
authority operates both with the community and the principal authorities.  As the 
size of the area served and the organisation of principal authorities may affect 
their capabilities, inversely the size of the organisation and the area covered by 
the authority may affect the authorities’ capabilities and priorities for local 
governance.   
 
Awareness of the Power of Well-Being 
 
One senior officer interviewed acknowledged that, whist awareness of the 
PoWB was high in Authority C, usage was less widespread across the sector, 
stating that: 
 
“It’s a bit disappointing in terms of the extent of usage.  I don’t think you’ll 
find that many authorities have used it proactively.  As for the reasons for 
that, authorities are probably risk averse.” 
 
One of the elected members of authority C noted the moderate level of 
awareness about the PoWB amongst officers and members of tertiary 
authorities.  This further highlighted the benefit the PoWB has brought to local 
councils over the previous discretionary power, citing “there is a substantial 
overlap with the old Section 137 [Local Government Act 1972] … but it’s not 
geographically or administratively restricted like section 137.”  Whilst the 
simplification of local authorities’ discretionary power was welcomed by this 
member, across the sector, the simplification may have created additional 
uncertainty that could have inhibited the use of the PoWB.  However, another 
elected member outlined an example of a project that did not use the PoWB as 
the discretionary power (even though it could have been).  Another power – 
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devolved from the principal authority – was used.  The elected member seems 
to outline a scenario that both highlights awareness of the PoWB, and the 
decision not to ultimately use it:  
 
“The county council delegated their land drainage powers to us; we think 
this is the first time this has happened because we couldn’t find a 
precedent for it.  It allows us to carry out a local flood relief scheme; they 
[the county council] wouldn’t do that because it’s too small. Neither would 
the environment agency, and nobody would ever fund it because the 
impact is too small but it’s ‘localism’.  We decided that it was a priority 
and are going ahead with it.  The county council is making sure that 
we’ve got the powers to do it; it fits in the Big Society agenda, which is 
the one that interests our councillors because it’s local people coming 
together deciding what’s best for their community.  Under the PoWB of 
course, I suppose you could argue that we’ve got a bit of a comfort 
blanket under that as well.” 
 
Although extremely innovative, this scenario seems to highlight that whilst 
elected members and officers are aware of the PoWB, it was not needed 
because the authority already had the discretionary power (albeit devolved from 
another authority).  This lends credence to the hypothesis that local authorities 
have more discretionary power and ability than they acknowledge i.e. not many 
authorities have used the PoWB because they haven’t needed it.  However, this 
doesn’t take account of the subtler changes the introduction of the PoWB could 
have brought to local authority discretionary activity.   
 
Attitude towards the use of the Power 
 
One of the senior officers from authority C suggested that the subtler changes 
were as important as the flexibility the PoWB itself allowed, stating that:  
 
“we would say, it has certainly been welcome for us over the years, it has 
provided more of a comfort blanket rather than anything more positive 
than that.  I’m glad it was there rather than not there, but with all those 
caveats it needs to go further.” 
 
One elected member further implied that the caveats placed on tertiary 
authorities’ use of the PoWB restrict its application, citing that:  
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“The PoWB only applies to parish councils if they are an eligible parish 
council.  In very simple terms, to be eligible you’ve got to be a quality 
parish.  Round here, the vast majority are not quality parishes.  So this is 
just another complication so I think in the years ahead it’s going to be 
interesting to see how things pan out, because the government seem to 
want local groups to take projects on voluntarily, but are they going to 
give them the necessary powers?”  
 
Furthermore, another elected member outlined the limitations of the PoWB 
itself, highlighting that: 
 
“if you focus on Section 3 of the 2000 Act, I don’t really like this provision, 
it says that the power under section 2 [the PoWB] does not enable a 
local authority to do anything they are unable to do by virtue of any 
prohibition, restriction or limitation on their powers, which is contained in 
any enactment whether passed or made.  Secondly they aren’t able to 
raise money by borrowing or otherwise, and a lot of these initiatives need 
funding.  Unfortunately, a lot of these things are not black or white.  You 
can’t actually be sure whether there’s some other limitation that’s going 
to get you into a legal wrangle.” 
 
These two statements offered by elected members, in comparison with other 
quotes, highlight the limitations of the PoWB and the restrictions placed on its 
usage by tertiary authorities.  Both factors could be perceived to reduce the 
operational effectiveness of the PoWB and the freedom it offers tertiary 
authorities.  Another elected member stated that “at the moment this quality 
status is an obstacle to parish councils being able to use this PoWB”.  Another 
member cited that the qualifiers that restrict the usage of the PoWB are uneven 
because “the post-hoc accountability test would only be relevant if parish 
councils followed the political leadership model that principal authorities do”.  
However, both members clearly demonstrated a high level of awareness of the 
technicalities of the PoWB.  Nevertheless, despite the limitations and 
restrictions, the PoWB may have encouraged authorities to do more by 
providing a ‘comfort blanket’.  One senior officer questioned the rationale behind 
the formal deployment of the PoWB, citing that authorities might not have found 
need to use their PoWB.   
 
“it may be a simple as, did they need to? A lot of authorities don’t get into 
areas of activity where they need to rely on this.  It’s probably more about 
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there’s nothing wrong with the power but authorities need to do a bit 
more.  I suppose, we’re the exception, where we’re always out there 
looking for a power to justify something that we’re doing.” 
 
The senior officer seems to reinforce the previous hypothesis that authorities 
did not use the PoWB because they had no need of it, because they already 
had broadly satisfactory discretionary powers and freedom to act.  Instead, the 
senior officer stated that the PoWB engendered a subtler kind of freedom by 
enabling local authorities to take action in non-traditional policy areas without 
fear of going beyond their remit.   
 
Role of the Power 
 
On uses of the PoWB and its ability to enable discretionary activity, one senior 
officer noted that: 
 
“Although the PoWB was promoted as being a power of first resort, there 
were of course limits on the use of the power, and some of the situations 
I’ve come across it’s not been very clear whether limitations apply or not.  
So in a number of instances, we’ve focussed upon the PoWB but also 
focussed upon other provisions as a supplement.” 
 
One elected member echoed this finding, emphasising the ancillary nature of 
the PoWB and the factors that inhibits its usage, stating that: 
 
“We’ve never really used it as a power of first resort, to be honest we 
haven’t.  We rely on it when we have to but, to be honest, even when 
we’ve done some projects we’ve relied on other legal provisions and 
taken advice to rely on other legal provisions – not just the PoWB.”  
 
Another elected member highlighted that – generally – while local authorities 
are risk averse, the PoWB might have ameliorated some of that aversion by 
enabling a greater sense of freedom i.e. engendering a reduction in a risk 
averse ‘culture’.  The member stated that “yes I’d say the authority is usually 
risk averse, I’m not sure if there’s anything in the drafting to make authorities 
more reluctant”.  One member implicitly noted the auxiliary status of the PoWB 
146 
 
and the risk aversion sometimes present amongst authorities when undertaking 
projects. 
 
“we took extra legal advice from an external lawyer just to see what we 
could rely on and he said quite rightly you can rely on the PoWB, but he 
also gave three other powers to fall back on if anyone ever challenged 
our usage of the PoWB; so there’s enough [discretionary power] out 
there that you can rely on to do this type of stuff.” 
 
One senior officer in the authority further reinforces the position taken by the 
elected member, stating that “we were a bit worried about the ground we were 
treading on, and whether we could be challenged”, which also serves to 
emphasise the (self-reinforcing) vulnerable position that some authorities 
occupy.  If authorities are naturally risk averse organisations, and occupy a 
position of vulnerability, then regardless of the implicit cultural flexibility the 
PoWB allows, the explicit limitations and restrictions within the PoWB would 
restrict its usage.  One senior officer acknowledged another aspect of 
authorities’ risk aversion (aside from operational risk management) stating that 
“political instability adds to the risk”.  The senior officer then further highlighted 
that: 
 
“senior officers and elected members will say ‘why should I take this risk 
when we may come a cropper, we’ve got an election just around the 
corner and we may come out of office’.  It so happens in this council that 
there is usually a big majority for the main group and we only have 
elections every four years, which adds to the stability.” 
 
One elected member further reinforced the importance of political stability when 
pushing for discretionary projects, stating that: 
 
“it helps if you’re going to take on a major challenge if you’ve got a good 
spirit of trust and confidence across the council leadership, we’re lucky 
because we’ve got that; we’ve had stability over the years.  In other 
councils there’s so much mistrust [I think] they’d be really reluctant to go 
out and take on a new project.” 
 
Regarding to local authorities’ powers, one senior officer implied that whilst 
authorities have various powers to call upon (without straying ultra vires) they 
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are confused.  Stating “at the moment notwithstanding the 2000 Act, I actually 
think it’s a bit messy”, which seems to further bolsters the case for clarification 
of the ultra vires principle and the introduction of a new bold discretionary legal 
power – a GPC.   
 
Enhancing autonomy, rebuilding local authorities capacity 
 
Despite the risk aversion of some local authorities, one senior officer 
acknowledged that authority C might be the exception to the rule (due to the 
organisations’ approach to risk management, and the degree of organisational 
ambition) stating that: 
 
“I think we are in some ways the exception to the rule, because we’re got 
some leading members who are very keen to take on new challenges – 
you know even if there are one or two risks in there along the way.  I 
think that mood is also mirrored by the officers here, who are happy to 
take on new initiatives.  I look at some neighbouring authorities in the 
Midlands, they wouldn’t even think of taking on some of the sort of things 
that we’ve done here.   
 
Going into further detail, one senior officer highlighted that “our corporate policy 
talks about greener, stronger, healthier communities and it [the PoWB] fits with 
all of those”.  The senior officer also stressed that rather than promoting a single 
policy context (i.e. health or environmental policy) the authority aims to promote 
a more holistic approach.  One elected member reflected that the role of the 
authority isn’t specified, stating that “I don’t think I actually link it to health as 
such, it’s more of a wider background”.  Another elected member cited that the 
role of local authorities should be to provide leadership for their communities 
and to help to promote the quality of life of local residents, and that: 
 
“I think we probably do the community leadership role without linking it or 
without thinking we’re linking it but we are, aren’t we?  I mean, everything 
we do is a community leadership role.  It should help the quality of life of 
our citizens; I mean one is implicit on the other isn’t it?”   
 
Whether or not authority C is the exception to the rule as one senior officer 
reflected, another elected member acknowledged that “few parishes have been 
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active developers, they don’t like going into Section 137 territory, and fewer still 
have gone beyond the Section 137 limitations.”  The elected member did place 
qualifiers on the previous statement, citing that “qualification is a barrier that is 
low to change” and that “parishes may become inhibited due to the pre-
conditions [applied to usage of the PoWB] for democratic legitimacy”.  These 
quotes highlight the restrictions and limitations placed on tertiary authorities that 
wish to use the PoWB.  Furthermore, the elected member highlighted that local 
authorities already possess discretionary powers that (largely) remain under-
used, citing that “sc137 [and the following PoWB] applies in a relatively few 
cases of interest to Parishes, as broad powers already exist”.  Another elected 
member highlighted that the restrictions on the usage of the PoWB might 
actually represent a hindrance or obstacle for tertiary authorities, which acts to 
constrain those authorities that do not meet the pre-conditions that could 
actually benefit from the PoWB, stating that: 
 
“I would say some of the parishes that don’t have quality status could 
actually be more competent than some of the ones that have got quality 
status.  It doesn’t actually define a level, I suppose it’s trying to define a 
level of competence but I don’t really know if it does or not.” 
 
Another elected member acknowledged that whilst the PoWB did not represent 
a power of first resort for tertiary authorities (due to the restrictions and 
limitations), it did offer some additional flexibility when applied to certain 
projects, stating that “the scale of some projects would be more difficult (but not 
impossible) to achieve without the PoWB”.   
 
‘New’ Localism or New ‘Localism’ 
 
Although the Coalition Government’s focus is on localism and a desire to 
cascade authority functions to local voluntary organisations and parish councils, 
one senior officer distinguished between the priority and the practical reality that 
seems to create a form of ‘directed localism’.  On the distinction between the 
reality and rhetoric, one senior officer noted that: 
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“the coalition government have been very strong on localism.  The 
rhetoric is ‘we’ll allow you to do whatever you want to do’; but having said 
that the first six months of the coalition government, whatever we’re into, 
we’ve had a lot of central dictates from CLG – every week effectively.  So 
we’re not seeing that in practise yet, the rhetoric doesn’t match the 
reality.” 
 
One elected member carried this distinction further, calling for real flexibility to 
operate freely rather than skin-deep autonomy – particularly during 
recessionary cycles that increase the requirement for operational innovation.  
The member stated that: 
 
“we need the freedom to do more because in the financial scenario we’re 
about to enter for the next four years, we need to be as innovative as 
possible; we need the ability to raise money and seek sources of income 
that we probably wouldn’t look at before.  So we need the comfort to do 
that because someone will challenge us at some stage because 
someone will say well that’s not what local government is supposed to 
do, but to keep viable and sustainable (as an organisation) we’ll need to 
do more projects, and be more innovative.” 
 
Another elected member reflected that central government could encourage 
tertiary authorities to use the PoWB by easing the restrictions and limitations 
placed on its use, stating that central government should “remove the election 
based democratic test, provided that councillors communicate well with local 
residents and are therefore accountable for what they have done at the next 
election.”  The elected member also reflects that central government should 
recognise the distinct nature of tertiary authorities, instead of being mirrored 
tiers of principal authorities.   
 
“Government should recognise that a Parish council is held in the 
community and also that the community often turn up to argue their case.  
Parish councillors tend to eschew political allegiance; they do not tend to 
stand on a manifesto but rather as representatives.” 
 
The same elected member also reflected that tertiary authorities could do more, 
specifically with regard to collaborative working with principal authorities.  The 
elected member cited that although some joint-working projects may take more 
time to complete and that they could crowd out the advancement of 
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discretionary projects at the Parish level (which might make use of the PoWB 
harder for tertiary authorities), some activities such as “roads and welfare are 
better handled by spreading the risk over larger populations i.e. counties, 
districts or unitary authorities”.   
 
Future Challenges 
 
One of the biggest potential challenges to tertiary authorities was perceived by 
officers and elected members to be the level of restriction or limitations on 
authorities’ discretionary activity.  As tertiary authorities are generally small 
organisations embedded within local communities, elected members have 
highlighted that the removal or reduction of some restrictions and limitations 
may increase the level of autonomy that could lead to greater activism.  Whilst 
one elected member cited that “I have not yet wanted to do something that 
could not be brought forward using the PoWB”; another elected member 
reflected that “to be honest, for the future, it would be good to have the 
simplification [of discretionary powers] and to be to focus upon one primary 
piece of legislation”.  The elected member further outlined their concerns 
regarding local (principal and tertiary) authorities’ legal framework to provide 
discretionary services, stating: 
 
“I’m not convinced that the legal framework is there at the moment to 
support all of these shared services initiatives.  Now I have some unease 
about it from a legal point of view irrespective of whether it’s a good thing 
for all services.  I think this is just one example of where the legislation 
needs to catch up if this is the way the Coalition Government wants to 
take us.” 
 
Another elected member also highlighted the budgetary pressures on tertiary 
authorities; pressures that are mirrored by principal authorities, stating that: 
 
“With the great financial pressures that councils face, I think there’s 
perhaps an expectation that councils will be able to operate on a more 
commercial footing.  At the moment, they’re severely constrained and it 
could be that if things are loosened up partly through this new power [the 
General Power of Competence], you’ll see authorities taking on more 
initiatives – and possibly generating some income.” 
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One of the senior officers reflected that the reduction in public sector 
expenditure (directly to principal authorities) could act as a catalyst to increase 
tertiary authorities’ activism.  The senior officer also highlighted the reduction in 
expenditure could also enhance tertiary authorities’ community leadership role, 
as principal authorities retreat and offer less provision, stating that: 
 
“A lot of parishes will use this as an opportunity.  You know, if 
concurrently we get more operational freedom, we’ll be using it as an 
opportunity to do more.  One of the things over the next four years, yes 
there’ll be less money, but we’ve still got to show our community 
leadership role and the councillors have got to do that.  I always say 
‘having less money isn’t an excuse not to do anything; you just have to 
run the business differently’.” 
 
The senior officer also acknowledged the risk inherent in this approach, stating 
that “I mean it might be risky to do that, but then maybe we’re in an era where 
we need to take more risks in order to deliver more projects.”   
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Chapter 8 - Case study findings: tertiary authorities. 
 
This chapter will outline the findings from the second tertiary authority case 
study – authority D.   
 
Local Authority D 
 
The local context  
 
Local authority D is a Town Council in the Midlands.  There are 134 tertiary 
authorities in the wider area served by the principal authority.  In 2008, the 
population of the wider area that the authority sits within was estimated at 
179,000.  The area served by the principal authority has the fourth lowest 
population density amongst principal authorities; whilst simultaneously being the 
second largest geographically amongst unitary authorities.  In 2008, the 
population of the town itself was estimated to be 11,000 (of which 99.1% of the 
population are ethnically white).  This makes it the largest of the five towns in 
the county. Of the population of the town itself, 21% was over the age of 65 
(ONS, 2004).   
 
It is a largely rural and sparsely populated county, ranked as one of the least 
densely populated areas in England.  Historically, agriculture retained a 
significant impact on the local economy.  However, the services industry has 
grown significantly in recent years and now forms the largest single sector 
employing 66.2% of the those economically active in the town.   
 
With the majority of the population of the wider area employed in the services 
sector, manufacturing and (to a smaller extent) agriculture, the unitary authority 
estimated that prior to the financial crisis (and ensuring depression) less than 
10% of the wider area’s population was out of work.  In the town itself only 5.5% 
of the local population was out of work, 4.6% of the population are long term 
unemployed or have never worked (ONS, 2004).   
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The political context 
 
The town served by Authority D formed the largest population centre and 
administrative centre of a district council that was abolished in 1998 to form a 
new unitary authority.   
 
The Town Council, which is a Tertiary Authority, consists of 16 councillors 
including a Chairman (the Mayor).  The elected members are responsible for 
providing assistance to the officers of the authority – depending on resource 
and the level of activity – as well as making policy decisions, developing new 
initiatives and fixing the annual budget.  The authority raises its budget through 
local taxation via an annual precept from the unitary authority.   
 
The unitary authority, which the Town Council is also served by, is dominated 
by a Conservative group.  As there is a high degree of political stability or 
dominance of a particular party, this could affect the mode of relations between 
the various tiers of local government.  The primary function of the town council 
is to represent the local community and work to improve the quality of life of the 
resident.  However the functions are not limited to this.  The Town Council also 
holds a number of responsibilities: 
 
 To provide a budget for the community and the provision of public 
facilities,  
 To provide allotments,  
 To be notified and consulted by the principal authority on all planning 
consultations,  
 To provide and maintain public buildings, clocks and bus shelters,  
 To light and maintain roads and public places (i.e. grass verges and 
lawns), 
 To offer grants to community and voluntary organisations, 
 To contribute financially to traffic calming measures, and 
 To install and maintain equipment and establish a scheme for the 
deletion and / or prevention of crime.   
 
In 2008-09, Authority D was awarded ‘Quality Council’ Status that has allowed 
the authority to utilise the PoWB.  This has enabled the authority to pursue a 
wider range of projects.  
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Awareness of the Power of Well-Being 
 
As highlighted, Authority D received ‘Quality Council’ status in 2008-09. One of 
the elected members was keen to highlight that this status represented a 
stepping stone rather a final objective, because it enabled the authority to fully 
utilise the PoWB.  The elected member stated that: 
 
“we haven’t rested on our laurels [since we were awarded Quality 
Status], but we have achieved accreditation through member and staff 
training, to use the PoWB to enable us to enhance our ability to promote 
and improve the economic, social and environmental well-being of our 
town and it’s residents – in short, we have more spending power for our 
community.  The PoWB can be used for items or services which, 
previously we had no power to provide, such as health facilities, 
affordable housing schemes, and cycle lanes even, building war 
memorials, all subject to the money being available and evidence that 
the community wants and needs such facilities.  We have been able to 
use our new power to enhance the curriculum at the local primary school 
by funding swimming lesions for the Year 2 pupils.”  
 
Another elected member acknowledged that: 
 
“I don’t think that I would want to pretend that I spend a lot of time 
thinking about the PoWB per se.  I spend a lot of time as a councillor 
thinking about how best I can use my position, my authority and skills to 
benefit the whole community.”   
 
This acknowledgment seems to highlight that awareness of the PoWB between 
elected members in authority D is mixed, although one senior officer from 
authority D, who advises elected members on policy, highlighted that: 
 
“There are different definitions, I suppose, [of the PoWB] but to my mind 
the PoWB relates to basically anything we would try to facilitate through 
our Parish Plan.  I think it’s supposed to be giving more authority to local 
authorities to sort of challenge them, where there might be blockages in 
the pipeline or central government [or the principal authority] is just 
stopping us doing something on the ground, it gives us that 
empowerment.”   
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Another elected member highlighted that “I think the PoWB empowers local 
authorities to contribute to economic, social or environmental well-being … so 
there are lots of policies that could contribute to that.”  This statement further 
reinforces the finding that suggests that the level of awareness of the PoWB in 
Authority D is mixed.  However, it does seem to have enabled a shift in the 
perceived operational autonomy of the authority, which has allowed elected 
members to be more proactive in their provision of community leadership.   
 
Attitude towards the use of the Power 
 
One senior officer also reflected on the scale of the challenge facing authority 
officers (and members).  The officer reflected that the problem didn’t lie with the 
PoWB itself, but within the relationship between different levels of government, 
the constraining nature of discretionary legislation and the effect that this has 
local authorities’ perception of operational autonomy. 
 
“I think the principal of well-being; I don’t think there’s a problem with it.  I 
think where the challenge is is trying to tease out where the blockages 
are to be honest, and trying to think differently.  Local government has 
been enshrined in legislation for so long, it’s very difficult not to think ‘well 
that’s the way we do it’ … lots of local government officers say ‘that’s that 
role and those are the things that we’ve been advised by central 
government that we can do’.  It’s quite hard for us to then spot the 
blockages, and that’s why I think the PoWB hasn’t been taken up very 
much, because we sort of feel like we’re regimented by the legislation too 
much.  It’s quite hard to unfetter your head from what would be a 
blockage.”   
 
One elected member stated that one of the main factors that inhibits adoption of 
the PoWB is historical; citing that “I would say the one that inhibits is the one of 
our thinking about issues.  It’s about opening up our minds to thinking ‘we can 
do things differently’ and ‘how we can do things like this’.  We need to be more 
creative when we think about problems.”  Another elected member also 
reinforced the importance of the way that officers and members perceive 
authorities’ level of autonomy from central government, stating that: 
 
“We’re so wound up in the way we currently do it.  It was always that we 
had to ask for permission [from central government] rather than just 
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saying ‘there’s an issue and this is how we’re going to tackle it’.  I think 
that’s going to be a major challenge on the road ahead.  I think the 
capacity for officers and councillors to think [would make a big 
difference], everybody is just so busy, just taking a little bit of time to 
think just how we could do it differently could make a big difference.” 
 
None of the members and officers interviewed in Authority D reflected on the 
PoWB’s ability to act as a power of first resort (as opposed to last resort or 
power of assurance).  The majority of interviewees reflected that the 
introduction of the PoWB offered authority members and officers the ability to 
think differently and act (more) independently from central government’s 
oversight.  The majority of interviewees (as reflected in the findings) cited that 
the next big challenge would be that officers and members would have to think 
more autonomously.   
 
“My understanding means that the council has the power, the ability, or 
at least the potential to act in a way to spend money on a particular 
activity because that is in the best interests of that community.  There are 
so many other ways of doing things that the PoWB is something you very 
rarely put to the forefront.  You always look to do something in another 
way; I think that the PoWB is always open to personal interpretation, isn’t 
it?”  
 
Role of the Power 
 
One elected member reflected that the PoWB’s loose framing, and the 
language used, offers local authorities the opportunity to undertake projects 
previously prescribed as ultra vires.  Nevertheless the responsibility remained 
with authority members and officers to undertake them.  He stated that: 
 
“I don’t know how many types of councils have used the PoWB.  I think 
sometimes when a power is so loosely framed; it creates the opportunity 
to do certain things but it doesn’t necessarily give them a very clear 
mandate and some places shy away from doing things that are perhaps 
innovative or discretionary because there is often a risk involved in doing 
certain things.” 
 
Another elected member also highlighted that whilst the PoWB offered a degree 
of assurance to local authorities; it still required authorities themselves to 
undertake action and shoulder the burden of risk.  For tertiary authorities, the 
157 
 
burden and the constraints (the eligibility criteria, the democratic pre-conditions 
and the limitations placed on use of the PoWB) may have implicitly represented 
a blockage that inhibited discretionary activity.  The member stated that: 
 
“I would agree with that [the PoWB did not represent a power of first 
resort].  It felt like you were still having to do your homework and still 
having to go back and ask ‘can we do this please?’  This meant that 
people dared not to do it, instead they just said ‘ah no, we couldn’t be 
bothered’ if that’s going to put the case together, then we’ll just find 
another way of doing it.” 
 
One senior officer reinforced the point that local authorities sometimes have 
alternative powers to rely on (besides the PoWB), and acknowledged that local 
authorities have more discretionary powers than some are acknowledging.  
However, the officer highlighted that the importance of the PoWB was that it 
raised local authorities awareness of what the discretionary legislation allowed:  
 
“We have a lot of discretionary powers; the PoWB, it’s more around what 
the government are doing but there are a lot of things that we can do.  
We could set up a business before but people didn’t realise that we 
could.  So there was a misunderstanding about some of the discretionary 
legislation that already existed that would allow us to do things.”  
 
The same senior officer also highlighted that there was still an element of 
misunderstanding on the part of authority officers and members in some local 
authorities on the autonomy granted by the PoWB, stating that: 
 
“The other thing about the PoWB is that people think there are a lot of 
things we can do in this; they think that we need to ask [central 
government] to use the PoWB.  There are loads of things that came up 
from when we were talking about things that we’ve done in the past, and 
some people kept coming up and asking ‘can we do that now?’  So 
there’s this kind of risk aversion approach still in some parts of local 
government a bit.”  
 
Enhancing autonomy, rebuilding local authorities capacity 
 
One elected member acknowledged that there was still a significant element of 
risk aversion in some local authorities.  
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“I just think that it has an element of risk attached to it [the PoWB], and 
that some authorities are risk averse.  So when it’s innovative and it’s not 
absolutely prescribed, local government tends to shy away from it.” 
 
Another elected member reflected that local authorities respond to external 
challenges differently and that the challenge itself prompts authorities to 
respond innovatively and adopt new practice: 
 
“I think we might be looking at new ways by which we can protect some 
of those services because it’s when you start to lose community assets 
then you start to lose the sustainability of the community i.e. if there’s 
only one pub or shop in the village, and that’s the only thing there, and 
that gets threatened then you lose a part of the community.  It’s about 
thinking about wider community assets [not just authority assets], then 
the council would maybe use some of its new powers, or all of its power 
to think differently about that challenge.”  
 
This finding seems to suggest that officers and members’ perception of the role 
of local government is that local authorities should demonstrate leadership by 
responding to external challenges on behalf of the local community – regardless 
of the challenger.  One senior officer underlined this finding by highlighting the 
opportunity for local authorities to attain more autonomy offered by the 
Sustainable Communities Act3, stating that: 
 
“When the Sustainable Communities Act came out, which was another 
opportunity to sort of challenge this government, you could nominate 
functions to the selector and it was really hard to get people to think ‘ah 
yeah, if you were thinking differently, how would you do it?’” 
 
Another elected member acknowledged that one of the biggest factors 
restricting the role that tertiary authorities play in providing leadership to their 
communities was the restrictions and caveats placed on tertiary authorities.  
The member also highlighted that this issue had a lower importance in authority 
                                                          
3
 The Sustainable Communities Act 2007 offers a mechanism for communities and local authorities to ask 
central government to either act to enable them to do so, or to act on behalf of the community or the local 
authority.  The purview of the Act is very broad encompassing anything that would increase the 
economic, social or environmental well-being of the area or its residents.  It could include the transfer of 
functions, with the aim of increasing the sustainability of the area.  However, action requires the 
permission of central government and the transfer of function is not followed by the transfer of funding 
(DCLG, 2008c).   
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D due to the relative political stability and the relative affluence of the wider 
surrounding area, stating that: 
 
“If I want to raise money for one place, then I’ve got to justify it to the 
wider community.  That’s where the concept of localism breaks down, 
because if an area is particularly deprived then the last place I’m going to 
raise it is there.  That’s the weakness, ultimately, I’d have to raise money 
on the council tax precept – the only way I can unless I borrow, and I’d 
still have to raise money to fund the borrowing.  If I do that, I should be 
judged at the poll every four years.” 
 
‘New’ Localism or New ‘Localism’ 
 
One elected member felt that although central government has constrained 
local authorities’ autonomy in the past, central government is at least trying to 
remove some of the burdens on local government to encourage authorities to 
be more active for their communities.  The member stated that: 
 
“I think that what central government is trying to do is push power down 
to the local level to let local leaders decide what’s best for their 
community.  Increasingly, I think the government intends to do that.  I 
think that what government can do around the major framework is to 
remove some of the burdens currently placed on local government and 
free them up to take whatever action they deem appropriate that will 
deliver better outcomes for people in communities where they are.  I 
don’t think it should be driven by performance targets or indicators, I 
think it should be driven by the whole decentralisation agenda.  So if 
decentralisation is pushing down to lowest [possible level, then the Big 
Society and community well-being in general is about encouraging and 
creating the environment for people to  use that power.  So they’re two 
sides of the same coin.”   
 
Another elected member reflected a degree of scepticism about the nature of 
the localism, and questioned the practicality of the universal reforms, stating: 
 
“All governments are very good in opposition about giving people powers 
at local level, but as soon as they get into power they get frightened.  
They don’t want to lose control because there’ll always be one council 
that goes too far.  Across the country, we are a diverse community but 
most politicians have never gotten to grips with the civil service, just like 
most politicians at the local level don’t get to grips with the officers.  
Ultimately, it’s about trust.” 
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One senior officer also queried the practicality of universal reforms.  Based on 
the historical precedent set by relations between central and local government, 
these detrimentally impact on the level of authority autonomy.  Although the 
officer agreed that empowering local government would most likely increase 
local authorities’ autonomy, nevertheless it was a big challenge: 
 
“It’s quite hard continually making a business case to the government, 
especially when the government keeps saying no.  Obviously for the 
parent organisation, it’s easier to have a single blueprint across the 
country.  Even though the mantra might be that one size doesn’t 
necessarily fit all, it becomes more challenging for them to manage so 
perhaps they wouldn’t want to set a precedent that would then lead to 
other variations in other areas.”  
 
Future Challenges 
 
The biggest challenge perceived by authority D officers and members that 
offered a threat to tertiary authorities specifically, and local government more 
generally, was that of officers (and elected members’) mindsets.  One senior 
officer acknowledged that the reductions in public sector expenditure could act 
as a catalyst to alter local authority officers and members views on their 
abilities:  
 
“I think that the public sector cuts will make a difference because the 
focus is much more on trying to get into the preventative phase.  Local 
government has traditionally focussed on dealing with or solving 
problems that have emerged from a set of circumstance … so you’re not 
necessarily dealing with a problem as such but trying to pre-empt the 
problem and bring the intervention further upstream into the chain and I 
think that [catalyst] will help authorities to think about well-being in a 
different way in the future.” 
 
An elected member (whilst reinforcing the point made by the senior officer) also 
highlighted that central government – after empowering local authorities – 
needed to allow authorities to operate freely without restriction.  The elected 
member stated that: 
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“Well for central government to get out of the way is a big one; to get out 
of the way to allow communities and authorities to get on with it will be 
the measure of success.  I think that the public sectors cuts will be a 
catalyst, to challenge the way that officers and members think, the 
challenge of doing that’s sometimes to find an invest to save approach.”  
 
Another elected member also stated that central government needed to allow 
local government to operate but offered local government finance as an 
example, stating that “we wouldn’t need a lot of money.  We’re not talking about 
millions.  I could give an example but in general terms it requires a tweak here, 
a tweak there and a little encouragement then getting out of the way and letting 
people fly.”  Another elected member also highlighted the wider challenge of 
developing a joined-up approach to the provision of public services.  Despite the 
reductions in expenditure that each individual authority or organisation is facing, 
this may result in more efficient public service provision that offer wider savings 
to the public purse.  The member stated that: 
 
“It might not be the council that makes the saving, it might be another 
public sector agency but it would still be a saving within the area and 
within the public sector.  So that’s a challenge about pooling budgets and 
how creatively we think about it.  So for example; we might spend twice 
as much on gritting the roads next winter because we recognise that the 
hospital bill has been too high this winter, it’s all our investment but it’s 
actually the hospital that makes the saving.” 
 
Overall, the greatest perceived challenge (and equally the greatest opportunity) 
by authority officers and members is that less intervention is needed and more 
empowerment and encouragement of local authorities to exercise their 
autonomy.  One senior officer surmised that governments are increasingly 
looking towards local authorities to be active, even if they don’t always allow 
them to be so, stating that: 
 
“I do think it’s tied very heavily into the Big Society and creating the 
opportunity for people to be the best that they can be.  So that they can 
step up to the plate and come up with creative, innovative solutions that 
will enhance both well-being and place.  Not just economic well-being, 
but emotional well-being and environmental well-being.  It’s a huge 
agenda (and a huge opportunity), and I think it sits very much within the 
Big Society.”   
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Increasingly all the officers and members in authority D acknowledged that local 
authorities would have to do more, and be more innovative in the future.  
Equally, one senior officer identified that the communities’ attitude towards 
greater localism would shape their local authorities’ degree of activism.  
 
“I think the other bit of it will be how much the second wave of the 
devolution, local government giving powers to local communities.  It will 
be interesting to see how much appetite there is out there from the 
communities themselves to get into this community right: the community 
right to build, the community right to buy, and the community right to bid 
for services.  it could be really really positive, it could become so popular 
that it soaks up a lot of council energy and time, so that we lose that 
bigger picture ability about some strategic issues – just because of 
authorities’ capacity.  It will be interesting to see how that dynamic plays 
out.”   
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(Figure 11) The PoWB: Key lessons for a future discretionary power 
 
Key themes Principal Authorities Tertiary Authorities 
Authority A Authority B Authority C Authority D 
Awareness of 
the PoWB 
 
High awareness of the 
PoWB; senior officers 
had previous 
experience of using it.   
High awareness, wide 
interpretation by senior 
management team and 
elected members.   
Moderate awareness, less 
widespread across tertiary 
authorities.  
Moderate to low awareness. 
Interviewees had mixed 
opinions on PoWB but very 
narrow interpretation.   
Attitude towards 
the use of the 
PoWB 
Broadly enabling 
power, significant 
inhibitors prevent use. 
Gave authorities more 
flexibilities, did not act as 
power of first resort 
Subtler change, restrictive 
caveats on tertiary 
authorities limit PoWB 
adoption 
Encouraged pro-activity and 
authorities to act differently - 
even if reality much different.   
Use of the 
PoWB: policy 
focus 
 
Enabled intervention, 
slippery concept so no 
defined policy area.   
Enabling power, within 
health & well-being, but 
confusion over the concept – 
what is well-being? 
Enabling discretionary 
activity, but not power of first 
resort. Ancillary power, with 
confusing basis (well-being).  
Not a power of first resort, 
an ancillary power, but 
encouraged action 
previously ultra vires.   
Has the PoWB 
enhanced local 
authorities’ 
capacity?  
Enabled proactive role, 
interviewees’ 
recognised authority 
already had the 
‘appetite’, PoWB acted 
as ancillary power.  
Interviewees recognised 
authority responsiveness to 
externalities; PoWB had 
significant impact on 
changing attitudes to ‘what 
the authority did’.  
PoWB enabled subtler shift, 
authority started engaging in 
non-required duties not 
linked to previous powers or 
duties.  Subconsciously, 
PoWB enhanced capacity.  
PoWB did not enhance 
tertiary authorities’ capacity.  
Limitations and restrictions 
‘shackled’ authorities, 
reduced capacity.   
Has the PoWB 
enabled genuine 
local autonomy? 
No, significant 
difference between 
rhetoric and reality.  
PoWB has not enabled 
greater autonomy, de facto 
restraints limit activity 
Distinction between rhetoric 
and reality. PoWB 
encouraged ambition but 
only ‘skin-deep’ autonomy 
Mixed autonomy, did not 
enable universal freedom. 
Whitehall & principal 
authorities want to retain 
control.  
Future 
challenges to 
local government 
and well-being 
Reduction in 
expenditure 
Expenditure is key, acts as 
key to discretionary services 
and mitigating authorities 
risk aversion 
Limitation and restrictions 
block significant proportion 
of discretionary activity. 
Organisational blockages to 
PoWB adoption.   
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Chapter 9 – Key findings: analysis of the case studies  
 
This chapter will draw together the key findings collected from the four case 
study authorities, and offer a thematic evaluation of the evidence.  Combined 
with data drawn from the scoping study interviews, these findings will offer 
insights on: the relations between central government and local authorities, the 
wider implications of the role of local government, and use the original data on 
usage of the PoWB to outline a contemporary local government typology for 
discretionary activity.  These findings will contribute to the current knowledge 
gap and address the research questions that emerge from the key aims of this 
thesis.  The research questions were: 
 
 To explore the awareness of the PoWB, and the discretionary role it 
provided local authorities, 
 To establish what impact the organisational culture within a local 
authority has on the use of the PoWB, 
 To define the role of local government, and to determine what impact 
different modes of relations between central government and local 
government has on it, 
 To determine whether type of local authority is a factor in the usage of 
the PoWB, 
 To establish what limits act to reduce usage of the PoWB, and to outline 
challenges that will threaten local government autonomy in the near 
future, and 
 To determine whether the introduction of the PoWB has increased local 
authorities’ autonomy. 
 
Genuine local autonomy 
 
The PoWB was intended to increase local authorities’ activity and enable them 
to overcome any limitations on discretionary activity.  Local authorities’ 
perception of the autonomy that it allowed differed from the aspiration.  As the 
reality differed from the rhetoric, the autonomy offered was not perceived to be 
genuine.  It did not significantly released local authorities from their shackles – 
as ambitious authorities would have succeeded in delivering innovative policy 
without the PoWB.  A number of officers and members reflected that authorities 
shouldn’t need a PoWB.   
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The previous chapters have identified that, despite the passage of time, the 
turnover of local government officers and elected members, and the sheer 
number of public service reforms during the period, awareness of the PoWB 
remains moderately high.  Senior officers from two case study authorities 
reflected that awareness of the PoWB had been higher in the past.  Awareness 
had since decreased due to turnover amongst senior officers, the passage of 
time and because the PoWB was introduced with a “fanfare”.  The ‘fanfare’ that 
accompanied the introduction of the PoWB would have artificially increased 
awareness.  Importantly, awareness was also moderately high regarding the 
limitation and restriction placed on the use of the PoWB – especially amongst 
the tertiary authority officers and members interviewed.  One legal officer from a 
principal authority in an urban area reflected that the awareness of limitations 
presented by the PoWB may have depressed actual usage, citing that: 
 
“I think one of the main factors that facilitate the use of the PoWB is how 
well it is known within the organisation.  The top team here is very 
familiar with it, as are the middle management – probably more so than 
in an awful lot of other organisations.  But it also inhibits the use of the 
PoWB because the reason the PoWB is widely known about is through a 
case that went badly [the LAML case].  So it does mean that people think 
about it. It does also mean that people tend to go ‘oh, not sure’ and tend 
to rethink using it.” 
 
The high awareness of the restrictions and limitations amongst risk averse 
authorities may have caused those organisations to adopt a cautionary ‘wait-
and-see attitude’.  The following sub-sections draw together the key findings 
from the case studies to address their impact on use of the PoWB and local 
government’s autonomy.  The sub-sections will address the impact of language 
used in the PoWB and the LAML case and how these impacts influence the 
degree of autonomy felt by individual authorities.   
 
The conceptual basis of the PoWB 
 
The term ‘well-being’ may have itself decreased the usage of the PoWB.  Whilst 
a power of general competence has a solid internationally-comparable 
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definition, the PoWB was less defined.  Officers highlighted that the context and 
background of the PoWB was “difficult to pin point”.  As well-being means 
different things to different people at different times, one legal officer from a 
principal authority acknowledged that: 
 
“there’s always been a tension on how to bring the PoWB in and what 
people mean by well-being.  I’ve always looked at the PoWB as an 
enabling power, to get local government out of the situations that it itself 
into, when it wanted to do something specific on behalf of the community 
but were stopped because they didn’t have the vires to do so.”  
 
One senior legal officer from a large rural principal authority reflected that local 
authority discretionary power should be clearly framed.  That is to say, any 
discretionary legal power should have clear defined boundaries.  A power of 
general competence has defined legal boundaries (as a result of international 
precedent), whilst the PoWB does not have a precedent and enabled local 
authorities to do anything “to improve the economic, social or environmental 
well-being” (Great Britain.  Local Government Act 2000, sc.2). The senior legal 
officer noted that local authorities: 
 
“shouldn’t be doing something that they have no business doing.  It 
shouldn’t be involved in risky credit swaps of financial instruments that it 
has no knowledge or understanding of, which is historically what’s gone 
on”.   
 
The officer reflected that this risk - of a local authority going too far or exposing 
itself to extreme liability - was the reason that the government “shied away from 
a power of general competence when they were looking at the PoWB”.  This (if 
accurate) also reflects a reluctance to fully engage with localism and enable 
genuine autonomy at the local level.  However, the reported level of awareness 
of the PoWB may be distorted by the predominance of legal officers amongst 
the survey respondents and interviewees.  That is to say, awareness may be 
artificially inflated due to the potential pre-dominance of legal officers amongst 
respondents.  As one legal officer from a principal authority stated, “actually 
policy officers don’t really know what powers are, and have little in-depth 
understanding of vires as a concept”.  Therefore, if this assumption were to be 
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accurate, legal officers’ and members’ of the senior management team 
awareness of the PoWB would be the crucial perspective to capture.   
 
On the origins of the PoWB, officers also cited that it was introduced to enable 
proactive local government rather than merely remove or reduce operational 
obstacles.  Officers and members from several authorities also reflected that the 
PoWB allowed a cultural shift in attitudes towards local authority autonomy and 
the perception of organisation risk.  Equally, this shift was not universally 
recognised.   
 
Whilst some officers reflected that it enabled a shift in the policy and 
governance culture, other officers opined that the actual usefulness of the 
PoWB was much less certain – even though awareness was high.  This seems 
to reinforce the theory highlighted by officers that it enabled a subtler cultural 
shift.  Nevertheless, despite awareness of the PoWB itself, some officers 
seemed unsure on the procedure involved with the use of the PoWB.  Officers 
reflected that they were unsure whether or not they had to “enact anything” and 
that saying they had “the Power was enough”, which seems to further reinforce 
the subtler change and emboldened approach that the PoWB enabled.   
 
The impact of LAML on the mortality of the PoWB 
 
If the previous assumption outlined by officers is accurate, the role of the Local 
Authorities Mutual Limited case (previously discussed in chapter 3) on the 
ability of the PoWB to act as a catalyst was significant.  Although whether the 
LAML judgement delivered a mortal blow to the PoWB remains uncertain.  One 
senior local government legal officer highlighted that additional judicial scrutiny 
(and therefore more case law) to define the boundaries of the PoWB would only 
benefit it.  However, this may be a more accurate reflection of the officer’s 
attitude towards local authority discretionary activity and risk aversion.  Another 
officer highlighted the impact of the LAML judgement; “it has made us more 
cautious, there’s no doubt about it.  We wouldn’t go and do something like that; 
we’d look very carefully at how we interpret well-being.”  The impact that the 
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LAML judgement had on the usage of the PoWB cannot be ignored; LAML 
exposed potential pitfalls in interpretation of the legislation and the perspective 
of the Courts.  One senior legal officer from a large rural principal authority 
reflected on the LAML judgement that: 
 
“when local authorities have historically thought that they could do 
anything that’s when litigation comes in.  I think the decision on vires [the 
LAML judgement] is very disappointing; I think generally speaking that 
the authorities involved in the LAML scheme haven’t met the technical 
exemptions but on vires – I’m not sure.  Especially when you consider 
the government’s intention that the PoWB would represent a power of 
first resort, and having to examine it, as you always have historically had 
to examine the vires, takes something away from it.” 
 
The LAML ruling highlighted that the Courts wanted to narrow the discretionary 
scope of the PoWB because they saw local authorities as creatures of statute 
i.e. as statutory bodies.  Therefore the LAML ruling seems to offer a narrower, 
more defined, perception of local authorities’ role.  Regardless, Judicial review 
exists to provide oversight.  Whilst officers and members may be disappointed 
that the LAML ruling resulted in a greater restriction of the PoWB as an enabling 
power, the Judicial process itself exists to provide oversight and (where 
necessary) reign in powers4.   
 
Officers’ and elected members’ disappointment about the LAML judgement was 
not universally shared.  One senior legal officer from a large rural principal 
authority reflected that using the PoWB to ease local authority operations and 
using it to support traditional projects (i.e. to support things that the authority 
would be doing anyway) would be unaffected by the LAML judgement.  The 
legal officer highlighted that the LAML judgment only impacted on actions that 
could be perceived to be “pushing the envelope”.  Even so actions or policies 
that are outside of the ordinary course of local authority action could be 
delivered if “carefully considered about whether we could deliver against the 
                                                          
4
 Importantly, it should be noted that the LAML ruling resulted in an amendment being added to an 
existing Bill that enabled local authorities to proceed on a purely financial basis (i.e. the basis upon which 
the LAML ruling was made).  However, despite local authorities now being able to operate in areas that 
the LAML deemed off limits, the ruling itself seems to have dealt reputational damage to the PoWB and 
restricted local authorities’ discretionary autonomy.   
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requirements of section 2 [of the PoWB] and then consequential section [of the 
PoWB]”.  The senior legal officer also reflected that “post-LAML our reporting of 
our use of the PoWB was much more detailed than perhaps we would have 
done before LAML”.   
 
As the LAML ruling exposed potential weaknesses in the interpretation of the 
PoWB, it may have dealt reputational damage to the PoWB as a broad enabling 
power, particularly in the way that overtly risk averse authorities interpret the 
PoWB.   
 
However, the LAML case equally could have raised wider awareness of the 
PoWB – especially as the LAML case (and subsequent judgement) was 
covered through the nationwide press.  Nevertheless, the PoWB is still being 
adopted.  This could imply that the damage dealt does not represent a mortal 
blow.  Instead, it would seem to suggest that balance should be established 
between opportunity and risk, and that local authorities should establish an 
optimal balance.  One legal officer from a large urban principal authority 
acknowledged the PoWB does have two sides and does require ambition from 
the local authority, “there is that dual aspect to it. We have to find the right 
balance; it’s about getting people to the stage where they feel comfortable in 
testing the boundaries.  They’re not there yet, which is not surprising because 
it’s still a bit new”   
 
The LAML ruling - and its potential impact on the PoWB – was not raised during 
the research conducted in the tertiary authorities.  In what limited literature 
exists on the tertiary authorities, there is no mention of the impact of the LAML 
judgement on their use of the PoWB.  It could be suggested that it did not 
significantly impact on tertiary authorities’ use of the PoWB because the ruling 
was based on a project beyond their capabilities, or that the ruling gave 
parameters to the PoWB in areas that already hold restrictions for tertiary 
authorities.  Regardless of the reason, tertiary authority officers and elected 
members did not acknowledge that LAML had a detrimental impact on the 
PoWB as an enabling power. 
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They did emphasise the impact that the interpretation of risk has on the 
discretionary projects adopted by tertiary authorities.  Whereas larger principal 
authorities may choose to absorb a certain level of risk associated with special 
projects, any risk of liability (besides loss of finance) could not be borne by any 
tertiary authority with smaller budgets and much fewer staff members.  Equally, 
tertiary authorities cover significantly smaller areas because they only serve 
their community. They do also have the ability to levy a higher degree of 
discretionary finance than principal authorities, whilst still avoiding a double 
taxation effect on their communities.  This would seem to emphasise the need 
for ambition from the local authority - as highlighted previously, implying that 
Pratchett’s (2004) concept of ‘earned autonomy’ may be accurate.  A more 
accurate representation would be that central government needs to permit 
(principal and tertiary) authorities to ‘seize autonomy’.   
 
Use of the PoWB: earned autonomy 
 
Pratchett’s (2004) concept of ‘earned autonomy’ may have reflected the nature 
of relations between central government and local government at the time.  The 
notion of ‘seized autonomy’ may more accurately reflect the role of 
contemporaneous local government.  As the Coalition Government is committed 
to localism, the current political climate also encompasses broad structural 
reforms in the public sector and reductions in expenditure.  Local authorities are 
being encouraged to “step up to the plate”.  This is based on the rhetoric 
matching the reality.  It is important to note that a proportion of interviewees 
have highlighted examples of contradiction between departments and across 
policy areas.   
 
The high degree of awareness amongst the senior management team of 
authority A undoubtedly affected the levels of usage of the PoWB – particularly 
as one senior officer admitted a fondness for the PoWB because of its “slippery 
nature”. Arguably, an authority whose elected members and senior 
management team adopted this attitude would have exercised a higher than 
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average degree of activism and exerted autonomy.  That is to say, the 
introduction of the PoWB did offer authority A and similar types of authorities 
(i.e. pro-active authorities that operate outside of traditional ‘comfort zone’) a 
level of assurance.  However, it did not prompt them to undertake action that 
wouldn’t already be undertaken in the normal course.   
 
Awareness of the PoWB in authority B was lower than authority A, and the 
interpretation was significantly wider.  Whilst senior officers and elected 
members showed detailed knowledge of the PoWB, this knowledge was not 
echoed across the authority; although senior officers acknowledged that time 
may have dissipated awareness due to staff turnover.  Even though the use of 
the PoWB may not be cited in Cabinet reports – as one officer highlighted “that 
sort of use of the PoWB is unlikely to ever be subject to scrutiny” – the 
interpretation that the PoWB acted as an enabling power seems to have 
reassured officers, which has allowed activism outside of traditional policy 
areas.   
 
This finding seems to illustrate that the introduction of the PoWB enabled 
authority B to engage in policy outside its traditional sphere of influence, which 
seems to highlight that the PoWB was useful in easing legal restrictions for 
authorities that have historically lacked the capability to introduce innovative 
local policy.  However, the officers interviewed also reflected that the LAML 
case did have an impact on the rationale that the PoWB acted as power of first 
resort for local government.   
 
As policies and projects supported by the PoWB - and therefore outside of 
traditional local authority action - were funded through central government 
grants, the lack of an ability to provide discretionary finance would also act as 
an inhibitor to further special projects.  As such, the degree of autonomy 
available to the authority itself remains restricted as the lack of locally-sourced 
discretionary finance would reduce the sustainability of local discretionary 
activity and potentially increase the level of control exerted by central 
government.   
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In authority C, officers and members awareness of the PoWB was much less 
widespread and less detailed.  Whilst a few senior officers possessed 
knowledge of the PoWB, the majority of officers and members reflected that – 
across the sector – usage and awareness was much more limited.  Officers 
acknowledged that the degree of local autonomy for tertiary authorities might be 
significantly lower than the degree of autonomy exerted by principal authorities.  
Officers highlighted that the generally lower levels of autonomy amongst tertiary 
authorities may be the result of historical neglect and the lack of a generally 
well-defined role for tertiary authorities.  The relatively low levels of usage of the 
PoWB amongst tertiary authorities may be more accurately the result of 
awareness of the restrictions and the pre-conditions on its usage, or simply the 
result of other statutory powers being available.   
 
Despite both tertiary authorities meeting the same eligibility criteria to use the 
PoWB, officers from authority D demonstrated significantly more detailed 
knowledge and awareness of the PoWB than officers and members from 
authority C.  Both officers and members from authority D acknowledged that 
they didn’t spend time covering the legal detail i.e. they didn’t “spend a lot of 
time thinking about the PoWB per se”.  This finding seems to reflect that 
although awareness of the PoWB is mixed, it did seem to enable a shift towards 
pro-activity that has engendered a greater sense of autonomy than existed 
previously.   
 
The greater degree of autonomy could be the result of variations in awareness.  
That is to say, even though officers and members are clearly aware of the 
limitations of the PoWB, perhaps a more in-depth awareness of the caveats and 
eligibility criteria would restrict (to a degree) the autonomy exerted by the 
authority.  Senior officers demonstrated a significant level of awareness 
regarding the constraining nature of discretionary legislation.  They cited that 
the constraints placed on discretionary powers by central government limit the 
freedom available to principal and tertiary authorities.   
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The relationship itself between different levels of government acted as an 
inhibitor to authorities demonstrating their autonomy – particularly as they felt 
“we had to ask permission [to use the PoWB]”.  Whilst Leach and Percy-Smith 
(2001) and Blond (2009) reasoned that the focus on the duality of the central-
local debate may increase the homogeneity of both government levels, there 
has been little contemporary academic debate on the ways in which different 
governmental levels interact and impact on levels of discretionary activity.  This 
may especially be the case when communities are served by multiple levels of 
governance – although the artificial presumption that different levels of 
government would automatically act combatively may also be false.  Instead, 
activity conducted by tertiary authorities may dove-tail (and compliment) 
principal authority activity.   
 
Relations between central and local government have been characterised by 
different scholars as a ‘complex game’ (Rhodes, 1981), a ‘swinging pendulum’ 
(House of Commons, 2009) and as a relationship as between ‘a parent and 
child’ (Clark, 2011).  In fact a practical model of relations is much more complex 
and multi-faceted, and is something more akin to the model outlined by Wilson 
and Game (2006) that distinguished between degrees of relations (i.e. political, 
functional and administrative) as opposed to a simple duality.  Instead of an 
overly simplified dichotomy between centrists and localists, a multi-polar model 
might be more appropriate.  
 
The PoWB was intended to act as an enabling power for local authorities, and 
clearly central government anticipated that it would act as a power of first resort.  
In fact the PoWB may have offered them greater choice within a shrinking 
system of constraints or enabled local authorities to pursue guided localism.  
That is to say, the PoWB enabled authorities to pursue localism within defined 
parameters or policy areas – similar to Wilson and Game’s (2006) ‘partial or 
earned autonomy’ distinction and Pratchett and Leach’s (2004) ‘choice within 
constraint’ model.   
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So whilst the PoWB may have offered local authorities greater operational 
discretion (in terms of legal cover for special projects), the fact that the 
introduction of the Local Government Act 2000 resulted in certain sections of 
the Local Government Act 1972 becoming obsolete, reduced the local 
authorities strategic autonomy, particularly as the removal of s137 of the 1972 
Act ultimately reduced authorities’ ability to support discretionary services and 
special projects.  As section 137 of the 1972 Act allowed a discretionary finance 
limit for community projects, which the 2000 Act did not, the introduction of the 
PoWB removed local authorities’ ability to provide discretionary finance.  This 
abolition of section 137 further constrained local authority activity and reduced 
their ability to exert local autonomy.   
 
Over the last 30 years, reforming local government has been one of the key 
questions of governmental relations.  As highlighted earlier, relations between 
central government and local government have not always been consensual 
and – at times – outright combative.  Wilson and Game (2006) distinguish types 
of relations between central and local government, and different categories of 
local authority autonomy could also be classified.  Wilson and Game highlight 
that, in the past, governments have chosen to decentralise power in “different 
ways and to different degrees” (Wilson and Game, 2006, p.25).  One point of 
this thesis’ hypothesis is that local government autonomy could be classified by 
type – as either strategic autonomy or operational autonomy.  As Wilson and 
Game recognise the different types of inter-government relations, similar 
degrees of freedom for local government can be defined i.e. financial freedom, 
political freedom, and legal freedom; which contribute to either the strategic or 
operational autonomy of the authority.   
 
As Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) highlight, the central-local debate only 
acknowledges two dimensions in a multi-dimensional relationship that further 
reinforces the uniformity on both sides.  The interview data would support this 
conclusion – almost unanimously, particularly as officers highlight examples of 
different central government departments pursing divergent, and sometimes 
contradictory, policy agendas.   
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The opposite may more accurately portray the practicality.  One officer from one 
of the case studies argued that Government’s rhetoric on localism does not 
match the reality of governmental policy, which has emerged from a growing 
theme of inter-governmental relations over the last 30 years.  The impact of the 
Judicial process is not acknowledged, where in practicality the role of the Courts 
played a significant part in the degree of legal flexibility held by local authorities 
i.e. the impact of the LAML judgement on the PoWB may have had a significant 
impact on the strategic autonomy of local authorities.   
 
One officer from a case study authority surmised that authorities just want 
central government to leave them alone and to leave authorities to respond to 
communities’ needs.  The officer also recognised that there’s “a million ways in 
which we get centrally controlled”.  On its introduction, central government 
intended that the PoWB would act as a power of first resort for local authorities.  
The PoWB was intended that it would enable local authorities to support any 
policy or project that would not be in breach of existing legislation, whereas a 
power of first resort was essentially the only power an authority would look to 
support a discretionary action, without having to look for a further 
supplementary or ancillary power.  Whether or not the intention met the reality 
remains uncertain.   
 
Culture as the key to ambition 
 
As the Transport, Local Government and Regions Committee report found, “the 
Government's stated intention at the time of the Act—to restore the self-
confidence of local government—has been lost in the focus on internal change” 
(HoC, 2002).  
 
If only 15% of local authorities have used the PoWB (Williams, 2010), this would 
confirm that local authorities have not adopted it as a power of first resort.  The 
interview data would support this conclusion, although, the initial scoping survey 
data would challenge this conclusion.  The majority of officers and members 
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from the case study authorities reflected that their authorities didn’t use the 
PoWB as a power of first resort.  Some officers referred to the PoWB as a 
power of last resort, suggesting that local authorities’ attitude towards the PoWB 
might equally be a reflection of the culture within the organisation, and their 
capabilities, as much as it is a reflection of the legislation itself.  However, how 
exactly does organisational culture shape the authorities perception of risk and 
their adoption of the PoWB?   
 
“A positive culture, providing a springboard for staff to perform at their 
very best, is seen by chief executives and senior managers as vital for 
effective results.  They stress the importance of taking a pro-active 
approach to organisational culture, building on the many positive aspects 
of council culture and moving away from aspects that act as a drag 
anchor on performance” 
(IDeA, 2009: p.5) 
 
IDeA highlights that ‘culture’ is made up of a variety of things, which are: 
 
 The values the organisation encourages, 
 The goals it pursues, 
 The example set by leaders, 
 The performance and reward frameworks it deploys, 
 The behaviours it encourages, 
 The ‘look and feel’ of the workplace, and many others 
(IDeA, 2009: p.6) 
 
The development of a proactive culture, that facilitates ambition, is crucial in the 
modernisation of local authorities and deployment of genuine local autonomy.  
The recession, and subsequent tightening fiscal environment, place greater 
emphasis on the necessity of innovative local government.  Use of the PoWB 
may be one indicator of proactive organisational culture.  As such, authorities 
that did not adopt the PoWB - instead relying on existing legal duties - face 
charges of being inward-looking, reactive authorities unwilling to ‘seize’ their 
autonomy.  IDeA highlights that local authorities “in the past and sometimes in 
the present, tend to be inward-looking, silo-based, resistant to change and 
challenge, and more concerned with a self-serving attachment to a particular 
model of delivery” (IDeA, 2009: p.8).   
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(LGiD, 2010b) 
 
If this is an accurate assumption, it might reflect that the managerial culture 
within the majority of authorities remains risk averse.  As such, organisations 
are unwilling to exert their autonomy beyond traditional authority activity.  
Alternatively, the majority of authorities may be comfortable with the 
discretionary powers that are currently available to them to deliver their projects. 
Moreover, the PoWB is enabling a minority of authorities to exert a greater 
degree of autonomy rather than enabling all authorities to exert more autonomy.  
However, whether it is has succeeded in engendering a subtler shift in the 
culture of authorities to foster ambition that would enable them to become 
strategic leaders of their communities remains much less certain.   
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Organisational Capabilities: a culture of ambition 
 
As highlighted, the culture of an authority could impact significantly on the 
usage of the PoWB, the level of (perceived) autonomy it has, or the degree that 
the authority engages in extra-statutory policies or projects.  Whether or not the 
PoWB engendered a cultural shift towards greater organisational ambition 
remains to be determined.  As previously discussed the PoWB did not become 
a power of first resort that was originally intended; in fact, the opposite may be 
more accurate i.e. that it was a power of last resort.  This would seem to imply 
that local authorities remain risk averse, when taking action beyond their 
traditional remit.  As Eric Pickles highlights, authorities must conquer risk 
aversion to exercise their autonomy to ‘seize localism’: 
 
“Power to sit on your hands and freedom to twiddle your thumbs isn’t real 
power or real freedom … I think it’s reasonable that councils shouldn’t 
use their new found freedom to saddle up the horses, arm their citizens 
and invade France.  Apart from that, the world will be your oyster.”   
(Pickles, 2010) 
 
The interview data would seem to reflect that at least some authorities retain 
risk averse attitudes towards discretionary action.  However, the data does not 
definitively cite the reason for their risk aversion; nor does it reflect that this risk 
aversion is maintained by the majority of authorities.  The rationale behind some 
local authorities’ risk aversion may be, as discussed in chapter 3, the result of 
unwillingness to expose the organisation to perceived external risk, therefore 
adopting a narrow interpretation of discretionary powers, and adopting a ‘wait 
and see’ attitude towards discretionary interventions.  The risk aversion in some 
local authorities was directly referred to in the data, primarily in Local Authority 
A but also in Local Authority D.  The findings from Authority A reflected that 
local authorities’ risk averse stance was the result of overly cautious senior legal 
officers.  Senior officers in authority A recognised that the senior legal officer in 
authority A had adopted a proactive attitude towards discretionary powers and 
interventions.  Senior officers thereby recognised the senior legal officer in an 
authority as a potential catalyst in the adoption of the PoWB.   
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Officers in authority A highlighted that risk averse legal officers tended to rely on 
established legal duties, rather than utilise the PoWB, even if the power didn’t 
push the boundaries.  This finding was further reinforced by the findings from 
authority D.  One elected member from authority D stated that “[the PoWB] has 
an element of risk attached to it and some local authorities are risk averse.”   
 
Officers do reflect that the historical mode of relations between central and local 
government has not engendered a greater sense of autonomy; the opposite 
may much more accurately reflect the reality.  Officers and members seem to 
acknowledge that the historical constraint of local government by central 
government has caused an unwillingness to test their autonomy.  However, 
other officers and members, also acknowledge the effect that these relations 
have had on local autonomy but question whether this has resulted in outright 
risk aversion, instead suggest that local authorities are adopting a more 
cautionary wait-and-see approach to discretionary activity.  In either case, this 
could essentially create a self-reinforcing scenario that continues to act as a 
constraint on local authorities because they don’t test their autonomy by acting 
beyond their traditional remit.  Therefore the only route that would allow local 
authorities to realise their autonomy would be either for central government to 
‘direct’ authorities towards autonomy (i.e. “encourage local authorities to step up 
to the plate” (Pickles, 2010)) or for authorities to ‘seize’ their autonomy from 
central government.   
 
Whilst officers recognised that historical inter-government relations may have a 
significant impact on organisational or managerial culture of authorities, other 
more current factors may have a more direct impact on the culture within local 
authorities.  As mentioned previously, the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing 
economic recession did – and continues to – have a significant impact on the 
culture within local authorities.  One eventual impact was of severely reduced 
expenditure in the public sector, which reduced local authorities’ budgets and 
therefore caused cuts to specific projects.  This means that there is less funding 
for discretionary projects, and also fewer officers due to reductions in staff 
budgets.  Officers and members recognised that local authorities would have to 
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operate within a shrinking resource base, but with an increased demand on 
services (i.e. do more with less).  This issue will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  A number of officers and members also reflected that the reduction in 
public sector expenditure may also present an opportunity to local authorities to 
act differently to deliver innovative policy.   
 
This finding raises the broader point that external pressures may force local 
authorities to respond differently to meet challenges in the future.  Although 
officers and members widely acknowledged that local government would have 
to act differently in the future to deliver radical innovations with regard to service 
delivery, there were no suggestions from interviewees as to what exactly radical 
innovation would look like.  One senior legal officer from a rural principal 
authority acknowledged that there isn’t enough innovation in local authorities, 
but also that officers don’t tend to think about innovation in traditional areas 
stating that: 
 
“Libraries are a classic example; local authorities have always provided 
libraries in buildings in local communities and that is how we deliver a 
library service.  But do local residents need a library service to be like 
that, could it be in a supermarket or could it be an Amazon style 
arrangement that delivers books.  I don’t know.  I think it’s that kind of 
thought of whether there’s another way to do this [of thinking differently].  
I think adult social care is very good at that, because they do keep 
changing because they have to keep changing and adapting.” 
 
Eric Pickles has acknowledged that local authorities would have to continue to 
operate with less funding but that the “fiscal environment was less important, 
structural change would deliver innovation” (Pickles, 2010).  The data reflected 
that external challenges could assist in delivering radical innovation.  A minority 
of officers and some members acknowledged that one of the biggest challenges 
– when trying to achieve genuine local autonomy – was getting local 
government officers and members to think creatively but that the current 
reductions in public expenditure could deliver some innovation – potentially 
through shared services.  A number of officers also reflected that radical 
innovation (and specifically shared services) was not the universal remedy that 
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would deliver autonomy.  One legal officer from a large principal authority cited 
that: 
 
“I think that shared services are not the panacea that lots of people think 
they are, because they will take a reasonable amount of investment to 
deliver a return and whether they deliver a return – significant enough – 
remains to be seen.” 
 
However, the data also suggested that special projects would only be 
successful with political support, and wider political stability within an authority.  
A significant minority of officers acknowledged that political momentum was 
extremely important when trying to deliver discretionary services; one senior 
legal officer stated that: 
 
“I think that special projects [like shared services] only really go ahead if 
they’re supported by politicians on all sides, so they all pull together or 
politicians don’t care about it and so it slips under the radar.  If politicians 
aren’t for it, then it just won’t go ahead.” 
 
This finding seemingly reinforces both the importance of political support and - 
the point made earlier in this thesis - that organisational ambition would have to 
be matched by political ambition in order to counter local authorities’ apparent 
innate risk aversion to produce an appetite for innovation.  Officers from 
authority A also reflected that political momentum from outside the authority 
(e.g. central government) could also drive projects and policies that could act 
counter to communities’ interests.  Officers also acknowledged that autonomous 
local government (i.e. authorities with the determination to accept operational 
risk and the capability to exert autonomy) could be able to counter such overt 
centralism.  One senior legal officer from a rural principal authority cited that this 
could also be linked to local authorities, and that it was a wider inherent risk of 
strategic community leadership, stating that “it all goes back to what the local 
community needs as opposed to ‘this is what we’re giving them’”.  
 
Whilst overt centralism is a risk that affects the autonomy of all tiers of local 
government, potentially, political stability and ambition are a lower category of 
risk to the autonomy of tertiary authorities than to principal authorities.  As 
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acknowledged earlier, elected members of tertiary authorities tend not to act as 
political agents – to the same degree that elected members of principal 
authorities do – instead they tend to act as community representatives.  As 
highlighted in chapter 3, political stability may be significant due to the effect on 
linkages between local authorities within the same area (i.e. links between 
tertiary and principal authorities).  An officer from Authority C reflected that 
“political instability adds to the risk [when taking on new discretionary projects]”.   
 
This finding was further reinforced by one elected member in the same 
authority, who acknowledged the importance of political stability in building solid 
relationships between officers and members, thereby also affecting take-up of 
discretionary projects, stating that: 
 
“it helps if you’re going to take on a major challenge if you’ve got a good 
spirit, trust and confidence across the council’s leadership.  We’re lucky 
we’ve got that here; we’ve had the stability over the years.  In other 
councils there’s so much mistrust they’d be really reticent to go and take 
on a new project.”  
 
This finding would seem to suggest that the level of political stability in an 
authority plays a larger role in the take-up of discretionary projects than was 
hypothesised earlier in this thesis.  The impact of political stability may act as a 
contributing factor towards the overall risk aversion of an authority – rather than 
a present a more direct impact on the adoption of discretionary projects.  The 
positive impact of cross-party political support (rather than political stability) was 
alluded to by one legal officer from a large principal authority.  The data did 
confirm that the relationship between officers and elected members is crucial 
when deploying something that is not required by statute i.e. discretionary 
services.  One senior legal officer acknowledged the importance of the officer-
member relationship when acting beyond local authorities’ usual remit.  This 
officer also highlighted that senior local authority managers might be better 
placed to introduce innovation, stating that “it’s much more based with the 
senior management team looking as creatively as they can in each of their 
areas.”   
183 
 
This finding presents a divergence in the interview data.  The senior legal 
officer, and others, reflected on the role of senior officers in innovation.  A 
significant majority of officers and members reflected on the importance of 
elected members acting in co-operation with officers – rather than officers 
acting unilaterally.  One senior officer from authority D reflected that “if you 
haven’t got the involvement of the local authority and those people that are 
democratically elected to care for the local community; I think it’s going to the 
difficult to understand on what basis you’re leading the community or acting on 
behalf of the community”.  Whereas a senior officer from authority B reflected 
that: 
 
“I think there’s forgetfulness about who is the local authority.  Yes it 
consists of non-executive officers, from the Chief Executive downwards – 
but at the end of the day, the officers do the policy bidding of their 
elected members.  We advise them, we can help shape policy, we have 
a wealth of experience about what works and what doesn’t work but they 
are the decision-makers.  They have been democratically elected and it 
is their policy that we interpret, formulate and draft.   
 
One senior legal officer from a principal authority highlighted that “in many ways 
members may be more attuned to it because some of them will have a lot more 
time on their hands to consider how to innovate”.  Regardless, the significant 
majority of the interview data highlights the importance of the officer-member 
relationship when introducing special projects – albeit to differing extents – and 
the wider implications for the authorities’ organisational culture.   
 
As highlighted previously in this chapter, the culture of an authority does 
significantly impact on an authority’s usage of the PoWB, and their wider 
provision of discretionary services.  A more accurate preposition might be that 
the capabilities that an authority possesses would significantly impact on the 
discretionary activity of an authority.  An authority’s culture could impact on 
discretionary services, but organisational culture is only one aspect of the wider 
capabilities of an authority and therefore (potentially) only one factor that should 
be considered.  The organisational capabilities of a local authority – such as the 
extent to which the organisation is willing to accept risk, the level of 
discretionary resources available, the extent of political stability locally or the 
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council’s culture – contributes to the overall ambition of an authority, and its 
willingness (and ability) to engage in something that is not statutorily required.   
 
There are differing levels of organisational ambition – due to the varying 
capabilities of various authorities – whilst any attempt to classify authorities into 
categories that have and do not have any ambition would prove impractical.  
Authorities could be categorised by organisational capability, which could then 
be adapted to be included in a typology of local government to establish a 
distinction between pro-active, cruising and reactive local authorities.  Such a 
typology could assist in gauging the impact of organisational culture in engaging 
discretionary services, and particularly local authorities’ usage of the PoWB.  By 
categorising capabilities, a typology could assist in the analysis of the PoWB’s 
role in enabling genuine local autonomy.  These categories will be discussed in 
further detail in the next chapter.   
 
Use of the PoWB: a contemporary typology for discretionary activity 
 
The election of New Labour, and the subsequent implementation of a Public 
Services modernisation agenda, has raised academic interest in local 
government.  Stoker (1994) began to explore local government and the 
rationale of local authorities as enabling authorities – as a method of developing 
local government’s capabilities to provide appropriate local leadership for their 
communities.  Sullivan (2007) highlights that, as a result the election of New 
Labour, community leadership became a central tenant of New Labour’s 
modernisation of local government.   
 
Local Government’s new strategic community leadership role would enable 
vibrant local leadership that focused on networking, influencing and leading 
communities (Sullivan, 2007).  As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, local 
authorities must now operate in an environment that now includes reductions in 
public sector expenditure.  Pickles (2010) reflects that the key element in the 
central-local relationship is no longer focussed on the top-down perspective and 
what central government is doing to local government, but about how much 
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(and what types) of powers and freedom that central government can offer local 
government.   
 
The Coalition Government’s Programme for Government (Cabinet Office, 2010) 
declared a series of reforms that would enable a fundamental shift from central 
to local government and beyond – to their communities.  Its manifesto has 
made a commitment to localism, including a number of specific pledges: 
 
 We will promote the radical devolution of power and greater financial 
autonomy to local government and community groups. This will 
include a review of local government finance.  
 We will create directly elected mayors in the 12 largest English cities, 
subject to confirmatory referendums and full scrutiny by elected 
councillors.  
 We will give councils a general power of competence.  
 We will introduce new powers to help communities save local facilities 
and services threatened with closure, and give communities the right 
to bid to take over local state-run services.  
 We will allow councils to return to the committee system, should they 
wish to.  
(Cabinet Office, 2010: p.11-12) 
 
The Coalition Government’s focus on localism, matched by the reduction in 
public sector expenditure, engendered a wider popular interest in local 
government, communities and community leadership.   
 
In a report for the Audit Commission, Leach acknowledges that local authorities 
have the ability to provide ‘strategic leadership’ and moved on to outline three 
‘ideal types’ of local government.  The first, ‘service first’, was essentially a 
service delivery arm concerned primarily with performance.  The second, ‘civic 
leader’, was focussed on governance and medium-term planning.  The third, 
‘democracy hub’, focuses on renewing and promoting local democracy (Audit 
Commission / IDeA, 2005).  These categories were not classified into a more 
formal typology, and only reflected the organisations’ scope to make strategic 
choices on the type of local authority they wanted to be.   
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The three categories are artificial concepts because the three types were 
identified and then the local authority could choose which type would best “fit for 
purpose”.  Therefore Leach presents a model for local governance rather than a 
typology of contemporary local government.  Whilst the typology upon which 
this thesis builds, (as already outlined) is orientated around the original research 
into local authorities’ discretionary powers, this then formed the three categories 
within the typology construct.  However, there are similarities between the 
typology that this thesis outlines and the three ‘ideal types’ of local authority that 
Leach (2005) outlined.  The most significant similarity is that the category the 
local authority is classified as is determined by the local context rather than 
organisational similarity, political structure or demographics.   
 
Any study of local government must begin with the knowledge that different 
authorities respond differently to broadly similar experiences.  The distinctions 
between local authorities and the policy variations between them – because of 
the total number of organisations (both principal and tertiary) and their 
sometimes superficial structural similarity – can become ameliorated, due in 
part to the scale of the comparison.  As highlighted earlier, this thesis will 
present a typology of discretionary activity for local government in contemporary 
Britain.  The typology will be categorised by activism and relates to authorities’ 
discretionary activity.  Figure 12 will outline in further detail the typology of local 
authorities’ discretionary activity.   
 
Based on the concept that the role of local government is to provide strategic 
leadership to their communities, the typology contains two characteristics that 
define authorities’ discretionary activity into the three categories mentioned 
previously.  The two characteristics referred to are ‘perceived autonomy’ and 
‘organisational capabilities’.  Informed by the interpretive approach developed 
by Bevir and Rhodes (2004) and based in original academic research, the 
typology will classify authorities into three broad categories (that determine their 
approach to local authority discretionary activity), pro-active, cruising and 
reactive authorities.   
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The first classification, the Proactive local authority, categorises those 
organisations that have demonstrated a practical and ambitious approach to the 
use of the PoWB and the deployment of discretionary services.  Proactive local 
authorities interpret discretionary powers in their broadest sense, exert a high 
degree of local autonomy and demonstrate a high level of organisational 
capability (whether through awareness of discretionary power or organisational 
resources).  Whether Proactive authorities exercise a higher degree of 
organisational autonomy than Cruising authorities or Reactive authorities due to 
higher perceived autonomy that has been ‘seized’ or whether it’s due to the 
culture of the authority that has engendered organisational ambition, remains to 
be determined.  If organisational capabilities are determined to have a 
significant impact on local authorities’ level of activism then this would have a 
direct impact on the policy implications for greater localism; specifically if the 
key to creating Proactive authorities is greater availability of discretionary 
finance.  In a political landscape that now includes severe reductions in public 
sector expenditure, this conclusion would present damaging implications for the 
future of localism and genuine local autonomy.  That is to say, fewer authorities 
would become proactive due to the restriction of available discretionary finance.  
The total number of Proactive authorities could be reduced by the overall 
reduction in public sector expenditure that may negatively impact on authorities’ 
engagement in discretionary services.   
 
One of the case study authorities – Authority A – would fall firmly into the 
Proactive authority classification.  The interview data from authority A would 
seem to reflect that access to discretionary finance does not have a significant 
impact on the capability of the authority.  This would seem to underline the 
previous conclusion (that the key to creating Proactive authorities is to increase 
the availability of discretionary finance) incorrect.  Other findings do reflect the 
restrictive nature of the lack of discretionary finance that would seem to suggest 
that even though it is not the deciding factor it still has a tacit role in enabling 
local authority activism.  The interview data did reflect that officers and 
members from authority A were concerned that the reduction in public sector 
expenditure may reduce local authorities’ operational role.  This concern was 
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also balanced by the potential for innovation and that even though local 
authorities’ operational role may be shrinking this did not automatically mean a 
smaller discretionary role.   
 
The interview data did also highlight that the culture within the authority, and the 
level of ambition that it has, were crucial in the decision to take on discretionary 
services.  One senior officer indicated that: 
 
“I think it’s the cultural issue behind the organisation not the legal power, 
is the organisation minded to try and do things?  So overall, I think it’s 
[the PoWB] one of the best powers we’ve probably got” 
 
Even officers and members from authority A – that could easily be classified as 
an outward-looking authority that takes a proactive approach to community 
leadership – reflected that central government needed to step back and allow 
authorities to engage with local policy freely.  This would reflect genuine local 
autonomy and enable to authorities to pursue proactive community governance 
free from central government influence or interference.  One senior elected 
member stated that ‘authorities want their autonomy and to be left alone’.   
 
As highlighted previously in this thesis, officers from authority A did reflect that 
“any authority worth their salt wouldn’t need a PoWB”, which does reinforce the 
earlier conclusion that (at least) some local authorities do have more 
discretionary power and operational autonomy than they acknowledge.  This 
conclusion would seem to imply that the key factors in trying to increase 
autonomy – instead of access to finance – would be to raise awareness and to 
engender a culture of ambition within the authority.  Whilst officers and 
members did not suggest that access to finance plays a key role in greater 
operational autonomy, lack of locally-raised finance that causes authorities to 
rely on central government grants is a longer term threat to authorities’ strategic 
autonomy.   
 
The second category, the Cruising local authority, classifies those authorities 
that demonstrated limited ambition in their use of the PoWB and discretionary 
activity, or those organisations that have demonstrated an ambition to engage 
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with discretionary services but that ambition is limited by the organisation’s 
capabilities.  Cruising authorities demonstrate a cautious interpretation of 
discretionary powers, and only exert a moderate degree of autonomy, or they 
have a record of demonstrating a broad interpretation of discretionary powers 
that highlights a proactive approach to discretionary action but currently seem to 
be restricted in their ability to engage in non-statutorily required services.  The 
distinction between Proactive and Cruising authorities could be a sometimes 
blurred one – particularly given the various levels at which an authority could 
‘cruise’, and given the potential difficulty involved in determining the distinction 
between a continually Proactive authority and a Cruising authority.   
 
The interview data revealed that one of the case study authorities (Authority B) 
had demonstrated a historical proactivity towards discretionary activity but no 
longer had the capacity to engage in non-traditional services.  The interview 
data reflected that Authority B not only ‘seized’ their autonomy but also 
defended their autonomy from central government’s advances.  That is to say, 
one of Authority B’s discretionary projects was questioned by central 
government as to whether it breached ultra vires. However, Authority B 
defended their decision to engage in the project and justified that it was not ultra 
vires by citing the PoWB.   
 
“what they were saying to us was that they wanted a financial appraisal 
of our well-being programme and they wanted to know why we hadn’t 
done a standard project assessment.  We were spending this money, but 
really had we done a cost-benefit analysis?  So we said to them that we 
were using the powers in the Local Government Act 2000 – we were 
using the well-being powers … we actually said ‘well in the 2000 Act it 
says that you can do whatever you feel necessary, so please go away’ 
and they did.” 
 
This challenge from central government may relate specifically to the project 
engaged in by the authority.  The specific challenge arose from a project that 
aimed to promote the emotional resilience in classrooms, which involved 
sending teachers to the USA on training courses.  The authority did not provide 
a cost-benefit analysis alongside the project.  Therefore, central government 
challenged the project on best use of public funds and value for money basis.  A 
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senior legal officer from a large urban principal authority reflected that central 
government had not offered a challenge to the discretionary projects engaged 
by that authority.  The senior legal officer stated that “we’ve done some 
reasonably challenging things but we’ve not faced any challenges”.   
 
The interview data also highlighted that the lack of available finance did restrict 
(to a degree) the discretionary activity that Authority B could undertake but 
recognised that the some of the discretionary activity had reached a critical 
mass that would enable them to carry on without the significant levels of finance 
that previously had been required.  One senior finance officer reflected that 
ultimately “finance oils all the changes – there’s not much you can do without 
resources”.  An elected member from authority B reinforced this point 
highlighting that sweeping structural statutory freedoms are contradictory if local 
authorities’ fiscal environment is tightening, stating that: 
 
“you’re having one conversation with government, they’re saying that 
‘well you can do anything you want, whenever you want, whatever’s 
positive for your community you can do it’ but in the next conversation 
‘oh by the way, we’re taking 23 million pounds from your budget.” 
 
The interview data also indicated that changes in senior officers and senior 
elected members in decision-making roles within the authority could also have 
affected the decision to engage in discretionary projects.  Therefore, it could be 
assumed that authorities could operate in both Proactive and Cruising 
categories – depending on the degree of activism and the discretionary projects 
that the authority engages in.   
 
Another case study authority (authority D) could also be categorised as a 
Cruising authority.  The interview data seems to suggest that authority D has 
only demonstrate a moderate degree of discretionary activity.  It may be 
important to highlight that at the time this research was carried out authority D 
had only had ‘Quality Council’ Status (and therefore only been able to use the 
PoWB) for between one and two years.  Therefore, given the time allowed, the 
moderate degree of discretionary activity – whilst keeping the authority in the 
Cruising authority category – would also seem to suggest that authority D could 
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increase its discretionary activity.  One senior elected member from authority D 
reflected that since the authority was awarded the Quality Council Status “we 
haven’t rested on our laurels”.   
 
“My understanding means that the council has the power, the ability, or 
at least the potential to act in a way to spend money on a particular 
activity because that is in the best interests of that community.  There are 
so many other ways of doing things that the PoWB is something you very 
rarely put to the forefront.  You always look to do something in another 
way; I think that the PoWB is always open to personal interpretation, isn’t 
it?”  
 
Equally, another elected member reflected that “I don’t think I would want to 
pretend that I spend a lot of time thinking about the PoWB per se”.  This would 
seem to imply that the PoWB took an enabling format that empowered the local 
authority.  This finding also seems to suggest that there is no formal structure 
involved in using the PoWB, which further raises the possibility that more local 
authorities have used than the PoWB than the 15% figure would indicate:   
 
“I don’t know how many types of councils have used the PoWB.  I think 
sometimes when a power is so loosely framed; it creates the opportunity 
to do certain things but it doesn’t necessarily given them a very clear 
mandate and some places shy away from doing things that are perhaps 
innovative or discretionary because there is often a risk involved in doing 
certain things.” 
 
The third classification, the Reactive local authority, categorises those 
organisations that, whilst they have a similar level of organisational capabilities 
(i.e. resources), have demonstrated little awareness of their discretionary 
powers or have adopted a narrow interpretation of their discretionary power and 
therefore demonstrated only a small degree of autonomy beyond traditional 
service delivery.  Reactive authorities could be classified as traditionally 
orientated service delivery authorities that tend not to look beyond their usual 
remit, do not have the capabilities to do so or show little organisational ambition 
beyond the usual course.  The distinction between Cruising and Reactive 
authorities could also be sometimes blurred by the potential overlap.  
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One of the case study authorities (authority C) could be categorised by the 
Reactive authority classification.  The interview data from authority C would 
seem to highlight that the restrictions and caveats, as well as the limitations on 
discretionary finance, reduce the capability of the authority to act and engage in 
discretionary activity.  One elected member outlined the blockages, and legal 
uncertainty, that the restrictions can create: 
 
“if you focus on Section 3 of the 2000 Act, I don’t really like this provision, 
it says that the power under section 2 [the PoWB] does not enable a 
local authority to do anything they are unable to do by virtue of any 
prohibition, restriction or limitation on their powers, which is contained in 
any enactment whether passed or made.  Secondly they aren’t able to 
raise money by borrowing or otherwise, and a lot of these initiatives need 
funding.  Unfortunately, a lot of these things are not black or white.  You 
can’t actually be sure whether there’s some other limitation that’s going 
to get you into a legal wrangle.” 
 
It is worth noting that as a tertiary authority, authority C would have greater 
access to discretionary finance (at a higher per capita basis) than principal 
authorities would be able access.  Equally, officers and elected members from 
authority C reflected that the authority – even with the restrictions, caveats and 
limitations – had set a precedent, by using land drainage powers that had been 
delegated from the principal authority (the scenario is outlined by an elected 
member from authority C in chapter 7).   
 
This finding reinforces the conclusion, presented initially in chapter 3, that local 
authorities have access to (and the ability to exercise) more discretionary 
powers than many authorities acknowledge.  This finding offers information on 
the catalyst behind the discretionary project and use of the PoWB.  The elected 
member, in outlining the scenario, implies that the catalyst behind the decision 
to engage discretionary project was in response to a negative external 
challenge.  However, the member did not say whether the tertiary authority 
would have undertaken the project without the assurance provided by the 
principal authority.  In this case, by providing delegated powers, the principal 
authority may have encouraged the tertiary authority.  The PoWB alone may not 
have had the same result.  A noteworthy distinction from this case is that the 
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delegated land drainage powers are historically proven and allow for specific 
actions to be undertaken; whereas the PoWB does not have historical 
precedent.  Therefore, the authority may have been less inclined to undertaken 
the local flood relief scheme without the delegated powers from the principal 
authority (i.e. with the PoWB alone).   
 
Despite the superficial structural similarity and the relative standardisation 
between authorities, which could imply that all authorities might respond 
similarly to challenges, with regard to discretionary activity it would seem that 
some local authorities are first amongst equals, when compared to other 
authorities (i.e. local authorities’ comparable record of discretionary activity is 
extremely uneven).  Indeed, in a similar way that local authorities are first 
amongst equals amongst Local Strategy Partnership partners (ODPM, 2005), it 
would be more accurate to say that while all local authorities are equal, some 
are more ambitious than others and that those ambitious authorities are first 
amongst those equals.  This disparity between local authorities occurs as a 
result of the local context that authorities often respond to.  Even so, it also 
suggests that the critical factor in discretionary projects (and therefore local 
autonomy) is the culture of an authority – particularly if the previous conclusion 
is correct and local authorities have access to more discretionary authority than 
they currently exert.  The cultural ambition of an authority, which the typology 
attempts to distinguish and categorise, is also crucial because of the role that it 
play in the willingness to accept risk and commit resources.   
 
A fuller measurement of understanding of these interpretations of discretionary 
activity (and authorities’ attitudes towards their own autonomy) is important as 
each degree of activism has differing policy implications for local government 
and the future of localism.   
 
The concept of local authorities acting as leaders in their communities is not a 
recent concept.  Whilst definitions would most likely differ between cases, 
Sullivan describes a local authority’s community leadership role as “the pursuit 
of community well-being through strategic interventions that would not 
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otherwise have happened” (Sullivan, 2007: p.143).  As highlighted earlier in this 
thesis, community leadership has been an intermittent aspect of local 
government since the nineteenth century.  Although the extent of local 
government’s community leadership role had shift in reaction to changes in 
inter-governmental relations, and in the post-war era local government became 
a service delivery model for central government, the advent of the New Labour 
saw community leadership become a key aspect of the renaissance of local 
government (Sullivan, 2007: p.142).   
 
Sullivan also acknowledges that the 1998 Local Government White Paper, 
which placed community leadership at heart of modern local government, forms 
a distinct shift from the previous ‘inward-looking’ authorities (DETR, 1998; 
Sullivan, 2007: p.142).  However, whether the shift from inward to outward 
looking local government ever occurred remains less certain.  Sullivan 
emphasises that this inherent scepticism was reflected in suspicion about 
central government’s commitment to local authorities’ community leadership 
role, highlighting that: 
 
“stakeholders who questioned how far the government was committed to 
local authorities developing a community leadership role (taking on more 
responsibilities thorough community strategies and local strategic 
partnerships), perceived a tension between policies promoting greater 
freedom for local government and an apparent need for control and 
regulation in key areas that impacted adversely on innovation on the 
local level”  
(Sullivan, 2007: p.151) 
 
Perhaps, in part due to the imposition of performance metrics, a more accurate 
summary for some authorities would be a shift from inward-looking authorities to 
upward-looking authorities i.e. waiting for direction from central government.  
Sullivan concluded that a universally agreed definition of community leadership 
continued to elude academics as “the meaning of the term continues to be 
opaque” (Sullivan, 2007: p.157).  Similar to the difficulty in established a 
concrete standardised definition for well-being, the definition of community 
leadership would be informed by the local context.  Equally, as with well-being, 
this thesis does not seek to undertake a conceptual analysis of the meaning of 
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community leadership nor well-being; instead, it reflects the current 
interpretation in the existing literature.   
 
The typology (see figure 12) will assist, as an analytical construct, in the 
exploration of the PoWB and in the investigation of local authority discretionary 
activity.  As analytical constructs, the authority categories are based on the 
original data gathered as part of this thesis investigation.  Whilst the 
fundamental basis for the typology rests on the author’s doctoral research, 
additional insight was found in existing literature.  A typology as a valid 
analytical construct on local government must be verified through repeated case 
studies in differing situations.   
 
Whilst the typology does allow certain controls, it can only provide a general 
guide to an authorities’ discretionary activity.  The typology removes special 
considerations – such as local authority type, setting, population served, 
regional variation and political control – and focuses on the authorities’ 
discretionary activity.  All of the case study authorities that are classified in the 
typology have demonstrated some discretionary activity by their use of the 
PoWB.  As such, the typology can provide a general guide to discretionary 
activity; it cannot be applied to local government innovation and an authorities’ 
category may differ by policy area.   
 
The typology classifications also present significant inherent risks.  The typology 
categories do not emphasise (or reduce) the potential dangers of excessive 
overt local government control.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, the 
typology attempts to highlight potential ambivalence by some authorities 
towards local government’s community leadership role and to engage in non-
statutory services.  It does, however, attempt to reduce the homogeneity of local 
government and stratify the degree of discretionary activity and special projects 
engaged in by local authorities.  
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Fig 12 – A Typology of Local Government’s use of 
discretionary powers in Contemporary Britain 
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Blockages to local government’s use of discretionary power in the future 
 
Officers and members from all the case study authorities, and a significant 
majority from the scoping authorities, reflected the risk that the reduction in 
public sector expenditure posed to local authorities’ discretionary activity and 
their community leadership role.  There was, however, a divergence in the 
interview data.   
 
Officers and members felt that the withdrawal of finance would leave authorities 
exposed, that local government would retreat into their traditional core-service 
provision model of delivery and that risk aversion would increase substantially.  
Officers also reflected that a universal percentage reduction in local government 
funding that did not take into account the local context of an authority and the 
efficiency savings that individual local authorities had already achieved,  
 
A significant number of officers and elected members felt that funding 
reductions reduce the likelihood that local authorities would engage in 
discretionary action because ‘funding was the key’.  Equally, a significant 
number of officers and members from the interviews reflected that authority 
officers and members would not think ‘creatively’ about their problems if they 
were not challenged.  That is to say, officers and members reflected that the 
reduction in public sector expenditure could act as a catalyst to introduce wide-
scale innovation to local authorities.   
 
Officers and members also felt that the restriction of available finance had the 
potential to introduce longer-term structural change to local authorities – 
particularly if this potential was harnessed and accompanied by reform of local 
government finance.  The interview data – predominantly from the tertiary 
authorities – also highlighted the negative impact of the introduction of the Local 
Government Act 2000 that made the discretionary finance clause (section 137 
of the Local Government Act 1972) obsolete.  This was especially since, as 
established earlier in this thesis, the discretionary finance clause was relatively 
widely used by authorities.  One of the elected members from authority C 
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highlighted that “there is a substantial overlap with the old section 137 [Local 
Government Act 1972] … but it’s not geographically or administratively 
restricted like section 137” 
 
The reduction in public sector expenditure - and the potential consequence that 
local authorities will retreat to providing core-services - raises another question 
about the future of the role of local government.  This could provide an 
opportunity to facilitate a renaissance of municipal government or alternatively a 
wide re-negotiation of the role of local authorities, and particularly their 
community leadership role.  One senior legal officer from a large urban principal 
authority also highlighted a disjunction in policy areas, between government 
departments that emphasises the renegotiated role for local government, stating 
that: 
 
“It’s quite interesting really because different ministers seem to be taking 
a different tack in relation to local government, because if you look at Mr 
Gove in relation to education then the role of local authorities will be 
greatly decreased over the coming years.  Whereas if you look at Mr 
Pickles and the localism agenda in relation to local government then 
possibly there’ll be greater role for local government, if there is a greater 
role then they need to make sure they’ve got the power to do it and 
actually the PoWB seems to fit that role reasonably well” 
 
The interview data also reflected that the LAML judgement affected the usage 
of the PoWB.  Whilst the interview data did reflect that the LAML judgement had 
an impact, the data presented two contradictory findings.  Broadly speaking, the 
interview data reflected that some officers and members thought that the LAML 
judgement did not hinder usage of the PoWB because it defined the parameters 
of the PoWB.  Other officers and members felt that the LAML judgment did 
inhibit the use of the PoWB because the ruling exposed several serious flaws in 
the PoWB that could prove to be lethal to its perception as an enabling power.  
One senior legal officer from a large principal authority, who felt that the LAML 
judgement was helpful, stated that: 
 
“Actually, funnily enough, I think that my view on LAML is that it’s one of 
those situations where to have something like that does more good than 
bad.  An example where you’re glad that you aren’t the authority but 
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actually the truth of the matter is that it has highlighted and brought to the 
fore the limitations of the PoWB.  It will be interesting to see what extent 
publicity for LAML has actually pushed forward the General Power of 
Competence debate.  There was a lot of publicity around it, and still is.  
Actually, what they were seeking to do was perfectly sensible and they 
lost out on a technicality.   
 
The legal officer also highlighted the main alternative point i.e. that the LAML 
ruling exposed serious flaws in the legislation.  Another senior legal officer from 
a medium sized highly-urbanised principal authority reflected that: 
 
“I think there are several flaws that case law has brought up.  I think the 
difficulty is [present] because most lawyers look at it and think ‘actually 
the case law all suggests that this restricting rather than broadening the 
use of section 2.  We’re not going to push [forward]; we’re going to be 
cautious about going too far down that route. So I think from that point of 
view, it’s not sufficient.  That’s partially because of the way it’s been 
interpreted, I think the spirit would have been sufficient.  I think there 
needs to be a determination in a sense about whether or not, do we 
actually envisage that local authorities should do whatever they can to 
minimise their costs – like the Insurance case – but some things that may 
be for purely financial gain are we happy with that? I think because at the 
moment – let’s face it – money is very important to local authorities and 
finding the best ways of maximising what they can do with their money is 
also very important.” 
 
Another senior legal officer acknowledged the impact that the LAML ruling had 
on discretionary activity in that authority, but reflected that “actually in light of 
LAML, the legal analysis of what was done was much more closely scrutinised 
but I had no concern that we could us it even post-LAML”.  This finding would 
seem to imply that while the LAML ruling clearly had a detrimental impact on the 
use of the PoWB; it may not have represented a mortal blow to it as a 
discretionary power.  As the case law suggests a restriction of the PoWB, this 
could deal reputational damage to the PoWB as a subtler enabling power.  
Whilst the data does highlight that some local authorities may not engage the 
PoWB in the future as a result of the ruling; the data does not reinforce the 
conclusion relating to reputational damage.  The senior legal officer from a 
medium sized highly-urbanised principal authority did highlight an area for 
improvement that could reinforce the PoWB, stating that: 
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“I suspect that one of the things that would be useful would be clarity 
about what the power is meant to encompass.  Is it purely meant to 
encompass a positive individual [sense of] well-being for either one 
person or for a group within the community?  By having the best use of 
its money from the local authority and I think there is a distinction 
between the two types.  It would be useful to have clarity about whether 
or not it is all-encompassing and it’s to enable local authorities the best 
possible service for a community in the best possible way, including 
getting more ‘bang for its bucks’ and doing things in a way it think is the 
best value or whether it’s much more specific about a tangible benefit to 
the community – rather than a slightly more ethereal benefit.” 
 
With these findings in mind, it might be precise to assume that the LAML ruling 
did limit the strategic autonomy of local authorities – rather than the operational 
autonomy – as the evidence would suggest that authorities (especially those 
that would fall into the Proactive category in the typology) are still engaging in 
guerrilla discretionary activity.  The LAML ruling clearly impacted on the 
mortality of the PoWB, which has implications for future discretionary activity, 
any potential General Power of Competence and the way that officers and 
members perceive vires. 
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Chapter 10 – Conclusion: localism, parochialism or tokenism 
 
This thesis has explored local authorities’ perception of ultra vires, 
demonstrated the factors that can impact on the usage of the PoWB and the 
engagement of wider discretionary activity, and the ways that interaction 
between central government and local authorities can influence the role of local 
authorities.  This chapter aims to highlight the key findings uncovered by this 
research.   
 
The key findings are that: 
 
 The PoWB has not permanently offered the majority of local 
authorities’ greater autonomy. 
 
Prior to the introduction of the PoWB, there is a perception that local 
government was shackled by constraints imposed by central government. 
Leading academics highlight that some local authorities were able to exercise 
choice or discretion within their constraints, but the challenge was identifying 
areas for discretion (Pratchett and Leach, 2004).  The previous discretionary 
power, sc.137, had enabled authorities to engage in discretionary action.  
However, the introduction of the PoWB made sc.137 obsolete.  Whereas 
research conducted into the use of sc.137 reported that 92% of local authorities 
made use of sc.137 (ODPM, 1999).  As highlighted earlier, local authorities 
perceived sc.137 as a power of last resort; although only a minority of 
authorities favoured change, citing that sc.137 provided essential flexibility 
(ODPM, 1999).   
 
Immediately after its introduction, central government announced its intention 
that the PoWB represented a power of first resort for local government, a 
significant improvement on the previous sc.137.  One of the key findings from 
this research was that the PoWB was not understood as representing a power 
of first resort for the majority of local authorities.  In fact, a significant trend in 
the data reflected that the PoWB actually represented a power of last resort for 
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local authorities.  That is to say, that the previous discretionary power (sc.137) 
had been more useful than the PoWB because it contained a discretionary 
finance clause that allowed authorities to raise limited discretionary finance.  In 
contrast, the PoWB did not allow authorities to raise limited finance, nor incur 
debt, until several years after the inception of the PoWB.  This attitude towards 
the PoWB was found in the majority of case study authorities and scoping 
interviews.   
 
The interviews from case study authorities B and C particularly highlighted this 
attitude.  Even though, in authority B, the PoWB enabled discretionary action, 
the PoWB was regarded by officers and members as “messy” and potentially 
contradictory.  The discretionary action conducted in authority B had strong 
momentum behind it and enjoyed support from senior officers and senior 
members.  Therefore, it is plausible to assume that with the same discretionary 
resources (i.e. finance) in place the extra-statutory activity may have occurred 
without the PoWB being present.  As highlighted earlier, the PoWB assisted 
officers in authority B in defending their autonomy from central government 
criticism.  As such, without the PoWB, officers may not have been able to 
effectively defend their discretionary activity from central government.  Even so, 
this does not automatically mean that the extra-statutory activity would not have 
occurred but that the PoWB offered additional assurance to the authority, 
although it did not permanently increase the authority autonomy.   
 
In contrast, interview data from authority A reflected that officers and elected 
members acknowledged the vulnerability of the PoWB, but continued to use it to 
support discretionary activity regardless of its vulnerabilities.  Officers and 
members acknowledged that the PoWB offered a “hook” to carry action; if the 
PoWB had not been there, officers would have authorised activity via another 
route.  One senior legal officer from a large rural principal authority surmised the 
role of the PoWB by highlighting that if the PoWB – as an option to support 
discretionary activity – had been removed, then legal officers would have 
searched for an alternative method to provide assurance.  The interview data 
from the tertiary authorities seems to question the notion that the PoWB offered 
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tertiary authorities any additional autonomy at all – whether temporarily or 
whether that autonomy has since been undermined.   
 
Authorities C and D, broadly speaking, reflected that the PoWB offered tertiary 
authorities restricted autonomy because of the range of limitations, caveats and 
pre-conditions on its use.  That is to say, elected members seriously questioned 
the rationale that the PoWB would increase the autonomy of tertiary authorities’ 
whist attaching so many caveats.  The elected members from authorities C and 
D uniformly reflected that the PoWB didn’t enable the majority of tertiary 
authorities to engage in extra-statutory activity.   
 
One member from authority C highlighted that one specific pre-condition of 
using the PoWB was that the council must have achieved Quality Council 
Status; whereas the vast majority of neighbouring tertiary authorities did not 
have Quality Councils Status, so were not eligible to use the PoWB.  Therefore 
the majority of neighbouring tertiary authorities in the surrounding area couldn’t 
use the PoWB, which may represent a wider trend amongst other tertiary 
authorities.  That is to say, as a result of the pre-conditions and caveats the 
majority of tertiary authorities do not hold Quality Council Status and therefore 
cannot use the PoWB.  The assumption that the PoWB represents an enabling 
power for tertiary authorities is inaccurate.   
 
Elected members from authorities C and D also highlighted the limitations of the 
legislation that contained the PoWB itself.  One member specifically reflected on 
the de facto limitation created by the lack of discretionary finance.  Another 
member highlighted the complications that apply when local groups take on 
projects.  That is to say, the conditions on the PoWB limit its usage due to a 
combination of the restrictions and the lack of finance, as local groups’ projects 
“are not black and white”.  Moreover, the impact of secondary legislation on the 
PoWB underlines its auxiliary status.  That is to say, the consequence of the 
LAML judgement may have significantly altered the perception of the PoWB as 
a power of general competence.  Officers and elected members from the 
tertiary authorities do not offer comment on the effect of the LAML judgement, 
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and the interview data from the principal authorities underlines the negative 
effect it had on the PoWB; particularly, the effect that the LAML judgement had 
on local government legal officers’ perception of the PoWB.   
 
 The risk-averse nature of local authority legal officers, and their 
function as ‘gatekeepers’, can inhibit the use of the PoWB. 
 
Discretionary activity, initially, does have significant issues that need to be 
addressed – such as stability within the authority, awareness and the availability 
of resources – before authorities can successfully engage in extra-statutory 
projects.  This research project has outlined that the most significant 
determination in discretionary activity is the attitude and wider culture of the 
authority.  This key finding emphasises the critical role that senior local authority 
legal officers play in local authority discretionary activity.   
 
As this research has shown, the majority of local authorities are cautious (and in 
some cases outright fearful) about exposing the authority to operational risk.  
This research has found that local authority legal officers can act as 
gatekeepers in the development of discretionary projects.  Overtly risk adverse 
legal officers can act as barriers to the adoption of the PoWB, and engagement 
in discretionary projects.  Legal officers with proactive attitudes towards extra-
statutory activity can act as facilitators to steer policies or projects towards 
successful outcomes.   
 
Although legal officers from authority A could not be classified under the risk 
adverse category, officers recognised the role that legal officers can play in 
blocking discretionary projects.  Senior officers and members from authority A 
recognised that lawyers’ risk averse nature can inhibit activity.  In contrast, from 
one of the scoping studies, one senior local government legal officer underlined 
the positive impact that legal officers can have on discretionary projects by 
acting as facilitators “we try to make sure that they [policy officers] can do good 
things”.   
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Conversely, from another of the scoping studies, one senior legal officer from a 
large rural principal authority highlighted that members “can’t just do anything 
they want” and are largely constricted by legislation.  The officer further 
highlighted that the introduction of the PoWB offered such a broad range of 
possibilities that traditional legal officers struggled with the concept; as 
highlighted earlier, where other powers enabled a specific function, the PoWB 
allowed a significant range of discretionary action so that traditional legal 
officers conceptually struggled with the PoWB.  The consequence was that 
legal officers returned to existing function related powers that they already 
possessed.   
 
The interview data seems to suggest that the LAML judgement acted to 
reinforce the cautious attitude of many legal officers.  This thesis has discussed 
the impact of the LAML judgement on the statutory basis of the PoWB; 
however, the LAML judgement also had a significantly detrimental impact on 
legal officers’ perception of the PoWB.  Whilst some proactive legal officers 
adopted the view that the LAML did not cause significant legislative problems, a 
significant majority of legal officers signalled that the LAML judgement exposed 
serious flaws in the PoWB legislation that solidified many legal officers’ risk 
aversion.   
 
From the four case studies, and the scoping studies, studied as part of this 
research, it is clear that the decision to engage in extra-statutory activity is 
complex and can be (in some cases) extremely fragile.  The factors associated 
with making successful discretionary intervention have been outlined in this 
thesis; it is clear that the process of demonstrating autonomy in some local 
authorities remains elusive.  All of the case study authorities did demonstrate 
varying degrees of autonomy, which have been categorised in the local 
government typology; despite the restrictions, caveats and limitations placed on 
use of the PoWB.  Nevertheless, a significant degree of further autonomy could 
be demonstrated by the majority of local authorities.  In most cases, local 
authorities do not demonstrate their autonomy because of the attitude towards 
discretionary activity and the resources available to the authority.  If the 
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authority, importantly the senior officers and members, demonstrate a proactive 
attitude towards engaging discretionary activity then the chances of successful 
extra-statutory activity significantly increase.   
 
 The attitude of officers and elected members, and the 
organisational culture of an authority, is the single greatest 
determinant of a decision to engage discretionary services.  
 
Whilst the case study authorities differed in terms of political control, process, 
local authority type and the demographics of the local area, the impact that 
attitude had on discretionary activity remained significant and the relationship 
between proactive attitude and discretionary activity was similar across all the 
case study authorities.  This was found in all four local authorities and all the 
majority of the scoping interviews.  Where officers and members regarded the 
PoWB as, broadly speaking, an enabling power, they were willing to expose the 
authority to a degree of risk because the PoWB offered an element of risk 
assurance.  When the PoWB was accepted as an enabling power, the authority 
was more able to exert its authority and successfully engage discretionary 
activity.  Although this could be applied throughout the case study authorities, 
this was the case in authority A.   
 
Officers and elected members from authority A demonstrated a willingness to 
expose the organisation to risk and to deploy the PoWB to justify discretionary 
services.  Where officers and/or members demonstrated a cautious attitude 
towards the PoWB, and engaging in discretionary activity, this could present a 
solid challenge to the provision of non-statutory services.  To an extent, 
amongst the case study authorities, this cautious attitude can also be observed 
in authority D. Even so, authority D has demonstrated discretionary activity 
suggesting that a cautionary attitude does not act as a mortal block on 
discretionary activity.  The interview data would seem to suggest that 
discretionary activity (and use of the PoWB) is less successful where a 
cautionary attitude is adopted.   
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The wider organisational culture of ambition, within an authority, was also found 
to be an equally significant determinant of successful engagement of 
discretionary services.  Within the case study authorities, authority B could be 
highlighted as example of an authority that has demonstrated a culture of 
ambition – in their defence of their discretionary action from central government.  
Organisational ambition could be found, to a lesser extent, in authority C – in 
their ambition to provide more non-statutory services.  There are, however, few 
examples of organisational ambition.   
 
When the Government introduced the PoWB, they left a void of solid ground for 
local authorities to advance upon.  As the PoWB made the previous 
discretionary clause obsolete, local authorities had no formal structure or path 
to follow that would enable them to exert their autonomy.  Prior to its 
introduction, the PoWB was not an established legal duty even though a power 
of general competence was firmly established in international law.  Whilst it is 
positive that central government recognised the positive influence the 
introduction of a general enabling power would have on local authority 
discretionary activity, the introduction of the PoWB did not completely maximise 
the potential of an enabling power.   
 
The New Labour Government’s rationale behind the introduction of the PoWB 
rather than the introduction of a power of general competence remains 
uncertain.  The distinction was far from semantic and the practical impact was 
significant.  Although central government regarded the PoWB as a power of first 
resort, the majority of local government officers and members interviewed did 
not share this view.  A number reflected that it actually formed a power of last 
resort in their authority.  The role of senior legal officers in the decision to 
engage in discretionary activity will be examined later in this chapter.   
 
The inclusion of the phrase ‘well-being’ in the legislation engendered further 
uncertainty about the PoWB as a general enabling power, which emboldened 
the cautionary attitude adopted by some officers and members.  The 
consequence of the inclusion of ‘well-being’ in the legislation was an increased 
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attitude of uncertainty, which left the adoption of non-statutory services 
vulnerable to those who adopted a risk averse attitude to discretionary activity.   
 
As highlighted earlier, where Dooris (1999) reflected on the tendency of certain 
professional groups to adopt particular language, the inclusion of well-being in 
the duty seems to have acted as a barrier to increased levels of adoption of the 
PoWB.  As the widespread definition of well-being remains elusive, the inclusion 
created greater uncertainty.  The absence of operational examples of uses of 
the PoWB may have solidified such uncertainty.  The initial absence of 
operational examples of the use of the PoWB acted as a de facto blockage for 
local government officers that inhibited the use of the PoWB.  Even though the 
PoWB enabled local authorities to do anything, besides incur debt, expenditure 
or engage in discretionary action for sole finance benefit, authority legal officers 
interpreted the PoWB narrowly.  When scrutinised, the PoWB was interpreted 
narrowly by the Courts as well (i.e. the LAML ruling restricted the scope of 
power).  This interpretation highlights that it is not a minority of overly cautious 
risk averse local government lawyers that recognise the potential faults of the 
PoWB.   
 
 In the absence of a culture that fosters organisational ambition, the 
absence or withdrawal of discretionary funding tends to limit the 
engagement in discretionary activity.   
 
The impact that attitude – and the wider culture – that an authority adopted was 
the single biggest determinant towards the engagement of discretionary activity.  
The availability of discretionary finance was also a significant factor.  The 
interview data highlighted where discretionary finance was limited, and the 
availability of the organisation’s resources and this restricted the effective 
engagement with discretionary services.  The interview data suggested that 
discretionary finance enabled special projects and (to an extent) reduced risk 
aversion.  The availability of discretionary finance offered an element of risk 
assurance because of the greater accessibility to resources.   
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Within the case study authorities, in authority A the availability of discretionary 
finance enabled a wider breadth of special projects.  As a large principal 
authority, authority A could draw upon a significant resource-base without 
discretionary finance.  Authority B could also be seen as an example of the 
impact of discretionary finance on the take-up of discretionary services or 
projects.   
 
However, authority B also had its access to discretionary finance limited as a 
result of the reduction of public sector expenditure.  This enabled (to a degree) 
officers and members to reflect on the impact that the restriction of finance had 
on discretionary services.  The interview data reflected that the presence of 
discretionary finance had facilitated discretionary activity, and that the impact of 
limitation on funding would inevitably restrict such activity.  In contrast, the 
tertiary authorities involved in the research reflected on the negative impact that 
the limitation of finance would have on non-statutory activity.   
 
Authorities C and D did not recognise that the limitation on finance would act as 
a significant inhibiter.  Authorities C and D reflected that the statutory caveats, 
restrictions and pre-conditions placed on use of the PoWB itself acted as bigger 
inhibiters than the limitation of discretionary finance.  That is to say, authorities 
C and D did not acknowledge the restriction on finance as an impact, as 
severely as principal authorities, on their decision to engage discretionary 
activity.  Either they do not allow the restriction to impact on their decision, or 
tertiary authorities face more pressing concerns when acting outside the usual 
course i.e. fulfilling the pre-conditions and acting with the restrictions.   
 
In a future political landscape that includes reductions in public sector 
expenditure, which will increase the pressure on local authorities to achieve 
greater efficiency savings, this finding will not encourage local authority 
discretionary activity.  Even though central government can emphasise the 
importance of structural change, and de-emphasise the importance of the fiscal 
environment, local government’s resource base will remain crucial in introducing 
innovation and discretionary activity.  Officers and elected members from all the 
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case study authorities acknowledged the importance of embracing innovation 
and introducing radical change into the local delivery of public services.  Whilst 
acknowledging the importance of innovation, few of the interviewed officers and 
members offered insight into a method to achieve radical innovation.   
 
As the majority of the interview data from this research suggests, authorities 
with access to finance that have their availability to funding withdrawn will 
retreat into a core service-delivery model and reluctantly abandon their 
community leadership role.  A number of officers and elected members 
recognised this threat to discretionary activity; although they did not 
acknowledge that it would automatically reduce the activity beyond their 
traditional remit.   
 
This could be seen to an extent across the case study authorities, Authority B 
presents a strong example.  As a local authority covering a number of areas of 
deprivation it has received local area based grants to boost the local authority 
area.  This included activities well beyond their traditional remit.  The restriction 
of the availability of discretion finance could present a barrier to further 
engagement beyond the core-service model.  Officers and elected members 
accepted that further engagement in discretionary activity would be unlikely as a 
result of the reduction in public sector expenditure.   
 
The majority (although not all) of officers and members recognised that this 
reduction in expenditure may present a false economy in the local area.  Some 
of the discretionary activity already being undertaken had reached a crucial 
balance, which could then continue without funding at the same level.  
Furthermore, some officers and elected members from authority B rejected 
outright the assumption that restriction of finance would directly limit the degree 
of discretionary activity.  However this rejection may be a symptom of a culture 
of pro-activity and organisational ambition that authority B ably demonstrated.   
 
However, authority B presents the exception rather than the rule itself.  The 
data from the scoping interviews, as well the majority of the case study 
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interviews, reflected that – in the short term at least – local authorities would 
retreat into their traditional core-services model.   
 
 There is a lack of awareness about the level of autonomy that local 
authorities are able to demonstrate.   
 
As highlighted in the introduction, this thesis aimed to explore the impact of the 
PoWB on local government’s autonomy and whether this new discretionary 
power would facilitate a shift from New Localism towards a genuine autonomy 
for local government.  As the findings suggest, the PoWB did not significantly 
increase the degree of autonomy that local authorities are able to demonstrate.   
 
In the same way as Wilson and Game (2006) categorise degrees of 
decentralisation of power from central government to local government, 
definitions could also be established for categories of autonomy.  The bulk of 
local autonomy, like an iceberg, remains hidden from the researchers’ view; 
whilst only the outcome (autonomous local government) can be observed.  
From a deeper perspective, research can reveal the aspects of local autonomy 
beneath the surface that influence the degree of autonomy that authorities can 
exercise.  The data from the case studies reveals that local autonomy has 
different component parts that contribute to autonomous local government.  The 
following sub-headings highlight the distinction between the types of autonomy, 
and highlight the different types of freedoms (Political, Statutory and Applied 
freedom) that contribute to autonomy.   
 
o Degrees of local autonomy 
 
This research has defined two distinct categories of local autonomy, strategic 
autonomy and operational autonomy (see figure 13, page. 213).  Both strategic 
and operational have component parts that enhance or reduce the overall 
autonomy of the authority.  Any strategy to achieve overall genuine local 
autonomy should aim to increase both the strategic and operational categories.  
Such a strategy, to achieve genuine local autonomy, would require a multi-
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stage action plan that enhances the component parts unilaterally.  Whereas, a 
deeper inspection would highlight that the PoWB only represents one 
component part.  Later in this chapter, the component parts of both strategic 
and operational autonomy will be outlined.   
 
The research data would seem to suggest that the introduction of the PoWB 
may have been aimed at increasing the strategic autonomy of local 
government, the interview data also suggests that local authorities’ operational 
autonomy was in fact reduced by other contemporary factors.  Whilst the 
introduction of the PoWB may have been intended to increase both strategic 
autonomy, by acting as a power of general competence, and operational 
autonomy, by acting as a power of first resort that could enable local authority 
discretionary action, the findings would suggest that neither aim has been 
accomplished.   
 
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, both the strategic and operational 
autonomy categories contain more defined components.  In reference to the 
relationship between local autonomy and local democracy, as highlighted in 
Chapter 1, Pratchett (2004) highlights a distinction between types of freedom.  
The statutory freedom of an authority affects the strategic autonomy.  The 
political freedom and the applied freedom of an authority affect the operational 
autonomy; whereas the financial freedom of an authority affects both strategic 
and operational autonomy.   
 
o Statutory Freedom 
 
The PoWB enhanced the statutory freedom available to local government, 
which enhanced authorities’ overall strategic autonomy.  However, the findings 
of this research suggest that authorities’ enhanced autonomy is limited due to 
the impact of the LAML ruling.  The data suggested that the level of political 
freedom available to an authority can considerably enhance the degree of 
discretionary activity exercised by an authority.   
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o Political Freedom 
 
Political freedom which enhances the operational autonomy of an authority can 
be promoted by political determination – or political stability – from elected 
members on certain projects.  Political freedom can be reduced by political 
instability within an authority.  The data from the case study authorities 
emphasised the significance that political instability can have on discretionary 
services.  Officers and members from authority C recognised that whilst their 
authority was politically stable, similar neighbouring authorities exhibited 
significant political instability which acted to deter action beyond the local 
authority’s traditional remit, whereas officers and members from authority A 
acknowledged the importance that political determination can play in engaging 
discretionary projects.   
 
o Applied Freedom 
 
Principal authorities’ applied freedom has been restricted by the abolition of the 
sc.137 discretionary clause and an absence of pro-activity and wider cultural 
ambition; whereas tertiary authorities’ applied freedom has been restricted as a 
consequence of the pre-conditions, caveats and limitations.  In the future, there 
is a significant risk that authorities’ applied freedom and financial freedom would 
be reduced by the restriction in public sector expenditure.  Financial freedom 
could enhance the strategic autonomy of local government by introducing a 
structural reform of local government funding to create a more long-term 
sustainable business model for local authorities that would (as highlighted) 
further enhance their strategic autonomy.  The level of discretionary power and 
autonomy available to authorities remains significant; whereas the majority of 
local authorities seem ignorant of the autonomy accessible to them.  
Importantly, this ignorance is not definition by structural type i.e. between 
principal and tertiary authorities.  That is to say, tertiary authorities do not 
demonstrate greater ignorance of their autonomy simply because they are 
smaller organisations.  Amongst the case study authorities, awareness of their 
own autonomy was high - particularly in authorities A, B and C, although 
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awareness of the authorities’ autonomy was demonstrably lower in authority D 
and in some of the scoping interviews.   
 
Officers and elected members from authority A especially demonstrated 
impressive awareness of their autonomy, but officers reflected that many 
authorities were not as aware citing that “any authority worth their salt wouldn’t 
need a PoWB” to engage in discretionary activity.  It is worth noting that, due to 
a restructure, authority A is a newly created authority.  As such it does not have 
a history of risk aversion or institutional immobility that serves to inhibit their 
activity and their autonomy.  The lack of historical context of the organisational 
could serve to promote proactivity and encourage an outward looking approach 
to community leadership.   
 
Officers and members from authority D demonstrated a significant awareness 
about the restrictions and limitations on the authority’s ‘operational’ autonomy, 
which may have affected their perspective on the authority’s overall autonomy.  
That is to say, the officers and elected members from authority D emphasised 
the various restrictions on the PoWB without acknowledging the discretionary 
power and access to greater autonomy that it offers authorities.   
 
This finding could assist in explaining the low levels of usage of the PoWB cited 
by Pickles (Williams, 2010).  That is to say, if authority officers and members 
are focussing on the restrictive elements rather than the enabling elements, this 
could create a self-reinforcing scenario that serves to act as a barrier to local 
autonomy.  The findings from this research would support this conclusion.  
Where authority officers and elected members emphasise the elements and 
components that restrict local government’s autonomy, this accentuates any 
risk aversion or cautionary attitudes, which serves to limit the adoption of a 
Proactive attitude and stop authorities’ ‘seizing’ their autonomy.  Authorities A, B 
and C serve as examples of authorities that have broken the organisational 
immobility and ‘seized’ their autonomy.  Whereas authority D, and a number of 
the scoping studies, underline the key finding that authorities struggle to exert 
their autonomy because of a lack of awareness.   
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Figure 13 - A diagram outlining 
local government autonomy in 
contemporary Britain 
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 Where there is stability, there is more likely to be strong officer-
member collaboration, which increases the likelihood of successful 
discretionary activity.  
 
The attitude of officers and members, and the culture within an authority, was 
the most significant determinant, whilst the influence of political groups within 
the authority also played an important role.  The research found that, unless the 
context and history of the authority acted to facilitate a proactive attitude 
towards discretionary activity from the majority political groups, then the 
consequence would be the reduced likelihood of successful engagement in 
discretionary activity.  The research also found that political stability could 
dramatically increase the chances of successfully engaging in discretionary 
activity.   
 
Within authority B, there was a tendency of the Labour group to dominate the 
authority.  This is due to a strong history of dominant Labour control in the 
authority.  This enabled the majority Labour group to be comfortable with their 
members, which facilitated trust between officers and members.  As such, 
officers and members developed a robust working relationship as the majority 
group’s political control of the authority was likely to continue beyond the near 
future.  The opposition groups within the authority had realistic expectations 
about their role; as such, the majority political group did not allow superficial 
political attacks to detrimentally impact on the authorities’ discretionary activity.   
 
On the other hand, in contrast, in authority A, there was no historical context or 
background for the authority because it was only recently created – due to a 
restructure.  Even so, this lack of historical context may have acted as a de 
facto boost to facilitate a proactive ambitious culture within in the authority.  
Furthermore, the majority Liberal Democrat group within authority A exercised a 
robust majority over the dominant opposition group, and that could have further 
facilitated an ambitious organisational culture within the authority by 
engendering significant trust between officers and elected members.   
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The interview data from authority A accentuated this conclusion.  One leading 
elected member from authority A acknowledged the high level of trust between 
the officers and members within the authority, reflecting that inter member-
officer trust could facilitate open and frank conversations that may not otherwise 
have occurred.  As highlighted previously in this thesis, elected members of 
tertiary authorities do not act as political agents in a similar manner to elected 
members of principal authorities.  The interview data from authorities C and D 
has reinforced the importance of stability in facilitating solid relationships 
between officers and members.  In tertiary authorities, however, political stability 
was de-emphasised but stability amongst elected members was given 
significant emphasis.   
 
Officers from authority C reflected that durability amongst elected members was 
especially crucial – particularly when engaging in specific discretionary projects.  
That is to say, officers underscored their belief that “political instability adds to 
the risk”.  Officers further reflected that some elected members may delay 
tackling a project until after an election, and could adopt a wait-and-see attitude.  
One senior officer from authority C reflected that members might say ‘why 
should I take this risk when we may come a cropper, we’ve got an election just 
around the corner and we may come out of office’ – although the officer 
recognised that members within authority did not demonstrate this attitude.  In 
contrast, elected members from the authority compared authority C with some 
neighbouring authorities reflecting that trust and confidence create additional 
assurance when tackling major challenges or engaging in extra-statutory 
activity.   
 
It is important to note that, the principal authorities in the surrounding areas all 
have a history of dominant control by the Conservative Party.  Therefore, it may 
be more accurate to highlight the importance of durability of elected members – 
rather than political stability – being significant in increasing the likelihood of 
discretionary activity.  Regardless, of this, the risk created by political instability 
cannot be removed; since the only sure way to remove political instability would 
be to remove elected officials or political parties.  The data suggests that (where 
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it occurs) political instability reduces the likelihood in successful deployment of 
discretionary activity.  Officers and members from all the case study authorities 
acknowledged the risk that political instability posed to discretionary service 
provision.   
 
The stability of an authority, or the durability of the elected members of an 
authority, directly affects the culture within an authority.  If individual elected 
members continue beyond a single term, thereby build working relationships to 
increase trust and confidence with individual authority officers, this can create 
assurance that promotes pro-activity in the authority and can contribute to 
creating a culture of ambition.  The longer a member serves an authority the 
more experienced they become, and potentially more comfortable exerting 
autonomy.   
 
An authority’s culture directly impacts on its attitude towards exercising its 
autonomy.  Therefore the importance of political stability cannot be 
underestimated.  An authority’s discretionary activity may suffer through lack of 
resources, the stability of an authority can demonstrably affect its attitude 
towards exercising autonomy.   
 
Areas for future research 
 
On the whole, local authorities exert (or are able to exert) more discretionary 
power and operational autonomy than they currently acknowledge.  This 
research has added to current knowledge on local government by highlighting 
key findings that relate discretionary power and local autonomy.  These findings 
would seem to highlight that the original hypothesis – that the PoWB had low 
levels of usage because risk averse officers didn’t fully understand the 
autonomy it offered – was partially inaccurate.   
 
The original hypothesis may contain a measure of accuracy.  The data from this 
research would seem to reflect that the PoWB did increase local government’s 
autonomy – their strategic autonomy – but other limitations were placed on local 
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government’s operational autonomy.  That is to say that, the caveats and pre-
conditions placed on tertiary authorities’ use of the PoWB and the lack of 
available finance for principal authorities limited the operational ability of local 
authorities to adopt the PoWB and engage in discretionary services.  The 
impact of these restrictions placed on local authorities’ operational autonomy 
created functional barriers to achieving genuine local autonomy.   
 
The data suggest that the majority of local authority officers adopted a cautious 
attitude towards the PoWB which acted to inhibit widespread usage of the 
PoWB.  Whilst the PoWB may have enabled Proactive local authorities to 
exercise more autonomy, those Proactive authorities most likely would have 
‘seized’ their autonomy and engaged in discretionary projects without the 
PoWB.  As highlighted earlier, the PoWB rests upon a more fundamental 
restriction.  The legislation itself that allows local authorities to engage in 
anything to promote the economic, social or environmental well-being of local 
residents created a de facto limitation by creating additional uncertainty.  This 
was the case given the decision not to introduction a power of general 
competence, instead introducing the PoWB.   
 
After considering the findings of this thesis, further research could focus on the 
impact of a future discretionary power on local autonomy – particularly on the 
role of senior legal officers; equally so, research could explore the impact of the 
reduction in public sector expenditure on local government innovation and its 
relation to local autonomy.  As has been observed through this research, local 
government officers’ attitudes towards the PoWB affected its usage as officers 
did not have confidence in either the concept or the definition (i.e. a power of 
first resort).   
 
These attitudes directly impacted on the autonomy that the authority exercised; 
therefore a well-established general discretionary power could serve to increase 
awareness about local authorities’ autonomy.  Future research could aim to 
update the findings of this thesis in relation to the evolution of local government 
autonomy.  Future research could also aim to develop a strategy for local 
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government to seize autonomy that would enable local authorities to maximise 
their potential.   
 
Clearly, this research could have significant implications for the future of 
discretionary legal power – specifically a power of general competence – and 
local autonomy.   
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Chapter 11: Post script – Implications of the research 
 
The research findings have significant impacts on the direction of travel towards 
greater localism in the future.  The findings offer insight into the ‘failure’ (if it 
could be called that) of the PoWB, and present reasons for its lack of use.  A 
future discretionary power could fall foul of the same failures as the PoWB.  
Two significant factors have changed the course of the debate on localism.  
First, the outcome of the 2010 General Election campaign and second the 2008 
financial crisis and the ensuring recession.  Dealing with the latter first, the 
financial crisis and consequent recession resulted in reduced public expenditure 
from central government.  This has two direct impacts on local authorities.   
 
Firstly, and most importantly because it would affect all local authorities, a 
reduction in the local government grant.  The NLGN (2010) cites that some local 
authorities could face losing up to 33% of central government funding over four 
years.  This reduction in expenditure is on top of previous realised efficiency 
savings.   
 
Secondly, local area based grants were removed.  These local grants 
represented the main source of discretionary funding for some local authorities.  
The outcome of the 2010 General Election campaign, a Coalition Government 
between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties, altered the course of 
the localism debate because the Conservative Party committed to introduce a 
General Power of Competence (Conservatives, 2009).  The Coalition 
Government’s ‘manifesto’ committed to the Government to localism and 
decentralisation (Cabinet Office, 2010).  The following section will evaluate the 
implications of this research on a new discretionary power (a General Power of 
Competence), local government autonomy and the future of localism.   
 
The Vires Gap: the PoWB versus a General Power of Competence 
 
“it will be a shot in the arm for local democracy.  It will give councils a 
general power of competence.  That is probably the single most 
important item in the Bill.  It will turn convention in its head.  It differs from 
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a general power of well-being in one vital aspect: instead of local 
authorities having to find a statute that allows them to act, the fun-loving 
legal advisers will have to find a statute that prevents them from taking 
action.   
We know that the Labour Party considered a general power of 
competence, so what held them back?  Apparently, the right honourable 
Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) once argued that councils should not 
be allowed a general power because it would allow Islington to build a 
nuclear bomb.  He is a much respected Member of the House and his 
worries should be taken seriously.  I have good news.  The residents of 
Islington and the rest of us can sleep safely in the knowledge that the 
Radioactive Substances Act 1993, the Nuclear Explosions (Prohibition 
and Inspections) Act 1998 and the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2000 will 
prevent Islington Council from obtaining weapons of mass destruction.  
In short, the power of general competence for councils does not 
simultaneously abolish all other laws of the land.” 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Eric Pickles 
(HC Deb 17 January 2011 c561) 
 
The proposed General Power of Competence (Conservatives, 2009; Cabinet 
Office, 2010) is a key provision of the Decentralisation and Localism Bill (Great 
Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2010), which is a central feature of the 
Coalition Government’s commitment to localism.  However, the wording of the 
General Power of Competence may present a problem to its adoption by local 
authorities. What is the difference between a General Power of Competence 
(the Coalition’s proposal) and a Power of General Competence (that has an 
international precedent), is the difference semantic?  
 
One of the key findings of this research was that overly cautious legal officers 
did not fully understand the PoWB, and therefore did not utilise it, due to 
confusion created reagrding the language (i.e. the inclusion of well-being).  This 
finding would seem to suggest that the General Power of Competence (GPC) 
could fall foul of the same confusion.  Whilst the exact wording of the legislation, 
and the activities enabled by the relevant clause, might lead the officers and 
members from Proactive authorities to question the difference between the 
GPC and the PoWB, opinion remains divided.  NLGN (2010) argued that a GPC 
would only be successful if it offered councils clear legal freedoms.  However, 
NLGN (2010) also argued in favour of abolishing the Ultra Vires principle.  
Stevens (2011) highlights that although the GPC allows local authorities to act 
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in any way that does not break the law, it does not remove the Ultra Vires 
principle.  As such some officers and elected may be concerned by what the 
GPC actually allows.  Therefore, the GPC could suffer the same fate as the 
PoWB – low usage.   
 
The GPC does prevent the Courts challenging local authority activities on the 
basis of the Ultra Vires principle, which prevents further damage similar to the 
LAML ruling.  However, the previous Labour Administration did enable local 
authorities to act for financial benefit by including a relevant clause in statute 
(Great Britain. Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 
2010).  Therefore, what change does the GPC bring?   
 
The GPC does offer the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government the power of veto over authorities’ discretionary activities - as a 
last ditch measure.  For some Cruising or Reactive authorities, and for risk 
averse legal officers, this may enable caution.  However, the removal of the 
threat of censure from the Courts – and another potential LAML ruling in the 
future – could act to reduce risk aversion and enable authorities to innovate.  
Furthermore, the DCLG (2011) assessment of the GPC concluded that it would 
result in fewer potential costs that may be accrued as a result of legal 
challenge.  The GPC will 
 
 allow authorities to act in their own financial interest to generate 
efficiencies and secure value for money outcomes and to raise money by 
charging for discretionary services and trade in line with existing powers.  
 allow authorities to engage in activities, ruled by the Court of Appeal in 
the ‘London Authorities Mutual Ltd’ (LAML) case, as outside the well-
being power, such as providing certain indemnities and guarantees and 
engaging in speculative activities.  
 provide the Secretary of State with a power to amend or repeal 
enactments that prevent or obstruct local authorities from using the 
power, and to remove overlapping powers.  
(DCLG, 2011: p.9) 
 
However, whilst the scrutiny of the Courts on the Ultra Vires principle has been 
removed, significant questions remain regarding whether the GPC will extend 
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authorities’ legal assurance and reduce overt risk aversion.  Limitations will still 
be in place on authorities (Great Britain. Parliament.  House of Commons, 2010; 
DCLG, 2011).  Authorities will still be required to act in accordance with 
statutory restrictions and limitations (DCLG, 2011; Decentralisation and 
Localism Bill. Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2010).  Although 
the Courts are unable to provide scrutiny on an Ultra Vires basis, the Courts can 
still provide scrutiny over authorities’ discretionary activities through other 
means (e.g. Equalities Laws, Public Procurement Framework and the Human 
Rights Act).  The continued scrutiny of the Courts may leave the GPC 
vulnerable to similar LAML-style judgements, even though discretionary 
activities can no longer be found ultra vires.  Discretion of the Judiciary remains 
a potential hindrance to local autonomy, and discretionary projects.  Central 
government’s removal (but not abolition) of the ultra vires principle may present 
a clear signal that central government wants local government to undertake 
bold projects – whether the judiciary is ready for local government to undertake 
those projects or not.  Equally, the inclusion of 142 regulatory powers within the 
Decentralisation and Localism Bill (Decentralisation and Localism Bill. Great 
Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2010) may present mixed messages to 
the Judiciary.   
 
“the attitude of the courts to the use of the general power will be critical. 
Not everybody was convinced that the courts were ready to grant 
councils a significant degree of levity even after the general power is 
introduced.  There will always be a high water mark where an authority 
will do something where the courts will say: we're not comfortable with 
local authorities being in that sort of area.  Administrative law has always 
provided some natural boundaries where judges just weren't ready for 
things … the judges clearly just weren't comfortable with what was going 
on and they were able to find ways to prevent it from happening.” 
(Local Government Lawyer, 28th July 2011) 
 
As pubic bodies, local authorities remain under judicial review but the GPC 
offers a degree of statutory freedom unparalleled by other public sector 
organisations.  In written evidence to the Communities and Local Government 
Committee, on the GPC, Eric Pickles argued that the GPC would remove much 
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of the doubt regarding the scope of authority powers and the extent of ultra 
vires:  
 
“Activities that individuals can undertake will no longer be able to be 
found to be ultra vires because they are not expressly provided for in 
legislation, or are of a type that are not normally associated with a local 
authority, or public body.” 
(Great Britain. Parliament.  House of Commons, 2011) 
 
They remain public bodies open to potential challenge.  Furthermore, specific 
safeguards remain in place – through secondary legislation – to ensure best 
use of resources.  These are: 
 
 the duties on an authority's chief finance officer to report to the council or 
cabinet when some part of its decision making machinery has made, or 
is about to make, a decision that would contravene the law or incur 
unlawful expenditure (Part 8 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 
and Part 1 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989), The 
decision maker is then barred from taking action to implement the 
decision until they have considered the report.   
 the duty of an authority to ensure that its financial management is 
adequate and effective, that it has a sound system of internal control 
which includes arrangements for the management of risk, to review the 
system of internal control at least annually and, based on the review, to 
approve a statement on internal control to be published with the annual 
statement of accounts (Accounts and Audit Regulations 2003)  
 the duty to maintain an adequate and effective internal audit of the 
authority (Accounts and Audit Regulations 2003)  
 the duty to balance the revenue budget annually (Local Government 
Finance Act 1992 and Part 2 of the Local Government Act 2003)  
 under the Prudential System, the restriction of borrowing to what is 
affordable (Part 1 of the Local Government Act 2003).  
(DCLG, 2011: p.11) 
 
Some elements could embolden authorities’ risk aversion.  However, the 
Decentralisation and Localism Bill (Decentralisation and Localism Bill. Great 
Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2010), may represent one of the most 
significant public service reforms introduced by the Coalition Government 
(NLGN, 2010; Stevens, 2011).   
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“The reason why the general power of competence is so important is that 
it turns the determination requirements on their head.  All those fun-
loving guys who are involved in offering legal advice to local authorities, 
who are basically conservative, will now have to err on the side of 
permissiveness.  That is a substantial change, and I would have thought 
that there would be no difference between parties on that matter.  I 
believe that a general power of competence is better than a general 
power of well-being, because the latter had to be invented as a concept 
whereas the former is well accepted by local authorities throughout the 
world, which understand exactly what it means.” 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Eric Pickles 
(HC Deb 17 January 2011 c562) 
 
The presumption has changed.  Authorities must no longer look for a reason to 
do something (as under the PoWB), but instead look for a reason not to do 
something (under the GPC).  That is to say, authorities will be looking for 
specific prohibition in statute that would prevent discretionary action.  However, 
the idea that as local authorities are creatures of statute – bound by the Ultra 
Vires principle – then the only method to induce change in local government is 
via a legislative route is opaque.  Proactive authorities will utilise the extension 
of powers provided by the GPC, but the question of the availability of resources 
and how that availability affects authorities’ ability to exercise discretion 
remains.  A thorough examination of structural reform to the way that local 
authorities are funded may offer innovative and original routes to greater 
autonomy for local authorities.   
 
Local Autonomy 
 
The introduction of the GPC, and the Decentralisation and Localism Bill 
(Decentralisation and Localism Bill. Great Britain. Parliament. House of 
Commons, 2010) to deal with the issue of Ultra Vires offers a broadly welcome 
move to increase innovative practice in local government.  By offering 
assurance to reduce overly cautious local authority lawyers, the GPC presents 
an incremental change.   
 
“Will he give practical examples of issues that do not fall within 
economic, social or environmental well-being, on which councils will be 
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able to act?  I am sure the House wants to be enlightened on how large 
the power is.  Before the election, he said that he wanted to give councils 
the power to do anything other than raise taxation,  Is that still his 
intention?  The right honourable lady makes a reasonable point.  She will 
be aware of problems with London authorities’ insurance, and the 
general power of competence will deal with those.  However, the 
question is, what is the difference between the general power of 
competence and the general power of well-being?  The truth is that there 
is not much difference, and we welcomed the intention to introduce the 
latter, but only about 17% of authorities have done so.  The reason for 
that is the innate conservatism of those providing legal advice, so 
councils have tended to err on the side of not introducing it” 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Eric Pickles 
(HC Deb 17 January 2011 c561) 
 
It is worth noting that the majority of local government lawyers are not overly 
cautious, nor are they risk averse.  However, the power of veto for the Secretary 
of State combined with the total numbers of regulatory powers included in the 
Bill may present a buffer towards greater localism.  As highlighted, when it was 
introduced into the House of Commons, the Decentralisation and Localism Bill 
contained 142 regulatory powers (Decentralisation and Localism Bill. Great 
Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2010).  Dealing with the vires issue is 
necessary to secure and expand authorities’ the discretionary ability offered in 
the PoWB. However, the restrictive Vires principle does not affect all local 
authorities – particularly those in the Proactive authority classification.   
 
“[On the GPC] the Bill provides a power for councils in England to do 
anything lawful, and in that is broader than the well-being power.  It 
makes clear that councils will be able to make decisions that involve 
activities anywhere in the UK or abroad, to do so for a change or for a 
commercial purpose, and whether the activity benefits the authority or 
local people, or, it appears, other benefit, for examples through the 
external provision of services to other organisations.  The well-being 
power if repealed as far as England is concerned” 
(Kitchin & Garfield, 2011) 
 
With the GPC, it may take time to embed the possibilities within authorities that 
do not have cultures of ambition.  Waiting for cultures of ambition to develop in 
Cruising and Reactive authorities may present a test to local autonomy.  
Whether there is another LAML-type case or whether a local authority advances 
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in a direction that central government is not comfortable with and uses its veto 
will test local government’s GPC-enhanced autonomy.  Vires is not the only 
factor impacting on discretionary activity.  The availability of resources does 
affect all local authorities – to varying degrees – not just those authorities in the 
Cruising and Reactive classifications.  Local authorities face significant 
reductions in public expenditure – potentially up to a 30% reduction (NLGN, 
2010).  The presumption from many officers and elected members is that 
severe reduction in expenditure would result fewer discretionary services.  
However, some of the findings from this research challenge the presumption.   
 
In those organisations that lack a culture of ambition, discretionary funding 
facilitates discretionary engagement.  Local authorities have to operate in an 
environment that is tighter in terms of the grant from central government.  
Therefore, officers and members may presume that the response to tightening 
finances is to retreat in a core-service provision model that does nothing beyond 
the deliver statutory services.  Where special projects have reached a ‘critical 
mass’, they could continue beyond the withdrawal of discretionary finance and 
restriction of the central government grant.   
 
However, this may only be the case for principal authorities.  The findings from 
this research show that tertiary authorities are less vulnerable to funding 
withdrawal or restriction than principal authorities.  The findings reflect that 
tertiary authorities’ discretionary activity is more susceptible to caveats and pre-
conditions (i.e. legislative blocks) then financial restrictions.  An agenda to 
introduce genuine local autonomy that pursues a solely legislative direction, and 
doesn’t include a structured review of the way that local government is 
resourced, would not fully realise the objective of genuinely autonomous local 
authorities.  The Coalition Government’s review of local government’s resource 
may prove to be an opportune method to realise the local government’s 
financial autonomy.  Prior to the General Election, the Liberal Democrats 
committed to including a review of the way that local authorities are financed.  
However, the outcome of the review and whether it will follow the Layfield 
Inquiry (1974) and the Lyons Review (2005) (House of Commons, 2009) – i.e. 
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be kicked into the political long grass - or whether it will begin to dismantle 
economic centralism remains to be seen.   
 
On the subject of a model of local authority, NLGN (2011) explores the future of 
local authorities’ approach to providing public services post-reduction in public 
sector expenditure.  NLGN (2011) presents parallels between emerging trends 
in the UK and the State government of California.  Exploring the impact of 
tightening resources and shrinking budgets, NLGN maps the options for local 
government finance.  Expecting some authorities to explore every function to 
achieve efficiency savings whilst accepting that other authorities will perform 
substantial retreats from service provision, NLGN alludes to a typology of 
different local authorities.  Acknowledging that authorities will react differently to 
similar challenges, whilst others may face entirely different pressures, NLGN 
presents three scenarios: 
 
 Local authorities in areas (such as the North East) clustering together 
into new regional federations to manage economic growth and share 
their services – with some having directly elected mayors.   
  Local authorities may introduce ‘pay as you go’ public services for 
residents and selling their services to neighbouring boroughs, allowing 
them to cut council tax and perhaps even pay dividends to poorer 
residents 
 Local authorities that try to commission most of their services might 
become ‘residual councils’ – a commissioning hub that directly delivers 
almost no public services. 
(NLGN, 2011) 
 
However, the three scenarios that NLGN explores focus on the reduction in 
public sector expenditure as the determinant of local authorities’ future 
operating models, and their autonomy.  Whereas the impact of reduction in 
public sector expenditure may be severe, it is not the sole determinant.  An 
enabling power, whether it is a GPC or a future power of general competence, 
would enhance the statutory autonomy of local authorities.  Autonomous local 
authorities could then be free to act as governments of their own localities that 
would better enable them to respond to local challenges.  However, whether an 
enabling power would grant genuine autonomy would be the responsibility of 
central government, and remains to be seen.  
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Genuine autonomy: the future of localism 
 
The key issue for the future success of localism or local government, the best 
way for local authorities to sustain economic, social and environmental 
resilience is through genuine local autonomy.  However, to address the 
question more accurately, it may more practical to define types of local 
autonomy.   
 
As Pratchett (2004) defines types of freedom, and Wilson and Game (2006) 
categorise degrees of decentralisation, this thesis (and the future of localism) 
may be accurately assessed by breaking autonomy into different categories.  
They are 
 
 Financial autonomy 
 Political autonomy 
 Statutory autonomy 
 Applied autonomy 
 
A strategy to achieve all four modes of autonomy would produce genuine local 
autonomy.  IPPR (2010) alluded to a need for a joined-up strategy to puruse 
genuine autonomy.  In response to the publication of the Decentralisation and 
Localism Bill (Decentralisation and Localism Bill. Great Britain. Parliament. 
House of Commons, 2010), IPPR (2010b) stated that without local financial 
controls many authorities would struggle to demonstrate their control over their 
own finances.  IPPR referred to the Bill as a ‘cosmetic commitment’ to ‘lipstick 
localism’ (IPPR, 2010b).  How can local authorities attain genuine autonomy 
from central government in a period of tightening resources?  Schmuecker 
(2011) asserts that the review of local government resources and funding will be 
the real test of the Coalition’s commitment to localism.  Schmuecker (2011) 
acknowledges that localism can have a lasting legacy on domestic politics in the 
UK.  Tax Increment Financing, the re-localisation of Business Rates, reducing 
the number Ring-fenced finance streams and a GPC all represent incremental 
advances towards real localism (Schmuecker, 2011).  However, at best, these 
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only represent advances in statutory and financial autonomy.  A joined-up 
strategy to achieve genuine local autonomy should be pursued.  The findings 
from this research would indicate that local authorities need to advance to 
‘seize’ the autonomy on offer from central government.  The findings suggest 
that local government can access more autonomy than many authorities 
currently acknowledge.   
 
One of the key findings from this research suggest that one of the biggest 
inhibitors to ‘Proactive’ outward-looking authorities is the attitude of senior 
officers and elected members, or the wider culture within the organisation.  
Absence of cultural ambition within an organisation could facilitate a culture of 
risk aversion instead, where authorities retreat into core-service delivery and 
look inwards (organisationally) rather than out into their communities.  
Engagement in discretionary services could also be found to be vulnerable to 
overt risk aversion.  Furthermore, the withdrawal of discretionary funding from 
authorities tends to limit wider engagement from the authority.   
 
In a political environment that includes public sector spending cuts, reductions 
in discretionary spending are clearly a threat to some authorities, which may 
limit some authorities’ wider engagement.  Public sector reductions will reduce 
the financial autonomy of some authorities and their ability to exercise 
discretion.  However, another finding suggests that many authorities are 
unaware of the level of autonomy that local government can exert – particularly 
those Cruising and Reactive authorities.  Cruising and Reactive local authorities 
can exert their autonomy by utilising the statutory autonomy offered by the 
PoWB (and the GPC – when it’s introduced) to advance to offer discretionary 
services and by innovation.   
 
Equally, this research found that the PoWB has not permanently increased the 
autonomy of the majority of authorities.  This is for a number of factors.  Firstly, 
the inclusion of the phrase well-being in the legislation created uncertainty.  The 
move from an internationally recognised power of general competence to the 
PoWB made some local government lawyers hesitant to adopt the PoWB.  
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Whilst technically the powers available to local authorities through the PoWB 
are expansive, in practicality they were less expansive and much less certain.   
 
Risk averse local government legal officers, in their role as local authorities’ 
‘gatekeepers’, could inhibit innovative use of the PoWB and local authority 
discretionary activity beyond their traditional remit.  Although it is important to 
note that the majority of local government legal officers are not overtly risk 
averse, and some champion the use of the PoWB, the majority did adopt a wait-
and-see attitude.  Indeed, those legal officers, and other members of the senior 
management team, in Proactive authorities did push the discretionary activity 
beyond their usual boundaries.  Local authorities A and B, from the case 
studies, are robust examples of such authorities.  However, the LAML 
judgement did detrimentally impact the perception of the PoWB as a valid 
enabling power.  Even though the New Labour Administration patched-up the 
PoWB to immunise it against future LAML-style judgements (Great Britain. 
Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2010), the 
damage had been done and a new broader enabling power was required.   
 
Furthermore, the role of the Courts in the long term validity of the PoWB is an 
important contributing factor.  Therefore the GPC, and the clause that would 
prevent Courts from ruling on an Ultra Vires basis in the future, is an important 
step towards genuine legal autonomy.  However, it must be matched by local 
financial autonomy and applied autonomy, which must be joined by the political 
will (from central government) to support localism and a greater autonomous 
local government.   
233 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abdallah, S., Thompson, S., Michaelson, J., Marks, N. & Steuer, N. (2009) 'The 
Happy Planet Index 2.0: Why good lives don’t have to cost the Earth', London: 
nef. 
 
Alesina, A., Di Tella, R. & MacCulloch, R. (2004) 'Inequality and happiness: are 
Europeans and Americans different?' Journal of Public Economics, 88 (9-10), 
pp. 2009-2042. 
 
Allin, P (2007) ‘Meausring societal well-being’ Economic & Labour Market 
Review, 1 (10), pp.46-52 
 
Aristotle (1905). Politics, by Aristotle, translated by B. Jowett. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Atkinson, H. & Wilks Heeg, S. (1999) 'German federalism: a model for English 
regional government', Contemporary Politics, 5 (2), pp. 153-169. 
 
Atkinson, H. P. & Wilks-Heeg, S. (2000) Local government from Thatcher to 
Blair: The politics of creative autonomy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Audit Commission, the (2004) ‘People, places, prosperity: Delivering 
government programmes at the local level’ London: The Audit Commission 
 
Audit Commission / IDeA (2005) ‘Fitness for purpose in the 21st Century: 
strategic choice at the local level in the new millennium’ London: Audit 
Commission & IDeA 
 
Bacon, N et al (2010) ‘The State of Happiness:  Can public policy shape 
people’s well-being and resilience?’ London: the Young Foundation 
 
Barrow, C. Greenhalgh, S & Lister, E (2010) ‘A Magna Carta for Localism: three 
practical steps to make localism real’ London: Centre for Policy Studies 
 
Benz, M. & Stutzer, A. (2004) 'Are voters better informed when they have a 
larger say in politics?–Evidence for the European Union and Switzerland', 
Public Choice, 119 (1), pp. 31-59. 
 
Bevan, M. (2003) 'New parish and town councils in urban areas Communities 
and DIY democracy'.  York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
 
Bevir, M (1999) ‘Foucault and critique: Deploying agency against autonomy’ 
Political theory, 27 (1), pp.65-84 
 
Bevir, M & Rhodes, R (1999) ‘Studying British Government: reconstructing the 
research agenda’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 1 (2), 
pp.215-239 
 
234 
 
Bevir, M. & Rhodes, R. (2000) 'Interpretive theory', in Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. 
(eds) (2000) Theory and methods in political science.  London: Macmillan 
 
Bevir, M & Rhodes, R (2001) ‘Decentring tradition: Interpreting British 
Government’ Administration and Society, 33 (2), pp.107-132 
 
Bevir, M., Rhodes, R. A. W. & Weller, P. (2003) 'Traditions of governance: 
Interpreting the changing role of the public sector in comparative and historical 
perspective', Public Administration, 81, pp.1-17 
 
Bevir, M. & Rhodes, R. A. W. (2004) Interpreting British Governance. London: 
Routledge 
 
Bevir, M & Rhodes, R (2004b) ‘The Interpretive Approach in Political Science: a 
symposium’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6, pp.129-164 
 
Bevir, M & Rhodes, R (2006) ‘Defending Interpretation’ European Political 
Science, 5, pp.69-83 
 
Bevir, M & Rhodes, R (2006) ‘Interpretive Approaches to British Government 
and Politics’ British Politics, 1, pp.84-112 
 
Bevir, M. & Rhodes, R. (2008) 'Authors' Response: Politics as Cultural Practice', 
Political Studies Review, 6 (2), pp. 170-177. 
 
Bevir, M. & Rhodes, R. (2008) 'The differentiated polity as narrative', The British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations, 10 (4), pp. 729-734. 
 
Bevir, M. & Rhodes, R. (2010) The state as Cultural Practice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Blanchflower, D. & Oswald, A. (2004) 'Well-Being Over Time in Great Brittan 
and the US', Journal of Public Economics, 88, pp. 1359. 
 
Blond, P (2010) Red Tory: how the left and right have broken Britain and how 
we can fix it. Chatham: Faber and Faber London. 
 
Blond, P (2009 The Ownership State, London: Nesta & ResPublica 
 
Board, D (2010) ‘Leadership: the ghost at the trillion dollar crash?’ European 
Management Journal, v28(4), p.269-277 
 
Bok, D (2010) The Politics of Happiness: What government can learn from the 
new research on well-being. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Booth, R (2010) ‘Barnet’s ‘easyCouncil’ finds it hard to cut with £1.5m spent, 
£1.4 saved’ the Guardian, 26th October 
 
235 
 
Brannen, J. (2005) 'Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches into the Research Process', International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology: Theory & Practice, 8 (3), pp.173-184 
 
Braybrook, L (2008) ‘The Well-being power and sustainable development’ Cities 
research Centre, UWE and School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham  
 
Brindle, D (2010) ‘’Big Society’ meetings cancelled over cuts anger’ the 
Guardian, 5th October  
 
Bryman, A. (2006) 'Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: how is it 
done? Qualitative research, 6 (1), pp. 97. 
 
Bryman, A. & Teevan, J. J. (2004) Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Bunt, L. & Harris, M. (2010) 'Mass localism', London: Nesta 
 
Bunt, L., Harris, M. & Westlake, S. (2010) 'Schumpeter comes to Whitehall’. 
London: Nesta 
 
Cabinet Office (2010) The Coalition: our Programme for Government. London: 
Cabinet Office 
 
Casebeer, A. L. & Verhoef, M. J. (1997) 'Combining qualitative and quantitative 
research methods: considering the possibilities for enhancing the study of 
chronic diseases', Chronic Diseases in Canada, 18 (3), pp. 18-13. 
 
Clark, G (1984) ‘A theory of Local Autonomy’ Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 74 (2), pp.195-208 
 
Clark, G (2010) ‘Three actions needed to help the big society grow’ London: 
DCLG 
 
Commission for Rural Communities and DCLG (2008) ‘A guide to becoming a 
Quality Council’ (2nd Ed) London: DCLG 
 
Copus, C (2006) ‘British Local Government: A case for a New Constitutional 
Settlement’ Public Policy and Administration, 21 (2), pp.4-21 
 
Coulson, A (1999) ‘Decentralisation and democracy: the neglected potential of 
Parish Councils’ Birmingham: INLOGOV 
 
Crump, H (2009) ‘Councils plan LAML Supreme Court bid’ the Local 
Government Chronicle, 21st September 
 
Davies, J (2008) ‘Double-devolution or double dealing? The Local Government 
White Paper and the Lyons Review, 34 (1), pp.3-22 
 
236 
 
DCA (2003) ‘Privacy and data sharing survey of public awareness and 
perceptions’ London: DCA 
 
DCLG (2007) The English Indices of Deprevation. London: DCLG 
 
DCLG (2008) Evaluation of the take-up of the Well-being power. London: DCLG 
 
DCLG (2008b) Practical Use of the Well-being power. London: DCLG 
 
DCLG (2008c) Meta evaluation of the Local Government Modernisation 
Agenda. The State of local democracy: the impact of policy changes on 
accountability and public confidence. London: DCLG 
 
DCLG (2009) Power to promote well-being of the area: statutory guidance for 
local councils. London: DCLG 
 
DCLG (2009b) Reforming Local Government: Impacts and Interactions of 
Central government policies from 2000-2006.  Final Report of the meta-
evaluation of Local Government Modernisation Agenda. London: DCLG 
 
DCLG (2011) Localism Bill: General Power of Competence for local authorities 
– impact assessment.  London: DCLG 
 
Deas, I & Ward, K (2000) ‘From the new localism to the new regionalism?  The 
implications of regional development agencies for city-regional relations’ 
Political Geography, 19, pp.273-292 
 
Deliotte (2011) A little local difficulty: the challenges of making localism work. 
London: Deliotte 
 
Demos (2008) ‘Towards Agile Government’ London: Demos 
 
Denscombe, M. (2009) Ground rules for social research: guidelines for good 
practice (2nd Ed). Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
DETR (1998) ‘Modern Local Government: in touch with the people’ London: the 
Stationery Office (Cm.4014) 
 
Devine, F (2002) ‘Qualitative Methods’ in Marsh, D and Stoker, G (2002) Theory 
and Methods in Political Science (2nd Ed) Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Diener, E (2000) Subjective well-being: The Science of Happiness and Proposal 
for a National Index, American Psychologist, 55 (1), pp.34-43 
 
Diener, E. (2009) Well-being for public policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Diener, E., Lucas, R. E. & Scollon, C. N. (2006) 'Beyond the hedonic treadmill: 
Revising the adaptation theory of well-being', American Psychologist, 61 (4), pp. 
305-314. 
 
237 
 
Diener, E & Biswas-Diener, R (2002) ‚Will money increase subjective well-
being? A literature review and guide to needed research’ Social Indicators 
research, 57, pp.119-169 
 
Diener, E & Seligman, M (2004) ‘Beyond Money: Towards an economy of well-
being’ American Psychological Society, 5 (1), pp.1-32 
 
Diener, E. & Ryan, K. (2009) 'Subjective well-being: a general overview', South 
African Journal of Psychology, 39 (4), pp. 391-406. 
 
Di Tella, R & MacCUlloch, R (2005) ‘Partisan Social Happiness’ The Review of 
Economic Studies, 72 (2), pp.367-393 
 
Di Tella, R & MacCulloch, R (2008) ‘Gross National Happiness as an answer to 
the Easterlin Paradox’ Journal of Development Economics, 86, pp.22-42 
 
Dolan, P. & Peasgood, T. (2010) 'Measuring Well-Being for Public Policy: 
Preferences or Experiences?’ in Posner, E and Sunstein C. (2010) Law and 
Happiness. London: University of Chicago Press 
 
Dolan, P., Peasgood, T., Dixon, A., Knight, M., Phillips, D., Tsuchiya, A. & 
White, M. (2006) 'Research on the relationship between well-being and 
sustainable development', Retrieved from http://www.sustainable-
development.gov.uk/publications/pdf/WellbeingProject3A.pdf.  
 
Dolan, P., Peasgood, T. & White, M. (2008) 'Do we really know what makes us 
happy A review of the economic literature on the factors associated with 
subjective well-being', Journal of Economic Psychology, 29 (1), pp. 94-122. 
 
Dooris, M. (1999) 'Healthy cities and local Agenda 21: the UK experience—
challenges for the new millennium', Health Promotion international, 14 (4), p. 
365-375 
 
Dooris, M. (2006) 'Health promoting settings: future directions', Promotion and 
Education, 13 (1), p. 4-52 
 
Dooris, M. (2009) 'Holistic and sustainable health improvement: the contribution 
of the settings-based approach to health promotion', Perspectives in Public 
Health, 129 (1), p. 29 
 
Easterlin, R. A. (1974) 'Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some 
empirical evidence', Nations and households in economic growth, pp. 89-125. 
 
Easterlin, R. A. (1995) 'Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of 
all?' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 27 (1), pp. 35-47. 
 
Easterlin, R. A. (2001) 'Income and happiness: Towards a unified theory', The 
Economic Journal, 111 (473), pp. 465-484. 
 
238 
 
Ellwood, S. Tricker, M & Waterston, P (2000) ‘Power to the parishes – a 
(missed) opportunity’ Local Government Studies, 26(2), pp.7-22 
 
Filkin, G., Stoker, G. & Wilkinson, G. (2000) 'Towards a new localism: A 
discussion paper'. London: NLGN 
 
Flynn, N (1999) ‘Modernising British Government’ Parliamentary Affairs, 52 (4), 
pp.582-597 
 
Folke, C., Carpenter, S., Elmqvist, T., Gunderson, L., Holling, C., Walker, B., 
Bengtsson, J., Berkes, F., Colding, J. & Danell, K. (2002) 'Resilience and 
Sustainable Development: Building Adaptive Capacity in a world of 
transformations', Journal of the Human Environment, 31 (5), 437-440 
 
Frey, B & Stutzer, A (2000) ‘Happiness prospers in Democracy’ Journal of 
Happiness Studies, 1, pp.79-102 
 
Frey, B. S. & Stutzer, A. (2002) 'What can economists learn from happiness 
research?', Journal of Economic literature, 40 (2), pp. 402-435. 
 
Frey, B. S. & Stutzer, A. (2003) ‘Direct democracy: designing a living 
constitution’, IEER Working paper no. 167 
 
Frey, B. & Stutzer, A. (2004) 'The role of direct democracy and federalism in 
local power', IEW Working Paper No. 209. 
 
Frey, B. S. (2008) 'Happiness: A revolution in economics', MIT: MIT Press 
Books. 
 
Frey, B. S. & Stutzer, A. (2000) 'Happiness, economy and institutions', The 
Economic Journal, 110 (466), pp. 918-938. 
 
Frey, B. S. & Stutzer, A. (2009) 'Should national happiness be maximized? 
Happiness, economics and politics: towards a multi-disciplinary approach’ in 
Dutt, A. K and Radcliff, B (2009) Happiness, Economics and Politics: towards a 
multi-disciplinary approach. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Ltd 
 
Gains, F., Greasley, S., John, P. & Stoker, G. (2009) 'The impact of political 
leadership on organisational performance: evidence from English urban 
government', Local Government Studies, 35 (1), pp. 75-94. 
 
Gains, F., John, P. C. & Stoker, G. (2005) 'Path dependency and the reform of 
English local government', Public Administration, 83 (1), pp. 25-45. 
 
Game, C. and Wilson, D (2006) Local Government in the United Kingdom (4th 
Ed). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Gilbert, D (2007) Stumbling on Happiness. London: Harper Perennial 
 
Gilbert, N. (1993) Researching social life. London: SAGE 
239 
 
 
Graham, C (2005) ‘The Economics of Happiness’ World Economics, 6 (3), 
pp.41-55 
 
Great Britain. Local Authorities (Goods and Services) Act 1970: Elizabeth II 
(1970) London: the Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain. Local Government Act 1972: Elizabeth II (1972) London: the 
Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain. Local Government Act 2000: Elizabeth II (2000) London: the 
Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain. Local Government Act 2003: Elizabeth II (2003) London: the 
Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain. European Trade Act 2004: Elizabeth II (2004) London: the 
Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain. Sustainable Communities Act 2007: Elizabeth II (2007) London: 
the Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain. Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007: 
Elizabeth II (2007) London: the Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain. Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 
2010: Elizabeth II (2010) London: the Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain. Decentralisation and Localism Bill London: the Stationery Office 
(Bills 2010-2011 126) 
 
Great Britain.  Parliament.  House of Commons (2000) The Local Government 
Bill [HL]: local government leadership, session 1999-2000. London: the 
Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain.  Parliament.  House of Commons (2009) The Balance of Power: 
central and local government, session 2008-2009. London: the Stationery Office 
(HC 33-1) 
 
Great Britain.  Parliament.  House of Commons (2011) Localism Bill: Local 
government and community empowerment, research paper 11/02. London: the 
Stationery Office 
 
Great Britain.  Parliament.  House of Commons (2011) General Power of 
Competence: written evidence, session 2010-2011.  London: the Stationery 
Office (HC 931)  
 
Hambleton, R. (2000) 'Modernising political management in local government', 
Urban Studies, 37 (5-6), p. 931-950 
 
240 
 
Hammersley, M. (1992) 'Deconstructing the qualitative-quantitative divide' in 
Brannen, J (1992) ‘Mixing Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative research’. 
Aldershot: Avebury 
 
Hammersley, M. (1992) What’s wrong with ethnography? Methodological 
explorations. London: Routledge 
 
Hammersley, M. (1993) Social research: philosophy, politics and practice. 
London: Sage. 
 
HC Deb 17 January 2011 c561-2 
 
Helliwell, J. F. (2003) 'How's life? Combining individual and national variables to 
explain subjective well-being', Economic Modelling, 20 (2), pp. 331-360. 
 
Helliwell, J. F. & Putnam, R. D. (2004) 'The social context of well-being', 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 359 
(1449), p. 1435-1446 
 
Helliwell, J (2006) ‘Well-being, social capital and public policy: what’s new?’ The 
Economic Journal, pp.34-45 
 
Helliwell, J & Huang, H (2008) ‘How’s your government?  International Evidence 
linking good government and well-being’ British Journal of Political Science, 38, 
pp.595-619 
 
HM Treasury (2008) ‘Development’s in the Economics of well-being’ Treasury 
working paper number four.  London: HM Treasury 
 
HM Treasury (2010) ‘Budget 2010’ London: HM Treasury 
 
Hoskin, P (2010) ‘General well-being is back’ The Spectator, 15th November 
 
House of Commons (2002) How the Local Government Act 2000 is working. 
14th report of the Transport, Local Government and the Regions committee 
(2001-2002) 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmtlgr/602/60203.
htm  
 
IDeA (2009) ‘In shape for success? Chief Executives perspectives on achieving 
culture change in local government’ London: IDeA 
 
Imrie, R & Raco, M (1999) ‘How new is new governance? Lessons from the UK’ 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 24 (1), pp. 45-63 
 
INLOGOV & UWE (2007) Formative evaluation of the take-up and 
implementation of the Well-being Power 2003-2007. Bristol: UWE 
 
INLOGOV & UWE (2008) The Well-being power: Practical experience and 
perspectives.  Bristol: UWE 
241 
 
 
IPPR & PwC (2009) ‘Who’s accountable?  The challenge of giving away power 
in a centralised political culture’ London: IPPR 
 
IPPR (2010) ‘Creative Destruction: Placing Innovation at the Heart of 
Progressive Economics’ London: IPPR 
 
IPPR (2010b) ‘Without financial powers, Pickes’ Bill is lipstick localism’ London: 
IPPR 
 
IPPR North (2010) 'Five foundations of real localism', Newcastle: IPPR North. 
 
Jessop, B (1993) ‘Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary 
Remarks on post-fordist political economy’ Studies in Political Economy, 40, 
pp.7-40 
 
Jessop, B (1998) The rise of Governance and the risk of failure: the case for 
economic development’ International Social Science Journal, 50 (155) pp.29-45 
 
Jessop, B. (2004) 'Hollowing out the ‘nation-state’ and multilevel governance', in 
Kennett, P (2004) A handbook of comparative social policy.  Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Ltd 
 
Jessop, B. (2004) 'Multi-level governance and multi-level metagovernance', 
Multi-level governance, 1 (9), pp. 49-75. 
 
Jenkins, S (2004) ‘Big Bang Localism; A rescue plan for British democracy’ 
London: Policy Exchange 
 
John, P (2001) ‘Local Governance in Western Europe’ London: SAGE 
 
Johns, H. & Ormerod, P. (2007) Happiness, economics and public policy. 
London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 
 
Johns, H. & Ormerod, P. (2008) 'The unhappy thing about happiness studies', 
Real World Economics Review, pp. 139-146. 
 
Jordan, B. (2007) Social work and well-being. Lyme Regis: Russell House 
 
Jordan, B. (2008) Welfare and well-being: Social value in public policy. Bristol: 
Policy Press 
 
Kahneman, D., Diener, E. & Schwarz, N. (2003) Well-being: The foundations of 
hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications. 
 
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (2003) 'Experienced utility and objective 
happiness: A moment-based approach', in Brocas, I and Carrillo, J (2003) The 
Psychology of Economic Decisions: Rationality and well-being. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
242 
 
King, D. S. & Pierre, J. (1990) Challenges to local government. London: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
 
King, D. S. & Stoker, G. (1996) 'Rethinking local democracy'. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan 
 
Kitchin, H & Garfield, D (2011) ‘Localism Bill analysis’ London: LGiU 
 
Kohn, M (2010) ‘Exploring Happiness’ the Financial Times, 21st August 
 
Labour Party, the (1996) ‘New Labour, New life for Britain’ London: the Labour 
Party 
 
Laffin, M (2007) ‘Comparative British central-local relations: regional centralism, 
governance and intergovernmental relations’ Public Policy and Administration, 
22 (1), pp.74-91 
 
Laffin, M (2008) ‘Local Government Modernisation in England: a critical review 
of the LGMA evaluation studies’ Local Government Studies, 34 (1), pp.109-125 
 
Laffin, M (2009) ‘Central-Local Relations in an Era of Governance; towards a 
new research agenda’ Local Government Studies, 35 (1), pp. 21-37 
 
Dobson, N (2010) ‘Local Government: general competence to restore vires 
confidence’ Law Society Gazette, 25th March 
 
Layard, R. (2006) Happiness: Lessons from a new science. London: Penguin. 
 
Layard, R. (2006) 'Happiness and Public Policy: a Challenge to the Profession*', 
The Economic Journal, 116 (510), pp. 24-33. 
 
Layard, R. (2008) 'Social Science and the Causes of happiness and Misery' 
Florence: European University Institute 
 
Leach, R. & Percy-Smith, J. (2001) Local governance in Britain. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave  
 
Leach, S. (2006) The changing role of local politics in Britain. Bristol: Policy 
Press. 
 
Leach, S., Lowndes, V., Cowell, R. & Downe, J. (2005) Meta-Evaluation of the 
Local Government Modernisation Agenda: Progress Report on Stakeholder 
Engagement with Local Government. London: Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
 
LGA (1998) ‘Modernising Political Management Arrangements: options within 
the existing legislative framework’ London: LGA 
 
LGA (2010) ‘Draft Local Government (Power of General Competence) Bill’ 
London: LGA 
243 
 
 
LGiD (2010) ‘Enterprising councils: getting the most from trading and charging’ 
London: LGiD 
 
LGiD (2010b) ‘Culture Change’ Available at: 
http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=10222199 (Accessed: 22nd 
September 2011) 
 
LGiD & nef (2010) ‘The role of local government in promoting well-being. 
Healthy communities programme” London: LGiD 
 
LGiU (2010) ‘People, places, power: How localism and strategic planning can 
work together’ London: LGiU 
 
Lindstrom, A (1998) ‘The comparative study of local government systems – a 
research agenda’ Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and 
Practice, 1 (1), pp.97-115 
 
Local Government Chronicle, the (1997) ‘Carrots and Semtex’ 15th August  
 
Local Government Lawyer (2011) ‘Who needs the Localism Bill?’ 28th July 
 
Localis (2009) ‘Can localism deliver? Lessons from Manchester’ London: 
Localis 
 
Loughlin, J. (2001) Subnational democracy in the European Union: Challenges 
and opportunities. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Lyons, M. (2005) 'Lyons Inquiry into local government: consultation paper and 
interim report', Found at www.tmi.org.uk (accessed 15 January 2006). 
 
Lyons, M. S. (2007) Place-shaping: a shared ambition for the future of local 
government, annexes. London: The Stationery Office. 
 
MacCulloch, R. (2005) 'Income inequality and the taste for revolution', Journal 
of Law & Economics, 48, pp. 93-709. 
 
Marsh, D. Richards, D. Smith, M (2003) ‘Unequal Plurality: towards an 
asymmetric power model of British politics’ Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Marsh, D (2008a) ‘Understanding British Government:  Analysing Competing 
Models’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10, pp.251-268 
 
Marsh, D (2008b) ‘What is at stake? A response to Bevir & Rhodes’ British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10 (4), pp.735-739 
 
Mason, W and McMahon, J (2008) ‘Freedom for Public Services’ London: 
Centre for Policy Studies 
 
244 
 
McCracken, L. M., Gauntlett-Gilbert, J. & Vowles, K. E. (2007) 'The role of 
mindfulness in a contextual cognitive-behavioral analysis of chronic pain-related 
suffering and disability', Pain, 131 (1-2), pp. 63-69. 
 
McMahon, S. (2002) 'The development of quality of life indicators--a case study 
from the City of Bristol, UK', Ecological Indicators, 2 (1-2), pp. 177-185. 
 
Michaelson, J., Abdallah, S., Steuer, N., Thompson, S., Marks, N., Aked, J., 
Cordon, C. & Potts, R. (2009) 'National Accounts of Well-being: bringing real 
wealth onto the balance sheet', London: nef. 
 
Midwinter, A. (2001) 'New labour and the modernisation of British local 
government: a critique', Financial Accountability & Management, 17 (4), pp. 
311-320. 
 
Miliband, D (2006) Double Devolution. The Guardian 21st February 
 
Moore, M (2009) ‘Barnet Council adopts easyJet and Ryanair business model’ 
the Telegraph, 28th August 
 
Morphet, J. (2008) Modern local government. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Morse, J. M. & Richards, L. (2002) Read me first for a user's guide to qualitative 
methods. London: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Moro, M et al (2008) ‘Ranking quality of life using subjective well-being data’ 
Ecological Economics, 65, pp.448-460 
 
Mulgan, G. & Albury, D. (2003) 'Innovation in the public sector', London: The 
Stationery Office 
 
NALC (2009) ‘The Parish Councils (Power to promote well-being) (prescribed 
conditions) Order 2008)’ London: NALC 
 
NALC (2010) ‘Localism in Practise’ London: NALC 
 
NALC (2010b) ‘What is Localism?’ London: NALC 
 
nef (2004) ‘A well-being manifesto for a flourishing society: the power of well-
being’ London: nef 
 
nef (2010) ‘Spending cuts will break Big Society, warns nef’ Available at: 
http://www.neweconomics.org/press-releases/spending-cuts-will-break-big-
society-warns-nef (Accessed at 4th November 2010) 
 
nef (2010b) ‘Cutting it: the Big Society and the new austerity’ London, nef  
 
nef (2011) ‘Measuring out Progress: the power of well-being’ London: nef  
 
NERIP (2008) ‘The State of the Region 2008’ Newcastle: NERIP 
245 
 
 
Nesta (2006) ‘The Innovation Gap: Why policy needs to reflect the reality of 
innovation in the UK’ London: Nesta 
 
Nesta (2010) ‘More than good ideas: the power of innovation in local 
government’ London: Nesta 
 
NLGN (2011) ‘Future Councils: Life after the spending cuts’ London: NLGN 
 
ODPM (1999) ‘Local Authority Activity under Section 137, Local Government 
Act 1972’ London: ODPM 
 
ODPM (2005) ‘National Evaluation of Local Strategic Partnerships: Formative 
Evaluation and Action Research Programme 2002-2005: Final Report’ London: 
ODPM 
 
ODPM (2005b) ‘New Localism – citizen engagement, neighbourhoods and 
public services: evidence from local government’ London: ODPM 
 
ODPM (2006) ‘Formative Evaluation of the take-up and implementation of the 
Well-being power, 2003-2006,  A baseline report for ODPM from the School of 
Public Policy, University of Birmingham and the Cities Research Centre, 
University of the West of England’ London: ODPM 
 
Oishi, S. & Diener, E. (2009) 'Goals, culture, and subjective well-being', in 
Diener, E (2009) Culture and Well-Being. Netherlands: Springer 
 
ONS (2004) ‘Neighbourhood Statistics’ London: ONS 
 
Ormerod, P. & Johns, H. (2007) 'Against happiness: It isn't sensible to make 
governments responsible for something as complex as personal happiness', 
London: Prospect Publishing Ltd. 
 
Pickles, E (2010) ‘Lazy local councils must act smarter to save more’ The 
Financial Times, 21st October  
 
Posner, E and Sunstein C. (2010) Law and Happiness. London: University of 
Chicago Press  
 
Powell, F (2007) ‘The Politics of Civil Society: neo-liberalism or social left?’ 
Bristol: Policy Press 
 
Pratchett, L. (2002) 'Local government: from modernisation to consolidation', 
Parliamentary Affairs, 55 (2), p. 331346 
 
Pratchett, L. (2004) 'Local autonomy, local democracy and the ‘new localism’', 
Political Studies, 52 (2), pp. 358-375. 
 
Pratchett, L. & Leach, S. (2004) 'Local government: choice within constraint', 
Parliamentary Affairs, 57 (2), p. 366-379 
246 
 
 
Pratchett, L. & Leach, S. (2005) 'Local Government: A New Vision, Rhetoric or 
Reality?', Parliamentary Affairs, 58 (2), pp. 318-334. 
 
Putnam, R. D. (1995) 'Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of 
social capital in America', PS: Political science and politics, 28 (4), pp. 664-683. 
 
Putnam, R. D. (2001) Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American 
community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Read, M & Marsh, D (2002) ‘Combining quantitative and qualitative methods’ in 
Marsh, D & Stoker, G (2002) Theory and Methods in Political Science (2nd Ed) 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Rhodes, R. (1981) 'Control and power in central-local government relations', 
Farnborough: Gower 
 
Rhodes, R. (1997) Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, 
reflexivity, and accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996) 'The New Governance: Governing without 
Government1', Political Studies, 44 (4), pp. 652-667. 
 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1999) Understanding governance. Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
 
Richardson, J & Jordan, G (1979) Governing under pressure: The policy 
process in a post-parliamentary democracy. London: Blackwell 
 
Rowell, A (2010) ‘Communities, Councils and a low-carbon future: what we can 
do if governments won’t’ Totnes: Green Books 
 
Rustin, S (2010) ‘The Rise of the Parish Council’ the Guardian 1st December 
 
Sale, J. E. M. & Brazil, K. (2002) 'Revisiting the quantitative-qualitative debate: 
Implications for mixed-methods research', Quality and quantity, 36 (1), pp. 43-
53. 
 
Schmuecker, K (2011) ‘Funding review is the real localism test’ Local 
Government Chronicle, 28th January 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1950) 'The march into socialism', The American Economic 
Review, 40 (2), pp. 446-456. 
 
SDC (2004) ‘Making the most of the power of well-being to achieve sustainable 
development’ London: SDC 
 
SDC (2009) ‘Prosperity without Growth? The transition to a sustainable 
economy’ London: SDC 
 
247 
 
Sketcher, C (2003) ‘Governing Communities: parish-pump politics or strategic 
partnerships?’ Local Government Studies, 29 (4), pp.1-16 
 
Smith Institute, the (2004) ‘Making sense of localism’ London: The Smith 
Institute 
 
smf (2009) ‘Well-being: how to lead the good life and what government should 
do to help’ London: smf 
 
Steuer, N & Marks, N (2008) ‘Local Well-being: can we measure it?’ London: 
nef 
 
Stevens, M (2011) ‘Anything, so long as it’s legal?’ Public Finance, 21st March 
 
Stiglitz, J. E., Sen, A. & Fitoussi, J. P. (2009) 'Report by the commission on the 
measurement of economic performance and social progress', Paris: 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress 
 
Stoker, G (1988) ‘The Politics of Local Government: public policy and politics’ 
(2nd Ed) Basingstoke: Macmillan 
 
Stoker, G. (1999) 'The unintended costs and benefits of new management 
reform for British local government' in Rhodes, R and Stoker, G (1999) The New 
Management of British Local Government. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Stoker, G. (2001) 'Great Britain: From Local Government to Local Governance’. 
Barcelona: ICPS  
 
Stoker, G (2004) ‘New Localism, Progressive Politics and Democracy’ Political 
Quarterly, pp.117-129 
 
Stoker, G. & Wilson, S. (2004b) 'British local government into the 21st century'. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Stratton, A (2010) ‘Happiness Index to guage Britain’s national mood’ the 
Guardian, 14th November 
 
Stratton, A (2010b) ‘David Cameron aims to make happiness the new GDP’ the 
Guardian, 14th November 
 
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. M. (1990) Basics of qualitative research: Grounded 
theory procedures and techniques. London: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Stutzer, A. (2004) 'The role of income aspirations in individual happiness', 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54 (1), pp. 89-109. 
 
Sullivan, H. (2007) 'Interpreting 'community leadership' in English local 
government', Policy & Politics, 35 (1), pp. 141-161. 
 
248 
 
Sullivan, H., Downe, J., Entwistle, T. & Sweeting, D. (2006) 'The three 
challenges of community leadership', Local Government Studies, 32 (4), pp. 
489-507. 
 
Sumner, L. W. (1995) 'The subjectivity of welfare', Ethics, 105 (4), pp. 764-790. 
 
Sumner, L. W. (1999) Welfare, happiness, and ethics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Tella, R. D. & MacCulloch, R. (2006) 'Some uses of happiness data in 
economics', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (1), pp. 25-46. 
 
Times, the (2010) ‘The Big Society: the Conservative Manifesto is an 
impressive attempt to reframe the role of government and unleash 
entrepreneurial spirit’ 14th 2010 
 
Tov, W. & Diener, E. (2009) 'The well-being of nations: Linking together trust, 
cooperation, and democracy', The Science of Well-Being, pp. 155-173. 
 
Veenhoven, R. (2007) 'Measures of gross national happiness'. Rotterdam: 
OECD 
 
Veenhoven, R. (2008) 'Sociological theories of subjective well-being', The 
science of subjective well-being, pp. 44–61. 
 
Veenhoven, R. (2009) 'World database of happiness', Psychological Topics 
(special issue on Positive Psychology), 18, pp. 221-246. 
 
Veenhoven, R. & Hagerty, M. (2006) 'Rising happiness in nations 1946–2004: A 
reply to Easterlin', Social Indicators Research, 79 (3), pp. 421-436. 
 
Veenhoven, R. (2004) Subjective measures of well-being. Rotterdam: United 
Nations University 
 
Veenhoven, R. (2000) ‘The four qualities of life’ Journal of Happiness Studies, 1 
pp. 1-39 
 
Verschuren, P. J. M. (2003) 'Case study as a research strategy: Some 
ambiguities and opportunities', International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology: Theory & Practice. 6 (2), pp.121-139 
 
Walker, D. (2000) 'Living with ambiguity: The relationship between central and 
local government'. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
 
Walker, D. (2002) In praise of centralism A critique of the new localism. London: 
Catalyst Forum. 
 
Walker, R. M. (2006) 'Innovation type and diffusion: an empirical analysis of 
local government', Public Administration, 84 (2), pp. 311-335. 
 
249 
 
Yarwood, R (2002) ‘Parish Councils, partnership and governance: the 
development of ‘exceptions’ housing in the Malvern Hills District, England’ 
Journal of Rural Studies, 18, pp.275-291 
 
Yanow, D. (2000). Conducting interpretive policy research, London: Sage 
 
Yanow, D., Schwartz-Shea, P. & Freitas, M. (2008) 'Case Study Research in 
Political Science', Encyclopaedia of Case Study Research, London: Sage 
 
Yin, R. K. Applications of case study research. London: Sage 
 
Yin, R. K. (2009) Case study research: Design and methods. London: Sage 
 
Williams, M (2000) ‘Interpretivism and Generalisation’ Sociology, 34 (2), pp.209-
224 
 
Williams, D (2010) ‘Councils must be bolder with well-being powers, says 
Pickles’ Public Finance 27th July  
250 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 – The Postal Survey Covering Letter 
ADDRESS LINE 1 
ADDRESS LINE 2 
ADDRESS LINE 3 
ADDRESS LINE 4 
 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
 
I am writing to you to ask for your help in improving the knowledge about uses 
of the Well Being powers by Local Authorities in England.   
All of your answers will be treated in the strictest confidence.  Anonymised 
responses may be passed to any Local Authorities, if they request it.  This is so 
that national patterns of usages of the Well Being powers may be established.   
The questionnaire consists of five pages and should take no longer than ten 
minutes to complete.   
If you have any questions or concerns about this survey please do not hesitate 
to contact William Holloway at william.holloway@northumbria.ac.uk who would 
be very happy to assist you.   
I very much hope you will be able to take part and feel sure that you will find it 
interesting.  Thank you very much for your help in advance.  Please return the 
completed questionnaire in the pre-paid envelope provided with this 
questionnaire by (DATE).   
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
William Holloway 
University of Northumbria 
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Appendix 2 – the Postal Survey 
 
 
Local Authorities’ usage of the Well Being Powers Survey 
Since 2000 the Labour Government has passed a range of laws aimed at 
promoting democratic accountability and devolving authority to local 
government, this agenda was called “New Localism”.  The Local Government 
Act received Royal Assent in July 2000.  Part one of the act introduced a new 
Well-Being Power, which enabled local authorities to promote the economic, 
social or environmental wellbeing of an area.   
Section 1 – Views on the Power of Well-Being 
 
1.1 Has your Local Authority used its Well Being powers?  Yes  □ No  □ 
 
1.2 If yes, what date was it initiated? 
...................................................................................................... 
 
1.3 If no, has your Local Authority examined and ruled out using the Well Being 
powers? 
Yes  □  No  □ 
 
1.4 If you have ruled them out; why?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………................
........ 
 
1.5 In your opinion how widely understood are the Well Being powers; 
 
 Broad            Limited 
 
Unsure 
a. In your local authority □ □ □ □ □ 
      
b. In central government □ □ □ □ □ 
      
c. In the Voluntary Community sector □ □ □ □ □ 
      
d. In local public sector bodies e.g. Police, NHS  □ □ □ □ □ 
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1.6 How should the cost of the Well Being powers be funded? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………… 
 
 Yes No 
1.6 In your opinion would there be greater take up / use of the well 
being powers if additional resources were available? 
□ □ 
   
1.7 Should Well Being be an established sub-set of the new 
Comprehensive Area Assessment? 
□ □ 
   
1.8 Do you think that the Power of Well Being should aim to target 
specific groups within the community?  If yes, please give examples 
below; 
□ □ 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………… 
 
If your local authority has not used the well being powers 
please go to section 2 of the questionnaire. 
 
 
1.9 Please indicate where the Well Being powers are focussed.  Please tick all that 
apply.   
 
  
Economic areas □ 
  
Social areas □ 
  
Environmental areas □ 
  
Enhancing plans / strategies □ 
  
Improving services for residents □ 
  
Improving the general quality of life for residents □ 
 
 
 
Other 
………………………………………………………………………………...............................
........ 
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1.10 Who were the initial proponents of use of the Well Being powers? 
 
  
Local Authority officers   □ 
  
Local Authority members   □ 
  
Initiated outside your local authority □ 
 
1.11 Could you give one example of a project or programme where the Well Being 
powers were used?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………… 
 
Section 2 – General views on the well being powers 
 
2.1 Is the current legislation sufficient to genuinely promote Well Being?  
          Yes  □  No  
□ 
 
2.2 Do you feel that the Well Being powers should be replaced by a new power of 
general confidence?        Yes  □  No  
□ 
 
2.3 Has the use of Well Being powers within your local authority produced change in 
the following areas? 
 
 increased decreased no change 
Organisational performance □ □ □ 
    
Delivery of council services □ □ □ 
    
Leadership role in the local community □ □ □ 
    
Ability to influence regional / national policy □ □ □ 
    
Meet the needs of specific groups □ □ □ 
    
Ability to respond to negative external challenges 
e.g. credit crunch 
□ □ □ 
254 
 
Section 3 – Measuring Well Being 
 
3.1  How does your Local Authority measure Well Being? 
...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................
................ 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……… 
 
3.2  How should Well Being be measured by Local Authorities?  
...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................
........................ 
 
3.3  What are the most appropriate indicators to measure Well Being? 
...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................................
........................ 
 
3.4 Should central government establish a comprehensive Well Being indicator set 
that could be used by local authorities? 
Yes  □  No  □ 
 
3.5  Should measuring Well Being at the local level become mandatory?  
 
Yes  □  No  □ 
 
Section 4 – General Details 
 
4.1  What type of Organisation do you work for? 
 
  
Unitary Council □ 
  
Metropolitan Council □ 
  
District Council □ 
  
County Council □ 
  
London Borough Council □ 
 
255 
 
 
4.2   What size population does your Local Authority serve? 
 
  
0 – 100,000 □ 
  
100,001 – 200,000   □ 
  
200,001 – 300,000   □ 
  
400,000 +   □ 
 
 
4.3  Which political party controls your Local Authority? 
 
  
Labour □ 
  
Conservative □ 
  
Liberal Democrat   □ 
  
Other □ 
  
No overall control   □ 
 
5.  Please use the box below for any additional comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this 
questionnaire. 
 
256 
 
Appendix 3 – the Covering Letter for the Interviews 
William Holloway 
Department of Social Sciences 
Lipman Building  
Northumbria University 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 8ST 
Dear XXXXXXX,  
 
I am writing to you to in relation to the original research I am undertaking as part 
of my PhD at the University of Northumbria.  My research is on Local Authorities 
and their use of the Power of Well-Being. 
The research entails conducting interviews with senior local authority officers 
with knowledge of, or experience in using the Power of Well-Being.  The aim of 
the research is to establish which factors are influential in the usage of the Well-
Being Power and to explore whether the Power is sufficient to genuinely 
promote the Well-Being of local people.   
Since your Local Authority has pursued an ambitious community agenda and 
used the Well-Being Power in a creative manner, interviews with a small 
number of your colleagues would be invaluable in providing key information on 
this subject.  The interviews would last no longer than 45 minutes and would 
explore different the aspects involved in the usage of the Power.   
Should you consent to participate in this research project, it would be very 
helpful if I could interview the relevant officers in your authority.  These could 
include a legal officer, a resources officer or an officer from policy services.  The 
list of questions for each interview would be sent to the interviewee in advance 
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and the interview transcript would be sent to each participant after the interview 
for final approval, with the option of making alterations to the transcript if 
required.  In addition, a copy of the final report would be provided when my 
research is complete for use within your Local Authority. 
The research complies fully with the University’s ethical requirements for 
research.  If you have any questions or concerns please do not hesitate to 
contact me (william.holloway@northumbria.ac.uk ) or my supervisor is 
Professor Keith Shaw (keith.shaw@northumbria.ac.uk) and we will be very 
happy to provide answers for you.  
I very much hope you will be able to take part in the research which will 
eventually aim to add to our understanding of an increasingly important and 
innovative area of local decision-making.  Please contact myself or my 
supervisor if you require any further information.   
Thank you very much for your help in advance. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
William Holloway 
 
Department of Social Sciences 
University of Northumbria 
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Appendix 4 – The semi-structured interview questions 
 
Background questions: 
 How long have you been working here? 
 What did you do before you worked here? 
 
Questions: 
1. What do you understand by the term well-being? 
2. Within which national or local policy context has the term emerged (e.g. 
legal powers, health, environment etc)   
3. How widely is that understanding shared across your authority? 
4.  
a. Can you give examples of the how your organization promotes and 
develops the well-being of local people?  
b. Do you see a link between promoting well-being and your local 
authority’s community leadership role? 
5. What factors facilitate the use of the power of well-being in your authority? 
6. What factors inhibit the use of the power of well-being in your authority? 
7. What does your local authority do to promote the use of the Power of 
well-being? 
8. In your opinion, do you believe the power of well-being is sufficient to 
genuinely allow for local innovation and creativity in designing initiatives? 
9. What could central government do to encourage local authorities’ to 
promote greater use of the Power of Well-Being? 
10. How do you think cuts in public sector expenditure are likely to affect this 
role?  
11. In your opinion, how do you think local efforts to increase well-being can 
be further developed? 
12. In your opinion, why do you think such a small percentage of local 
councils have used the Power of Well-Being? 
13. Do you think that there’s anything that I’ve missed?  
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Appendix 5 – a sample interview transcript 
 
WH – William Holloway 
I – Interviewee 
 
WH: So if I could just ask you a couple of questions just to kind of get a bit of 
background information, how long have you been working for the organisation? 
I: I’ve been working here, well obviously originally in the County Council I 
started working for in February 1996. Though I’ve been, and obviously on the 1st 
April 2009 the county council along with the district council became a unitary 
authority so effectively I’ve been working for the council since the 28th of 
February 1996 so effectively fourteen nearly fifteen years. 
WH: Right. Is all of that in a in the same role? 
I: It has yes slightly differing legal roles but yes all within a legal role yes. 
WH: Ok, thank you so if we kind of just drift into the questions now then so what 
do you kind of what do you understand by the term well-being? 
I: Well I take a legal view about it I mean I think but sort of not thinking 
specifically at the moment about the act and the powers under the 2000 Act, but 
just talking about well-being in its most generic meaning then I understand that 
as being anything that can broadly benefit the local authority but I understand it 
as anything whether it’s something economic social being something which 
benefits the local authority so I see it as having a very broad meaning. 
WH: Excellent so within which kind of policy context do you think it’s emerged?  
I: Well legal powers are obviously the one that I am most aware of so I would 
feel most comfortable commenting on obviously as that’s the one I have the 
most experience of. 
WH: Excellent so how widely would you say that this view is shared across the 
authority? 
I: Well I would say it’s interesting, interesting how many people for instance 
actually know about the existence of the well-being powers.  I suspect that 
people don’t and that traditionally local government has had to rely on very 
specific powers or powers which are ancillary to those specific powers to do 
anything. Funnily enough I have just come back from running a training course 
for members and I have been explaining to them that obviously local 
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government is totally different to real life I mean in real life you can do anything 
unless the law says you can’t, you can drive your car as fast as you like unless 
the law says no its only 30mph in this zone or 70mph when you’re on the 
motorway. Local government is exactly the opposite local government you can 
only do anything if you can find a power that says you can.  I was trying to 
explain that to members in the context of why they can’t just do anything they 
want to but they have to put it into a specific power but of course that does buoy 
local government lawyers as when the well-being power came in in the 2000 act 
it was quite radical. 
I:  I don’t think it was intended to be radical and potentially it was very radical, 
but I think that historically people, traditional local government officers struggled 
with it because it was so broad. And I think even today I think if you said if you 
walked into a non-legal department and and sort of took a straw poll of officers 
and said right tell me what you know about the well-being powers and local 
government act 2000 most of them would look at you gone out, they just 
wouldn’t really understand what you were talking about.  If you refer them to a 
specific power then if you walked into you know you walked into an engineer’s 
officer and said right you know tell me about section 119 of the highways act 
1980 then probably they would quote you chapter and verse so it’s quite 
interesting that something so radical and potentially so helpful actually has so 
little visibility and understanding. 
WH: Out of curiosity, in your opinion, do you think that the proposed general 
power of competency is something that might redress that? 
I: I think it would, but that’s taking the well-being powers one major step forward 
and I think that because it has been so trailed politically, being honest about it 
obviously now we have much more media savvy age and people pick up on 
things so much more easily that I think both the fact that it’s so radical which I 
think will take it out of the local government context and put it into the wider 
media context and public interest context and also the fact that there is a lot 
more that will be written about it and said about it which will be translated 
electronically so I suspect the combination of those things will mean it will have 
a far greater impact than the 2000 act did 
WH: Whilst staying within the concept of Ultra Vires? 
I: Indeed 
WH: Can you give me examples of how the organisation promotes and 
develops the well-being of local people? 
I: I think that I would say there are obvious examples in terms of economic 
regeneration and I would say that that’s probably where in generic terms 
XXXXX have had objective one and now confirmed European funding for many 
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years since I think about 2002 and that’s made a huge difference so a lot of the 
projects that have come through that European funding have effectively 
addressed strategic issues in terms of the well-being of the whole county so as 
a specific example of that you have ‘act now’ which is a project which effectively 
meant that every person in XXXXX, well its actually 99% let’s not exaggerate, 
99% of people in XXXXX have access to broadband.  That’s a massive project 
which would never have happened without European funding so that’s a huge 
strategic example if you’re looking for specific recent example then perhaps its 
one area where the council has done something very proactive and had quite a 
bit of media coverage in terms of dealing with a problem and thereby enhancing 
the well-being of local communities. Heard of something called ‘Town A safe’? 
WH: Yes 
I: It was quite well covered a specific example of a young person last year who 
last summer, got drunk celebrating his GCSEs and went for a walk along a cliff 
top path and fell over the edge because he was drunk and died, and we had 
two or three examples of where that’s happened so that’s highlighted a whole 
issue of people coming down from up country as we say in XXXXX of people 
coming down and celebrating and parents and so forth coming down and that 
had all sorts of impact on well-being in that particular community because 
obviously there was the drunkenness and the loutish behaviour which was 
obviously something which was greatly concerning but also of concern for all 
the local hoteliers and guesthouse owners because of course the whole 
reputation of Town A was being adversely impacted, so the holiday trade the 
general family holiday trade was being lost because people didn’t want to be 
caught up in stag nights or people celebrating finishing their exams, this project 
called ‘Town A safe’ which was brought in which was about coordinating the 
whole thing about providing advice to young people when they came and also 
liaising with pubs and clubs trying to get them to act responsibly and enforce 
alcohol laws so you didn’t get people drinking, putting on specific events for 
young people, specifically for young people putting on buses so they were 
bussed back from the town back to their hotels and campsites rather than 
wandering off so a whole range of things like that, that’s a very specific recent 
example where the council have promoted well-being for Town A. 
WH: The two projects you mentioned did they did the authority have the existing 
power or was the power of well-being utilised in that sense? 
I: I don’t think, that’s an interesting point, I don’t think it was consciously used 
but I think but probably the regeneration powers were sufficient to ensure the 
broadband project came in and I think Town A safe was a range of licensing 
and general criminal powers that were used but that’s an interesting point you 
raise because actually probably there are certain things on the margin of both 
projects where someone's asked the question of what powers are you doing 
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this under so actually probably  we could have relied on the well-being powers 
for certain aspects of it and I think the interesting point of course is that of 
course because they are popular and socially beneficial projects we weren’t 
faced with anybody who was going to challenge but I suspect there are aspects 
of those projects where if we had been questioned we would have had the 
fallback of the well-being powers. 
WH: Yes the almost unconscious kind of support that the well-being power 
offered that’s come up before so that’s quite an interesting. 
I: Well I think yes I think you’re right having said what I’ve said about if you’d 
gone into a department and asked them, I stand by that comment obviously 
some of them will look at you as probably a bit gone out however having said 
that I think there is a knowledge and a consciousness or you might be right a 
sub consciousness that there is something there that acts as this catch all, 
giving officers the confidence that they’re doing something where they perhaps 
they don’t know or can’t identify a very specific power but they know it’s the right 
thing to do, they’ve got this consciousness that there is this catchall provision 
there filling in the gaps in the power giving them access to this power when they 
aren’t immediately what the specific power might be. 
WH: Excellent thank you so just one last question so obviously given your 
background you’re probably aware of the LAML ruling?  
I: Yes 
WH: There’s been a lot written on the impact the LAML ruling had on the power; 
do you think it represented a mortal blow to the power? 
I: Well, no actually funnily enough I think that my view on LAML is that it’s one 
of those situations where to have something like that does more good than bad. 
An example where you’re glad you aren’t the authority involved but actually its 
nice not to be a London authority but actually the truth of the matter is that has 
highlighted and brought to the fore the limitations of the well-being power, but 
probably it will be interesting to see to what extent publicity for LAML has 
actually pushed forward the general power of competence debate. Actually I 
don’t see at all, There is a lot of publicity around it and still is and actually what 
they were seeking to do was perfectly sensible and they lost out on a 
technicality. I summarise my point and what my own view was, actually there’s 
faults in the law and the law needs to be changed in order to enable sensible 
things like this to happen and whether that’s a change specifically to the well-
being powers to make them wider or a general power of competence either way 
that is what should happen interestingly you get some commentators saying 
well it’s the fault of the London authority and they were trying it on, I don’t know 
why it got so much publicity, well that wasn’t the case and they were totally 
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upfront about what they were doing most people said it was highly sensible and 
of course the challenge of what they were going to do would narrow self interest 
rather than the public interest challenge. I actually think it’s one of those cases 
where if you aren’t the person involved actually to have a case where it goes 
wrong can bring about greater good and that are what’s happened here. 
WH: It could bring around greater scope or a wider view of the power? 
I: Absolutely, if the power exists doesn’t allow you to do this, what the London 
authorities were trying to do, then it’s the power that’s defective and needs 
extending further rather than the authority’s concern being for something stupid. 
WH: Thank you, so do you see a link between promoting well-being and the 
community leadership role of the authority? 
I: Yeah oh absolutely if I could just give you an example which might be helpful 
of our own involvement where we did specifically look at it? 
WH: Yes. 
I:  We didn’t actually follow it through but I think it illustrates the point.  About 
three or four years ago I got involved in advising on potentially using the well-
being powers for an arrangement between ourselves and health, and effectively 
the petition was that the health the local PCT had revenue difficulties but plenty 
of capital and we had the opposite we didn’t have capital but our we our 
revenue situation was fine, so what we discussed with health was effectively 
using the well-being powers so we used our revenue to prop up their budget 
revenue budget, so we ‘cashflowed’ if you like their revenue budget and in 
return they would pay us back in capital and that would mean we could use 
more money for our capital projects, and that was the basic premise and I won’t 
bore you with the details we went into, got councils opinion etcetera, but in the 
end it was felt that we couldn’t do it. But the fascinating thing about it was that 
the minister at the time must have somehow got hold of this or heard about it 
and about for three or four months while this was ongoing was going to 
conferences and taking the local paper out of his pocket and saying this thing 
that XXXXX are doing is exactly what we want this is exactly what should be 
happening. So although actually sadly we couldn’t fulfil the pledge and do it so 
in a sense you could say, this is 2006 from memory and we were sort of in the 
vanguard in the big society and XXXXX in our case are now heading, so using 
legal powers existing or other legal powers to actually join together with other 
public services to deliver things at less cost to the community overall and more 
joined up. Working much more closely with health. It was a very simple idea 
which sadly fell foul of ultimately legal advice but was a classic example of two 
big public sector well the two biggest public sector employers in XXXXX coming 
together and saying actually we’ve both got problems so we’ll swap revenue 
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and capital and solve both problems so we’re seen to be working together and 
both of us being seen as community leaders. 
WH: Yes its interesting, would you in your opinion if that project was re-
examined now or say in a years time do you think that kind of arrangement 
would be provided for under a general power of competence? 
I: I would sincerely hope so, it wasn’t reckless, and as I say ultimately it was a 
technicality in the drafting that let us down at the end of the day.  I am a very 
pragmatic lawyer and my view is that law should never get in the way of 
common sense and a sensible outcome. What it should be about is stopping 
you doing something reckless that obviously originally when the well-being 
power came in I mean we all know the section 4 restriction which is about you 
know you can’t just use it for purely financial reasons or financial remuneration 
and fundraising.  It has to be for something other than that, obviously partly 
because of the LAML petition. It’s an unnecessary restriction. My view is that 
the general power of competence if it comes in will be far less rigorous in terms 
of being prescriptive like that, and will simply have a sort of fallback provision, 
and if you are doing something you have to make sure it’s signed off so that will 
be expressed in a positive way so of course there will be restrictions so instead 
of saying you can’t do it even if it’s for that purpose probably general power of 
competence will say yeah you can do everything but before you do it it’s got to 
be signed off by you know the section 151 officer or whatever. so my short 
answer to your question is that something rather adjusting that the general 
power of competence bill if it came out in such a way that this project that we 
planned to do was not able to be delivered because it was perfect, it made 
absolute sense, it wasn’t, we weren’t speculating they weren’t speculating we 
were filling the gaps within our own capital and revenue budgets and in a way 
we.  It should be in my view a lot more positive and should be instead of having, 
you can’t do that full stop nothing will be ruled out but everything will be subject 
to audit or financial sign off, and that must be right because I think there are 
things that on the face of it look like raising revenue and that might be the prime 
reason for it but my view is that’s nothing to stop it, it doesn’t mean it’s wrong 
because the aim is to generate income because actually as long as it’s not 
reckless generation of income that’s absolutely fine. 
WH: Yes. 
I: The role of the law should always be to, you know whos given the local 
authority power, I mean you don’t give with one hand and take with the other 
and I think the general power of competence yes there have to be you don’t 
want local government to be reckless, but ultimately what they should do is give 
them enough rope to hang themselves and if one or two try something stupid 
then the appropriate sanctions will be there but don’t put something in 
legislation which judges all local authorities by the worst offender. 
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WH: Yes definitely, and do you think similar kinds of related legislation e.g. the 
sustainable communities act 2007, that being signed off by ministers or do you 
think that is kind of too senior a level for projects to be signed off? 
I: Well certainly under general power of competence definitely. I would think 
that, interestingly with the abolition of the audit commission how diverse the 
audit role can be, but I would think there would be certain levels where it should 
be externally looked at but I would have thought it would be local audit level 
rather than Secretary of State level. Ultimately other than that I think it’s the 
internal responsibilities of your own financial controls. 
WH: Yes 
I: Local authorities know they’ve got to balance the books and local authorities 
know they can’t be too reckless and as I say there’s no reason to treat things 
like they’ve got to be signed off by the Secretary of State and as long as there 
are clear guidelines as to what local authorities have to do in terms of financial 
and governance probity then let them get on with it, don’t always need it to be 
signed off by the Secretary of State which will potentially cause delays and 
intervention. Local authorities always say we’re the ones who can best judge 
what we can do locally and the general power of competence its about 
releasing power at the local level then don’t give it with one hand and then take 
it back and say ah yes but anything you’re going to do over 100,000 quid you 
have to get it signed off by the minister because that would be nonsense. 
WH: What kind of factors do you think both facilitate and inhibit, what kind of 
factors do you think inhibit and promote the use of the power of well-being? 
I: I think partly its ignorance. I think it’s partly, until we had this financial crisis 
ironically, what was the incentive in terms of inhibiting, what was ever the 
incentive for a local government officer to take a risk? You know the job is 
difficult enough as it is, why would you want to do something which you couldn’t 
do as part of your day-to-day I mean it might get your name in lights but it 
ultimately it also might nosedive. From a member point of view unless you could 
see some significant tangible benefit then why do it. I think it’s partly the fear of 
doing anything radical, partly lack of knowledge, Partly about being too busy in 
the day job to think about it and its one of those powers that acted when you 
used it and demonstrated how it can be used then you know once you’ve done 
it once you can do it again. Probably in your search you may find out the 
marked dichotomy between some authorities who’ve either never heard of it 
and never used it and those who’ve used it several times because they’ve 
embraced it and seen its benefits and then go out actively to look at ways in 
which you can do it. Interestingly enough just by way of background, in 2003 the 
government themselves were concerned about it not being used and they 
themselves couldn’t understand that it hadn’t been used because they thought 
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that it would be taken up hugely. And they sort of looked at it three years on and 
thought we gave well local authorities were clamouring for greater powers and 
we’ve given them greater powers and they haven’t done anything with it. And 
they set up a forum with local authorities to look at ways it had been used and 
to try and promote- I got invited to a meeting in London because it was what I 
was talking about, ministerial local knowledge about the finance swap and so I 
got invited up and they produced a leaflet which was about case studies and I 
suppose the leaflet links in with your point of your question you ask about what 
facilitates, I think its actually about for all local authorities about what’s 
happened nationally you know to give people ideas and examples so you know 
promote them, and that’s effectively what happened so they produced a leaflet 
which I played a small part in drafting, and that was then in December of 2003 
they sent that round.. It was a Local Government Association document it was 
called ‘powering up: making the most of the power of well-being’. If you want 
that as part of your research I’m more than happy to do a copy and send it up 
for you. 
WH: That would be great, thank you. 
I: just give you a bit of context, I always remember the example I think it was 
Brighton or one of the Sussex counties or Sussex authorities; they 
manufactured and sold their own sun tan lotion under it. 
WH: Ah Hastings, yes. 
I: Hastings, yes thank you.  Yes well that’s the sort of thing people can identify 
with I mean not all local authorities are on the coast and could market sun tan 
lotion but that’s a classic example where you obviously had some officer who 
has thought outside the box, you know this is fantastic for well-being this is a 
health enhancing power and of course it raises money as well so it’s ideal.   
WH: Yes it was certainly innovative. 
I: it was, not that I ever saw the business model so I don’t know how long it 
worked but I just thought it was... 
WH: It was certainly different, the previous uses of the power that I, the most 
publicised ones that I’m aware of is kind of Essex with the post offices or Kent 
with the bus services and TV stations; so Hastings and their project is certainly 
a marked difference. Right so I mean we’ve kind of touched upon things that 
inhibit as well so what does your local authority do really to promote the use of 
the power because I know you mentioned at the start that perhaps some 
officers aren’t as knowledgeable about the power as others might be? 
I: I think I’d go back to my point that I made with Town A safe and Act now, that 
I think probably whether it’s the right thing or not probably not rather than say 
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writing around to all directors of services and saying oh by the way do you know 
there’s a power of well-being and how to use it, this is what it is, I think what 
we’ve got is a culture whereby in the current financial crisis thinking out the box 
and coming up with anything any ideas that you think might generate income for 
the authority on the basis we’ll worry about how we do it whether its legally right 
or not, we’ll worry about that afterwards but you know in the current time of 
huge financial stringencies anything you can come up with which might deliver 
some kind of financial or economic benefit for the area hopefully things like the 
sun tan lotion can also generate income for the authority as well. 
WH: Yes, and do you think it was a specific problem which lies at the root of the 
power that it didn’t have the ability to raise finance attached to it? 
I: absolutely absolutely, I think there’s a fundamental flaw in the act with the 
belief that in some way if its prime motive was to raise money then it was 
wrong.  I think that was all about the other cases you’ll have looked at, the watt 
cases and so on, all of that still left the government fundamentally nervous that 
if you allowed local authority government to have a power that was primarily to 
engage in all sort of reckless business ventures, then I think unfortunately you 
know that might have been the prudent way to do things but I think it just put 
people off. And probably I would say that’s another reason as to what inhibited 
it, not necessarily in our authority but what inhibited it nationally was people 
saying, well you know if we don’t I mean ideally you get a sun tan lotion idea 
which is picking up on a social and environmental well-being issue, and oh by 
the way we get money out of it but you know I think, the government should 
have as I say issued a general power of competence saying you know local 
government we’re trusting you. To me it’s always felt like one of those things 
that’s neither one thing nor the other, a compromise I suppose I would call it, 
you know you’re saying to your local authority ‘you know brave new world we 
want you to go out and do all these things, ah but, and um, it’s a bit like meeting 
your daughters new boyfriend, you know oh yes hes absolutely lovely darling, 
yes he’s lovely but if I were you I wouldn’t do’.  You know it doesn’t work, you’ve 
either got to be wholly enthusiastic or you say not. Yeah by the way you can 
have him but we put these restrictions on it. It doesn’t send the right message. 
WH: Would I, I’m correct in assuming that the 2000 Act and specifically the well-
being power, did that make obsolete certain sections of the 1973 local 
government act, specifically sections 137 which allowed a discretionary 
spending limit? 
I: Yes, yes it did. 
WH: So it actually, it took away the ability to offer discretionary finance. 
I: Yes quite 
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WH: Okay thank you, so that kind of emphasises the point really I suppose, so I 
mean we’ve almost in a sense already talked about it but in your opinion do you 
believe the power of well-being is sufficient to genuinely allow for local 
innovation and creativity in designing initiatives? 
I: I mean, yes it does, I don’t think anything within the general, in the well-being 
power stifles innovation or creativity as the examples in the leaflet you’ll have 
read about indicate. You know people thought long and hard about it and there 
was plenty you could do with innovation, one of the ones which wasn’t 
particularly innovatory but we thought about, was using the well-being power, 
we were going to do a joint bid to, in fact we did do a joint bid to manage the 
trunk roads in XXXXX with a private sector partner and use the well-being 
power to justify that. And we couldn’t have used, if it was, obviously the nature 
of the contract was going to be joint liability and we were advised we could use 
the well-being power to take on a potential liabilities of the private company 
through a contract so I think that the examples are when you sit down and think 
about it there’s lots of things you could do about it I don’t, it’s one of those 
conundrums that I’ve just talked about in terms of apart from the restrictions 
apart from that you do scratch your head and wonder why it didn’t happen other 
than the fact that maybe it needed to be launched , it needed to be examples 
given, and given far more publicity and promotion across the pace. And sort of 
three years afterwards we produced the leaflet went out to other local 
authorities which in itself was probably too late and probably wasn’t enough. But 
certainly I’m sure you’ll find examples with your contacts and through your 
research you’ll find authorities that were very creative about it, and didn’t find, 
yes of course certain things that LAML has proved is that restrictions with the 
well-being power prevented them delivering what they wanted to deliver but 
there was still within what you could do a huge amount of innovation and 
creativity that authorities could have brought in. 
WH: So what do you think central government could do to encourage local 
authorities to promote greater use of the power of well-being? 
I: well, what in fact, if the general power of competence does come forward in 
the autumn, between now and the end of November, what, how does that 
impact on your research if you don’t mind me asking a question? 
WH: not at all, no believe me it’s a question I’m having to ask myself. There is, 
I’m having to shall we say, address a significant portion of my research looking 
at the power of general competence as well but I can’t really, well, there’s either 
two scenarios, the first is that either I look at the power of general competence 
as well, but I can’t do anything to do with that until the draft bill is published 
which I hear is going to be the week beginning 15th November but equally so 
I’ve just heard that the localism bill is going to be so innovative and radical that 
it actually needs more time to be worked through CLG. So either I look at both 
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the powers together or I look at specifically the power of well-being and my 
thesis and my research is just basically a snapshot of ten years of local 
government innovation, or thirteen years actually. 
I: yes, well its everyone’s worst nightmare isn’t it how everything can change 
during the course of writing of a thesis or a project. But that’s something 
fundamentally affecting yours as the power of general competence it is 
unfortunate, unfortunate timing, but I suppose my answer to that would be of 
course, that’s why I asked the question to you I don’t know I don’t think you can 
separate them out because clearly if the power of general competence comes 
in then at the end of the day of course there’s lots of radical stuff which fails, it 
does fail and bring down something everybody agrees with but I don’t think 
there’s anyone who is opposed to the general power of competence.  I think 
that should come through, but of course you could say there’s a lot of 
provisional bills that don’t get the necessary support but again looking at the 
ideal scenario if the general power of competence comes in I think then that 
effectively that would be the death knell for the power of well-being, if it doesn’t, 
then I think in a sense you would hope the government would use the fact that 
having the general powers of competence not being enacted then the 
government the fallback position would be well I’m sorry local government that’s 
all very sad but, and then you almost re-launch it, and maybe of course the 
2000 act if the localism bill fails then the lets give that act then itself can be 
amended and talk about financial restrictions but in the meantime I think the 
only thing you can do is almost what they tried to do in 2003 but bigger and 
better. 
WH: Yeah, well one thing I am seeking to do from the thesis is if the general 
power of competence, or power of general competence as it might be, not sure 
about the legislative differences in terms, but what lessons that have been 
learned from the power of well-being can inform the use of the power of general 
competence? 
I: I think that’s sensible. 
WH: How do you think cuts in public sector expenditure are likely to affect the 
role? 
I: My view is that I think it could enhance it, because I think what you are seeing 
across the public sector at the moment is that people are being radical and are 
thinking all sorts of things and sort of the, specific example is we are, certainly 
one part of the A30 into the county is not being dualled, and effectively its 
ongoing, the highways agency obviously look after the A30 and our chief exec  
said why should we be cowering down and batten down the hatches and we 
haven’t got much money, and let’s not do very much, it’s actually no lets be 
bold, and say ok lets use this time as an opportunity, there might not be as 
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much government central funding to do certain projects but that’s why we’ve 
been looking for opportunities with the private sector to do major projects 
together so why can’t we go into partnership with a civil engineering contractor 
and look to take over the A30 and do the maintenance and therefore look 
potentially at ways of doing the dual carriageways on the A30? So that’s just 
one example and of course if you’re going to do something like that, something 
as radical as that then of course the first thing would be well what are our 
powers, and I’m absolutely certain we’ll look at the powers of well-being. So I 
think you’ll find, I may be proved wrong, but rather than say oh we’ve got no 
money we can’t do anything, and we haven’t got the funds and we can’t afford 
to do anything radical, I think we should go a different way and say we need to 
do more in partnership with the private and voluntary sector and other public 
sector agencies like health and the police, I think will make people and possibly 
have greater reliance on the power. 
WH: yeah, well that’s I mean that’s quite interesting the dualling of the A30, I 
would suspect that nobody would really question it, I mean that’s the ultimate 
question with rulings, I mean why- 
I: why challenge it? Yeah of course it’s always, that’s an issue that we lawyers 
have with those who are responsible for doing things, I’ve had to have a 
conversation with a chief exec on numerous occasions about who will challenge 
it but of course that’s difficult for me as monitoring officer because it doesn’t 
matter whether someone will challenge or not if I don’t think its lawful we 
shouldn’t be doing it, and then we get into the question of whether its lawful or 
unlawful and then if it’s arguable there’s a risk it may be challenged but I think 
people like myself, and quite rightly, are being pushed by the party majors to 
look for the most wide application of powers in order to do things that as you 
say, nobody in reality is ever going to challenge because everybody wants it. 
And that’s the interesting thing about the power of well-being and using it and 
one of the things that’s, backtracking a little bit, but one of the reasons why 
early on the power of well-being was not used as much as it should have been 
is that local authorities, it was sold as and local authorities interpreted it as the 
power of last resort, and one of the things that this group I was part of in 2003 
looked at was actually of course, power of well-being should be the first resort. 
The confusion was of course as you know you couldn’t use the power of well-
being if something else, if there was a power, or a prohibition against it, and 
most people took the view that, sorry, a bit of law, but to be specific, if there was 
a specific power which was similar to what you wanted to do but didn’t allow you 
to do what you wanted to do then you couldn’t use the well-being power for it. 
And I think of course one of the messages the govt wanted to get across in 
2003 was of course actually that’s the completely wrong way to look at it, what 
you should be doing is saying actually, unless there is an express prohibition in 
that other piece of legislation then look to the 2000 act as being your primary 
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power to do something, don’t look for something else and say oh we’ll fill in the 
gaps with the well-being powers, be bold and say no the well-being powers are 
there to do it, let’s do it. And unless there is a specific piece of legislation which 
looks like it carries an express prohibition then just ignore it or use it as an 
ancillary subsidiary power. 
WH: Excellent, that’s really quite interesting, obviously I’ve heard that the 
perception that the power of well-being should be perceived as the power of first 
resort. So I mean, how do you think efforts could be further increased, to 
increase well-being could be further developed rather? 
I: I suppose that goes back to what I’ve said previously, which is I actually think 
you know you take the approaches of today and, almost local authorities are 
backing up the message of the chief executive which is to say you’ve been 
asked to look at radical ways at which the authority might raise money or cut 
costs or whatever, and you know you may be thinking that because you’ve got 
good local authority officers and you’ve grown up knowing you have to have an 
express specific power to do anything, the thing I started this conversation with, 
but use the 2000 act then as your specific power and be aware of how wide it is 
for you. Or if you don’t know the details, don’t be constrained in looking at the 
radical, by oh gosh have we got the legal power for it, don’t worry about that, 
we’ve got this wide power in the background, think of the radical, we’ve got the 
well-being power, we’ll advise you on it, come to us and we’ll tell you if you can 
use it or not. So, and that’s the important thing and I suppose the second thing 
is always again, what I’ve said previously-  the best way of advertising how 
effective something is, to use it once and get it right. 
WH: Yes, definitely. 
I: it’s something that works, and I think unfortunately in the example I gave you 
before where we joined with a private sector company looking after the trunk 
road maintenance, that one we did use it but the bid was unsuccessful, and so 
that went by the board, and obviously my finance one with health didn’t work 
out, that went by the board, so of course that’s the difficulty, you try something 
and you get something radical and you look at the well-being powers and its oh, 
not quite, I’m sorry, nearly there but not there, but also then that has a risk, 
people think it’s the answer to everything but it isn’t. Every authority needs to 
find something, needs to find a project where it works and then that advertises it 
to other officers out there, other members out there, looking at other potential 
projects. 
WH: Thank you very much, it’s been great, very useful, is there anything you 
think I might have missed that you think might be useful? 
I: No I think it’s a good comprehensive list of questions. 
